THE CHINESE FROM INDONESIA

The History of a Minority

PATRICIA TJIOOK-LIEM

ROUTLEDGE



Chinese Indonesian Heritage Center

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The History of a Minority

Patricia Tjiook-Liem

Translated by Linawati Sidarto

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Introduction

Without a recorded history, you will be forgotten. Without knowledge of the general history, you cannot understand your own history. This book, an initiative of the Chinese Indonesian Heritage Center Foundation (CIHC), was created with these thoughts in mind.

At some point in their lives, people with Chinese Indonesian roots may well have posed the questions 'why, how, and what?' with respect to their heritage. They may seek a deeper understanding and want to know more about family stories already told. These questions arise whether or not they were born in Indonesia, have close ties with their (grand)parents' birth country, or are still familiar with the country's language and culture.

What was behind the decision to stay, or to leave for a new life in another part of the world? These are questions related to developments in the past that influenced – or defined – the lives of past and current generations.

This book, in which the Chinese from Indonesia play a central role, provides the background and context to the many and diverse personal histories. According to the 1930 census, the Chinese made up 1.4 per cent of the population in Java and Madura, and 2 per cent of the total Dutch East Indies population. A small part of this group decided to leave Indonesia in the twentieth century. As a destination, the Netherlands was often at the top of the list due to the long-standing colonial ties and the Dutch language and education. Others made different choices and went to China, other European countries, or different parts of the world such as Australia, the US, Canada, Brazil, and Suriname. Sometimes, their migration did not end in one country, but continued on to others. The last chapter of this book describes the accounts of Chinese Indonesian migrants in the Netherlands.

The Chinese were part of Dutch history in the latter's East Indies colony from the time the Dutch East India Company (VOC) established its first trading centre in Batavia. The first contact between the Chinese and the VOC in 1619 marked the beginning of a shared history, which, until the late nineteenth century, took place mainly in the economic sphere. From those initial VOC years in the archipelago, the role given to the Chinese within the VOC grew into an indelible position in the colonial economy. Starting at the dawn of the twentieth century, this position changed and, in addition to economics, Dutch education became an important link with the Netherlands. In their quest for more knowledge and development, Dutch education was essential for the Chinese in colonial society. Beginning in the late nineteenth century, the first Chinese from Indonesia came to the Netherlands to pursue higher education.

The history of the Chinese in Indonesia described in this book begins in 1619 with the first contact mentioned above. The history I describe ends in 1966–1967, when,

in Indonesia, the period under President Sukarno ended and President Suharto's *Orde Baru* (New Order) era began. For the Netherlands, the bond with Indonesia ended several years earlier with a rift between the two countries as a result of the New Guinea issue. The territory was ceded to Indonesia in 1963. The deteriorating living environment for Chinese people in the Indonesian Republic presented them with difficult choices. Like their seventeenth-century forefathers, who were seeking a better life beyond their homeland, some of the Chinese in Indonesia in the 1950s and 1960s were looking for a new future. They hoped to find it in, among other places, the Netherlands.

In describing nearly three-and-a-half centuries of history, I pay attention to developments that were important or distinctive to the Chinese in different periods. Those developments, sometimes turning points or fault lines in their history, do not necessarily have the same significance as, or coincide with, the history of the Dutch and Indonesian people or other groups. Conversely, the same is true. In addition to striving for an overview, it is also important to gain insight into the course of this history in order to better understand it. Consequently, the history of the Chinese from Indonesia has the character of a biography: a life history of a minority group. As in a biography, various aspects of the central figure's life history are highlighted, especially the significant events and experiences that shaped that life. It is a story about the pull of migration, about seizing opportunities and making a move, about dealing with adversity and success, about the pursuit of knowledge, about identity and nationality, and much more. It is a story about a population that has long lived within the tension of colonial society, in which ethnicity and differences in origin and culture were important distinguishing factors. Depending on who was in power – the Dutch, Japanese, or Indonesian – Chinese descent and culture took on different meanings at different times. This, in turn, changed the position of the Chinese in society.

The first two chapters cover the period of the VOC and that of the colonial state until the end of the nineteenth century. The Chinese economic position was formed during this period. It took shape in a society dominated by the pursuit of profit, and later revenue for the treasury. The third chapter (1900–1942) is dominated by the pursuit of education, the removal of restrictive and discriminatory regulations, and a growing political awareness. It was a period of emancipation. The fourth chapter is about education for the Chinese during this era of emancipation. This is followed by chapters on the Japanese occupation (1942–1945) and the Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949), two periods of transition towards the Indonesian Republic. The concluding chapter on the history of the Chinese as it plays out in Indonesia relates to their position as a minority in the Republik Indonesia. The last part is about the Chinese who came to the Netherlands from the late nineteenth century, mainly to study.

The history described here mainly covers the situation in Java. With its capital Jakarta (then Batavia), Java was the centre of administration and trade in the

archipelago, and government policy towards the Chinese was based on that situation. Dutch authority was not extended to the outer regions until the late nineteenth century. The general and often entirely different situation of the Chinese on other islands, such as Sumatra and Borneo, is included only insofar as it is relevant. This means, for example, that the situation of the Chinese contract workers – the 'coolies' on the tobacco plantations of Deli in Sumatra – is beyond the scope of this book. The same applies to the Chinese *kongsi* (business) communities[1] in Borneo.

In constructing the book, I chose for cohesion rather than completeness. The broad outline is the chronological history with attention paid within it to aspects distinctive to the Chinese in each period. The common thread is what these distinctive events meant to them. In the general Dutch historiography about the Dutch East Indies and Indonesia, the Chinese are barely mentioned. Unjustly, in my opinion, because during the centuries-long Dutch presence in the colony, and afterwards, they played an important and sometimes essential role in the economy. The same lack of attention is evident when it comes to their social role and significance. This gap in Dutch colonial and postcolonial history means that the descendants of these Chinese cannot learn about, understand, and identify with their own history, and, consequently, they cannot pass it on. Fortunately, historians and writers – within and especially beyond Dutch borders – have conducted in-depth research on specific topics and periods in the history of the Chinese in Indonesia. These publications have been informative for this book. Also of value were the personal experiences garnered from interviews with several Chinese from Indonesia, like those in the CIHC's Oral History Archives. Biographical sketches of several Chinese figures who took important initiatives or played an important role in political or social life in the Dutch East Indies/Indonesia are also included in this book.

I am indebted and thankful to everyone who has contributed to this book. Their publications and research in different fields were invaluable to me. The same goes for those who have generously shared their personal histories, narratives, and experiences.

Terminology and Spelling

In terms of terminology and spelling, difficult choices had to be made when covering a period of nearly 350 years and three linguistic areas. Attention must be paid to political developments that led to different forms of state and regimes, and thus to different names. It is complex, for example, to deal with words that were common and embedded in laws during a certain period, but which later acquired a negative connotation and were preferably not used again. Sometimes, using these terms is unavoidable. Moreover, there are many changes due to new spelling guidelines and differences in spellings, not only in Dutch, but also in Indonesian and Chinese.

Uniformity is absent, for example, in the names of Chinese organisations. The word 'Chinese' is sometimes written as 'Tiong Hoa'; at other times it is 'Chung Hwa' or 'Tsung Hoa'. The term 'Hua Ch'iao,' which means overseas Chinese, is also used for the Chinese in Indonesia. The Chinese word for 'union' is sometimes written as 'Hui'; at other times it is 'Hwee,' depending on the use of Mandarin Chinese or the Hokkien dialect. It is impractical to give fixed rules for all these situations and spellings, or to sharply delineate when and how personal, association, geographical, place, and other names will be written in which way. For practical reasons, it has been decided to use terminology and spelling that is in accordance with what was customary in that period as much as possible. Where necessary, this is provided with a translation or explanation. Clarity and ease of reading are paramount.

Personal names of the Chinese in Indonesia are written in Romanized form as much as possible, as was customary at that time, i.e. in full and consecutively without a comma, starting with the family name: for example, Phoa Keng Hek, without a dash between the proper names. The then customary spelling for names of government leaders and high officials from China are retained, i.e. with a hyphen between the proper names, as in Chiang Kai-shek.

One general rule is that colonial terminology ended around 1942. In that terminology, for example, the Dutch were referred to as Europeans, Indonesians as 'Inlanders' or natives, and the Indies administration as the government. The Chinese, as people equated with Inlanders, fell under the group of Foreign Orientals. The new Indonesian spelling, in which, for example, the 'oe' was replaced by 'u,' is used as much as possible from 1942. The terms first and second Police Actions deserve attention. Replacement of these terms with, for example, 'military action' or 'decolonization war' is an ongoing discussion. In Indonesia, these actions are known as *Agresi Militer Belanda* (Dutch military aggression). I have chosen to continue to use the term 'Police Action' in this book. An important consideration for this is that for readers beyond the academic world – those readers I also hope to reach with this book – these terms are established concepts. I am keen to avoid ambiguity or confusion as much as possible.

The Chinese: A Heterogeneous Group

The Chinese in Indonesia could differ – sometimes greatly – from one another because, for example, they belonged to different dialect groups, such as the Hokkiens, Hakkas, or Cantonese. These groups came from different regions of China's coastal provinces. They differed from each other not only in their dialects, but also in culture. Often, different groups were active in specific segments of society. In the Indonesian archipelago, they settled in groups on different islands. In Java, the Chinese population consisted mainly of Hokkiens.

The main distinction that emerges in this book is the one between *peranakans*, the long-established Chinese, and *totoks* or *singkehs*, the newcomers. The interpretation and explanation of the term *peranakan* versus *totok* is a complex matter because of the fluid boundaries between the two groups. Three distinctions are often used to differentiate them. First, the term *peranakan* generally refers to those Chinese born in Indonesia and who have settled there for a long time. The word *peranakan* contains the word *anak*, which means child in Indonesian. The Chinese migrants who came to Indonesia over the centuries until the second half of the nineteenth century were mainly men. The children born from unions between Chinese men and local women were called *peranakans*: children of the land. These *peranakan* households and (extended) families had sometimes already settled in Indonesia for generations, and the mixed *peranakan* culture that developed had both Chinese and Indonesian elements.

Generational settlement outside China led to a second distinguishing feature: language. In general, *peranakans* no longer spoke Chinese, but used the local language, i.e. Malay. In the twentieth century, as Chinese children gained access to Dutch education, mastery of the Dutch language became more likely. Some *peranakan* children attended Dutch primary and secondary education, and some went on to Dutch higher education. It is mainly these *peranakan* Chinese from Indonesia – who spoke Dutch as well as Malay (later Indonesian) – who came to the Netherlands.

Besides being born in Indonesia and speaking the local language, descent is another important difference between *peranakans* and *totoks*. *Totoks* were considered to be of 'pure' Chinese descent. For most *totoks*, China was their country of origin, and also their country of birth. They still spoke the Chinese language, which allowed them to maintain ties with China. Culturally, they were considered to still be fully Chinese and oriented towards China.

A fourth difference between *peranakans* and *totoks* was added after the establishment of the Chinese Nationality Law in 1909. That law based Chinese nationality on descent from a Chinese father and made all Chinese, regardless of their country of birth, Chinese citizens. *Peranakans* were simultaneously Dutch subjects because of their birth in Indonesia. After the transfer of sovereignty on 27 December 1949, they became Indonesian or Dutch citizens with Chinese nationality. Thus, they had dual nationality. Most *totoks* had only Chinese nationality. These terms appear further on in the book, and I hope that this explanation provides some clarity.

As part of this CIHC initiative, several team members conducted research in certain areas. This research has been incorporated into this book. In alphabetical order: I thank Ing Lwan Taga-Tan, Boen Tan, and Yap Kioe Bing for their contribution, enthusiasm, observations, and critical comments. Kioe Bing provided the visual material that has enriched the book. I am grateful to Henk Schulte Nordholt for reading and commenting on the material relating to the 1942–1949 period. This was invaluable to me. From the beginning, the CIHC envisioned a book that had

to be accessible and easy to read, despite the relatively uncharted nature of this history, and its particular and sometimes complex aspects. This readability was important because we wanted, first and foremost, to inform our younger generations as well as a wider audience about this part of the colonial and postcolonial history of the Netherlands. Walburg Pers and its editors have made great efforts to achieve this. On behalf of the CIHC, I am very grateful to Jan-Peter Wissink, Annelies van der Meij, Lotte Akkerman, and all the other editors who were involved in this book. It was of great help to have my text seen through the eyes of others. It goes without saying that I alone am responsible for the content of this book and any shortcomings therein.

Since its release two years ago, the book has sought out and found its way to Dutch readers. With this English edition, I hope to meet the interest of readers beyond the Netherlands. I am very happy with Linawati Sidarto's vivid translation. Born and raised in Indonesia, she studied in the United States and is currently living in the Netherlands. She has worked as a journalist in Indonesia and the Netherlands, and is a valued CIHC team member.

Patricia Tjiook-Liem

I From Migrant to Major (1619–1800)

The Chinese and the Development of Their Economic Position in the VOC Period (1619–1800)

Long before Dutch ships sailed into the Indonesian archipelago in search of spices, Chinese people had already settled there. The official historiography of the Song dynasty (960–1279) already described Chinese houses in Java. There was already trade even then.[1] Taking advantage of the monsoon winds, the Chinese sailed their junks from the coastal provinces southwards to Nanyang,[2] the name they used



1.1. Trade routes to Southeast Asia.



1.2. The different Chinese dialects in Fujian province.

Many Chinese living in Java originally came from the southern Fujian province. In the area around Amoy (now Xiamen), the Minnan (southern Min) dialect is spoken. This dialect is usually called 'Hokkien'.

to designate Southeast Asia. In the Indonesian archipelago, some small Chinese settlements had developed along the sailing routes over time, such as in Banten and Sunda Kelapa (later named Jacatra)[3] on the northern coast of Java.[4] There, apart from inter-Asian trade, the Chinese engaged in agriculture, including the cultivation of rice and pepper. The Chinese communities in Banten, Sunda Kelapa, and on Java's northeast coast were not isolated communities. Through their networks, they were connected to other ports within the archipelago and beyond, where relatives or relations also traded, and sometimes even held important positions locally.

The Chinese who had settled in the Indonesian archipelago were the link in the Asian trade of Chinese and East Indies goods. However, with the arrival of the Dutch East India Company (VOC), their role in the local economy changed. The VOC began its long-term settlement with the conquest of Jacatra. A trading centre

with the new name Batavia was to be built on that site. Initially, the VOC was mainly concerned with importing European goods and exporting Indies products to Europe. It tried to acquire a monopoly for these Indies products, such as spices. With its ambitions to become a powerful wholesaler and monopolist, the VOC's interests lay both in the field of trade and in areas related to exploiting the local conditions as efficiently as possible. The VOC needed middlemen to liaise with the local population, to distribute the items they imported, and, later, to buy up and collect indigenous products for the European market. The Chinese became those intermediaries.

Besides their own trade activities, the Chinese then also became, simultaneously, the link with Europe and the link with local trade. They increasingly became the *trait-d'union*, a vital link between the West and the East, between European and indigenous societies, between foreign industry and the domestic market with its indigenous producers and consumers. The Chinese came to occupy an important place between the VOC and the local population. Wherever the VOC established itself as ruler, the Chinese also settled. After all, opportunities for trade or other economic activities arose there.[5]

Coen and the Chinese

After the VOC's victory over the prince of Banten – the ruler of Jacatra – in May 1619, the city had to be rebuilt and protected from the attacks expected from the rulers of Mataram and Banten. The Javanese population had also fled the city along with the prince. The remaining, already multicultural, population of Batavia came from all corners of Asia. Among them were some 400 Chinese. The idea of Jan Pieterszoon Coen, the governor-general at the time, to make Batavia a European colony did not come to fruition because the *Heren XVII* (Gentlemen Seventeen, the VOC board of directors) in the Netherlands did not allow European citizens to trade on their own in the Indonesian archipelago for fear that they would undermine the VOC's trade monopolies.

It soon became clear to Coen that in order to become an established and flourishing trading centre, military dominance was only the beginning. Labour, craftsmen, and agricultural and horticultural workers were needed not only to rebuild the city, but also for trade and food supply. The VOC and its employees were outnumbered by the various eastern ethnic groups in Batavia and the indigenous population outside the city. The VOC was also unfamiliar with the languages and cultures of the eastern populations it was dealing with, which made it difficult for the Westerners to establish contacts. Coen decided to bring the Chinese into the city. They had been established in the region for a long time and had the necessary local

and international contacts. They knew their way around the region and its people. Through them, the VOC would gain access to trading partners in international and local trade, and to producers and consumers. Moreover, the Chinese would become the intermediaries in relations with the inhabitants of Batavia and other population groups.

Gradually, the VOC's territory on Java extended eastwards to the land of Cirebon, westwards to the border of Bantam, northwards to the Java Sea, and southwards to the Indian Ocean. At first, Coen attempted to lure the Chinese to Batavia from surrounding areas, such as Banten, Cirebon, and Jepara, by promising them proper treatment and rights, and freedom from toll payments. This was opposed by the prince of Banten, who recognized that trade there would decline if the Chinese left. Banten, then an important staple town, was home to about 2,000 Chinese who were engaged in trade and growing pepper and rice. However, Coen soon managed to replace Banten with Batavia as a staple town, and thus Chinese traders settled in Batavia. By 1620, the number of Chinese inhabitants in Batavia had risen from 400 to 900, and by 1627 to 3,500. The Chinese settled both within the city walls and outside, where – despite the roaming wild animals that made the area unsafe – they engaged in agriculture and horticulture, with arrack distilleries and sugar mills.[6] Other means were also employed to get even more Chinese to Batavia. Jacques Specx, head of the VOC settlement in Japan, was ordered to promote Chinese migration. Trade from China was to be directed to Batavia whenever possible, to which end blockades were set up in other ports. In Batavia, the passengers and crew on junks were persuaded or, when necessary, forced to stay behind in the city. Even kidnapping was tolerated. This was evident when Coen sent commander Cornelis Reyersz to China in 1622 with orders to abduct and bring as many men, women, and children as possible from the Chinese coast. Most of the 571 people who were taken away during these raids, or captured from junks, died on the way to Batavia, leaving only 33 survivors.[7] By bringing Chinese people to Batavia, either by dangling the carrot or wielding the stick, the VOC was able to meet its manpower needs.

During the first VOC period, Coen's positive attitude towards the Chinese was noteworthy, not least because he had a reputation for tough and ruthless actions whenever he saw fit. He described the Chinese as industrious and unarmed, and not posing a threat to anyone. He did not allow them to be treated badly or arbitrarily by Europeans, neither by the Dutch nor by the British. They had to be treated well 'in order to continue developing trade in Batavia'. The Dutch wasted no time in closely involving the Chinese in the VOC's economic activities. In the early years of the VOC, three institutions crucial to these endeavours were established, the first one being the institution of Chinese officers. The second one was the *pacht,* a system of leasing and farming out different government monopolies and rights

to individuals and third parties. The last one was the institution of *particuliere landerijen* or private estates. Usefulness and necessity characterized these policies.

When he stepped down in 1623, Coen believed that there were 'no people in the world who could serve us better than the Chinese'. The early policy of protection and favouritism soon caused much discontent among the city's other populations. Nevertheless, that could not prevent this policy from laying the foundation for the position of the Chinese during the VOC period. Indeed, the three institutions would be of great significance for the VOC administration, and later for the colonial administration.

Three Institutions

Good governance, peace, and order were essential for the VOC to develop a favourable trading climate. In doing so, it was important to take into account Batavia's multi-ethnic population. The VOC's unfamiliarity with Java's different languages and cultures required differentiated treatment and various adjustments. A head was appointed for each ethnic group, both for groups from the archipelago itself, such as Balinese, Bandanese and Ambonese, and those from outside, such as the Chinese and Arabs. One of the chief's duties was to maintain peace and order within his own community. In this system of indirect administration, the chief also acted as an intermediary and mediator between the VOC administration and the population group he represented.

For the growing Chinese population, the first chief was appointed as early as six months after the conquest of Jacatra by the resolution of 11 October 1619. It was the merchant So Beng Kong,[8] also known as Benҫon, who was given the title 'captain of the Chinese'. This appointment marked the birth of the institution of Chinese officers, which would not be abolished until the twentieth century. Although So Beng Kong was given the military title of captain, he had no military duties and responsibilities, but rather administrative and economic ones. The captain had no involvement in military affairs, as the Chinese were exempted from services for the Batavia Fort and the militia by paying a head tax,[9] instituted in October 1620. This was a precautionary measure to keep the Chinese far away from military training and weapons. The native chiefs, on the other hand, had to provide manpower to the VOC in wartime.

As the conquest of Jacatra resulted in high expenditures and costs, Coen was well aware that the VOC had to seek sources of income. To this end, the levying of taxes and its collection through the lease system (*pacht*) were introduced. Thus, this system of leasing or outsourcing government revenues used in the Netherlands in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was also adopted in the East Indies. This

system – different from what is currently referred to as *pacht*[10] in the Netherlands – involved national and city governments 'leasing' or farming out their monopoly rights to private individuals. In other words, the government's monopoly on collecting duties and other taxes was sold to individuals.[11] In Batavia, the Chinese chief was brought in to collect taxes on all kinds of economic activities in and around the city, starting with the head tax for the Chinese. The leasing system reached its peak in the nineteenth century with the *opiumpacht* (opium lease), which only ended around 1920.

The lease system was soon linked to the institution of Chinese officers. The system established the structure that would characterize the cooperation between the Dutch administration and the institution of Chinese officers. So Beng Kong and all subsequent Chinese officers were officially appointed by the governor-general. As the Chinese chief, they held an office with great authority among their people. Between the instalment of the post in 1619 to its abolition in the 1930s, there were two periods without Chinese officers. The first was under Governor-General Maetsuycker (1653–1678), when he did not appoint a successor to Captain Siqua after his death in 1666. Instead, he allowed the captain's widow-concubine, a Balinese, to fill the post for twelve years, much to the discontent of the male Chinese population. Maetsuycker, unlike his predecessors and later successors, was not very taken with the Chinese and the policy of favouritism. He also did not appoint a second Chinese member to the *Schepenbank* (College of Aldermen) after Captain Siqua's death. The second time no Chinese officer was appointed was after the Chinese killings in 1740 in Batavia. Captain of the Chinese Nie Hoe Kong was exiled, and the position was only filled in 1743 with a new appointment.

As the Chinese population increased in Batavia and beyond, more Chinese officers were appointed. In Java's three capitals – Batavia,[12] Semarang, and Surabaya – the institution of Chinese officers took the form of a Chinese Council, the Kong Koan. As early as 1633, the captain in Batavia was supported by a lieutenant. A second lieutenant followed in 1639, and two more lieutenants were added in 1689 and 1706. In 1837, the first 'major of the Chinese' was appointed in Batavia. The major, the highest in rank, acted as leader of the Chinese community and was the chairman of the Kong Koan. As a governing body, the Batavia Kong Koan played a mediating role between the Dutch authority and the Chinese community. For the Chinese community, the council acted as its own institution in charge of matters concerning the Chinese community. In 1717, the Kong Koan started giving written permission for Chinese marriages. It registered marriages, divorces, and deaths until a civil registry for the Chinese was established in 1917 (operational in 1919) by the colonial government. This registry office was linked to, and resulted from, the declaration of the applicability of European family and inheritance law to the Chinese in that year. Furthermore, the Kong Koan in Batavia managed the city's

Chinese cemeteries and temples. It managed the council's financial affairs and Chinese education, and gave advice to the colonial administration.[13]

Chinese officers had an unpaid position. In the early VOC years, the captain of the Chinese, So Beng Kong, received compensation in the form of a share in the tax collection proceeds, such as the collection of head tax. Later, this right of collection was leased out, mostly to Chinese officers. The lease provided access to some very fertile sources of income.

A leaseholder had to pay for the lease, and thus received the right to collect the relevant taxes or other duties such as tolls. In Batavia, one of the most important levies in that early period was the right to the *boom*:[14] the levy on incoming and outgoing goods that had to be paid whenever a ship passed a wooden crossing bar. In March 1622, this right to the boom was leased to a Chinese. Other levies and leases established by the VOC were the rights to the weighing house (1626) and the bread setting (1631), the right to make *cassies/pitchies* (loose change) (1633), and the salt monopoly (on preparing and selling salt). Later, other leases were added such as the *pasarpacht* (levying market fees), the exclusive right to buy up all native products in certain districts, fishing rights, a lease on Chinese and Javanese tobacco, and the levying of tolls on certain roads or rivers, river crossings, and toll bridges. Others include lease proceeds on *wayang* (puppets) games, arrack, rum and *tjoe*,[15] the slaughter of pigs and sale of pork, the slaughter of cattle and buffaloes, and lease income on birds' nest cliffs and on pawn shops.[16] Some leases were specifically for the Chinese, such as those for dice games (from 1633 onwards), and for the *pho* and *topho games*.[17] Leaseholders were often Chinese. The chief – the captain of the Chinese – was first in line for the lease. In the nineteenth century, opium leases were auctioned off, which allowed for a substantial increase in their rent revenue.

This system, where the government sought assured income and leaseholders aimed at maximizing profits from their investments, opened the way to abuse. Commoners were the victims as they faced these levies and taxes in their daily existence or livelihood. Abuse could lead to a lease being abolished, but what also happened was that –due to practical or economic considerations – the same lease was reinstated after some time.[18]

Until the late nineteenth century, an appointment as a Chinese officer was highly sought after. In the early VOC period, this was accompanied by the giving of gifts, even to the extent that an appointment sometimes took on the character of being 'bought'. Also, on appointment, Chinese officers had to pay recognition fees[19] that benefited the Chinese hospital. Subsequently, the relationship between Chinese officers and the top of the Dutch administration was maintained with regular, and sometimes extraordinarily expensive, gifts to the colonial administrators. The appointment of a Chinese officer was a festive occasion attended by Dutch officials. The administration preferred to appoint Chinese officers from prominent

and wealthy families. Apart from the criterion of wealth, there were no guidelines or clear criteria for selecting candidates. Personal preferences and self-interest seemed to play important roles in the selection process.[20]

The third institution through which the Chinese gained an important role in the economy was the institution of the *particuliere landerijen,* or the private estates. These estates were vast plots of uncultivated and cultivated arable land, which were ceded by the VOC administration to private individuals since its early days. Initially, these plots were acquired free of charge, though later it was in the form of a sale. One special feature of the private estates was that ownership of the plots came with 'lordly' rights. This meant that these European, Chinese, and Arab landowners could exercise governmental rights and powers on their private estates. These landowners, also known as *tuan tanah* (landlords), had the right to levy taxes from the 'residents'[21] and impose lordship services.[22] The condition of the land and its residents depended on what the landowner had in mind for the development of the land.

During the VOC period, ownership of private estates was encouraged for a long time, especially when the administration needed money. Estate owners were obliged to cultivate these 'wastelands', which could be a heavy burden. Knowledge and expertise were required, labour was needed, roads had to be built, and their safety and that of their workers had to be ensured. In effect, this construction placed part of a government's task – development and opening up uncultivated land – on the landlords' shoulders. The landlords' capital and manpower, their mercantile spirit, and their ability to attract workers and make these labourers live and work on the land as indentured servants, could lead to successful enterprises. Besides improving general conditions, the land increased in value, potentially making the landlord very rich and powerful.[23]

Both the lease system and the institution of private estates were often intertwined with the institution of Chinese officers. In West Java, where private estate ownership was most common, many Chinese officers were landowners. In Central and East Java, Chinese officers were often leaseholders.

Peace and Order

Appointing a Chinese officer, who was accountable to the VOC administration, as chief of his people was one measure to maintain peace and order. Another was the way the administration of justice was regulated. The European legal system, introduced from the Netherlands, was exclusively for VOC people, and did not include Chinese and other non-European populations. In the field of justice, the Chinese chief was given the authority to handle minor cases among Chinese

residents, while major or complicated cases were submitted to the *Schepenbank* (College of Aldermen). This college was established on 24 June 1620, to administer justice to Chinese and other foreign citizens who were not VOC subjects. The College included two Chinese as extraordinary members. They were tasked with giving advice and information in cases involving Chinese.[24]

The Chinese were allowed to retain their own family law and law of inheritance,[25] derived from their own traditions and customs. This 'policy of abstinence' was based on the idea that disturbing these traditions and customs would only lead to unrest and resistance. As long as these traditions and customs did not conflict with the VOC administration's regulations and interests, it was deemed unnecessary to change or interfere with them. In 1761, at the request of the VOC administration, the Chinese family law and law of inheritance – which differed greatly from the European system, was recorded as *Chinaas regt* (Chinese laws) by Aldermen Secretary Pieter Haksteen, with the cooperation of the captain of the Chinese Oei Tsi Lauw. This previously unrecorded law was to serve as a guideline for the College of Aldermen, which no longer had Chinese advisers by that time.[26] The validity of this Chinese family law and law of inheritance came to an end in 1917, when the colonial administration declared European family law and law of inheritance, with some exceptions, applicable to Chinese people.

Migration

Throughout the VOC period, mainly Chinese from Fujian[27] came to Java. Fujian's geographical location lent itself perfectly to seafaring and the closely associated overseas trade. Fujian province itself was not particularly fertile, as the land was cut off from the hinterland by high mountains. In the coastal area, there was too little arable land to fill the hungry stomachs of the population. Famines were frequent. Daily food consisted mainly of taro (a root vegetable) and sweet potatoes. There was a chronic shortage of rice. Early on, the Fujianese were forced to import rice from neighbouring provinces. A well-known expression relating to the Fujianese was 'the sea is their rice field'.[28]

Behind them lay the hills and mountains, in front of them lay the seas that connected them to Korea, Japan, and Southeast Asia. The people depended largely on overseas trade for their livelihoods. Tea from the mountainous hinterland, forest products such as bamboo, indigo, paper, silk, and the famous white porcelain, called 'blanc de Chine' by Europeans, all found their way to overseas buyers. This trade was a centuries-long process of economic expansion, and resulted in social and economic networks that played a crucial role in migration. In February, they sailed south with the monsoon winds to the Strait of Malacca, the passageway

connecting the South China Sea with the Indian Ocean, only to return in June, with the returning monsoon winds.[29]

The coastal province of Fujian was home to the Hokkien Chinese, who came to Java as migrants. Shipping between Fujian and Batavia was called *jonkenvaart* (junk shipping). Large and smaller junks carried not only products for the city of Batavia, but also many labourers. The latter were sometimes considered the most important cargo. Indeed, the policy of the VOC administrators was to limit migration from China to Batavia as much as possible to workers from this coastal province.

The link between Fujian and Batavia was so strong that it has been characterized by historian and sinologist Leonard Blussé as an umbilical cord. In junk shipping, there were sometimes close ties between the Dutch administration and the owners of the Chinese shipping companies who sent their ships to the Indonesian archipelago. Gifts were exchanged, and cooperation from the administration was sought to enable the junks to return to China within the monsoon period. It was important to leave on time to reach the home port with the monsoon wind blowing. Being stranded in another port meant that the ship owner had to equip another ship for the next trip.[30]

On both sides of the Fujian–Batavia umbilical cord, circumstances determined the scale of migration. Until the mid-nineteenth century, migration from China would have two limiting 'enemies'.[31] The first was the culture of ancestor worship, and the second was the imperial prohibitions on migration. Until about 1850, the duty placed on sons, and especially the eldest son, to look after ancestral graves would be a major obstacle in the decision to leave China. Migration was probably only seen as a solution when living conditions were very bad, or when the need arose.

The second obstacle was the policy of successive imperial dynasties to use legal bans and severe sanctions to stop the Chinese from leaving China. Upon return, a migrant could face death by beheading. Wars, such as the years-long civil war (1644–1680) following the transition from the Ming to the Qing dynasty, also had a major impact on imperial policy and junk shipping, and hence migration. The civil war was fought out on the Fujian coast between the Manchu, or Qing, dynasty and the Ming loyalists led by the rebel Koxinga, who at that time was based in Taiwan. During that war, overseas shipping was banned, and only coastal shipping was allowed. Only after the battle was decided and the rebels were defeated did junk shipping resume from Amoy to Batavia in 1684. At the same time, the imperial government knew that after the subjugation and pacification of the coastal regions, deep-seated anti-Manchu sentiments remained. Distrust of those who had settled outside China remained. These rebels could plot to overthrow the new imperial government. Although the Manchu authorities realized that junk shipping was the backbone of the coastal provinces' economy, and essential for political peace in the region, they did not shy away from completely restricting overseas junk shipping

when necessary.[32] Thus, junk shipping and migration depended on conditions in China. For Batavia, this decreasing and fluctuating supply of labour meant a decline in the economy. Free migration only became possible starting from the mid-nineteenth century in the aftermath of the Opium Wars, when China was forced to open up and free migration had to be allowed. Officially, the ban on migration was only lifted in 1894.

After peace returned to China around 1690 and regular junk shipping resumed, Batavia experienced a boom period. Trade ties between Batavia and Fujian's capital Amoy were officially restored in 1727. In Batavia, meanwhile, the VOC had succeeded in bringing its rival Banten, a formidable competitor in junk shipping from China and Japan, under its rule in 1683. The VOC thus became ruler of the Banten area. Batavia's hinterland, the Ommelanden, was pacified and could be developed. Chinese farm labourers and other workers were especially needed to operate the sugar mills following the strong growth of sugar cultivation.[33] This demand attracted large numbers of Chinese labourers. In the following years, junks brought many workers and a rich supply of Chinese merchandise to the Indian coasts. The VOC had to recognize that junk shipping provided a major contribution to the welfare and prosperity of Batavia and should be supported by all means possible.

Gradually, however, the increasing number of job-seeking Chinese setting foot in Batavia became a problem.[34] The impossibility to control the arrival of the Chinese ('all sorts of scum', as they were then called) was a major concern for both the VOC administration and Batavia's Chinese elite. Additional registration and control measures followed, as well as measures to distinguish between the Chinese already settled in the city and the newcomers. Chinese men living in the city had to keep the traditional hairstyle with a crest on top of the head. The hairstyle of newcomers, the so-called Manchu queue with a shaven forehead and a braid, was banned. This unintentionally gave Batavia the reputation of being a refuge and safe haven for Ming loyalists, who refused to wear their hair as prescribed by the new Manchu regime.

Furthermore, to markedly limit the influx of migrants, junk skippers were told that they could no longer take passengers to Batavia. If they did, they could count on a fine. This total ban on immigration was completely unrealistic given the fluctuating demand for Chinese labour. Moreover, transporting passengers was the main source of income for ship owners: income from transporting labourers was higher than that from goods. Maximizing the numbers of new passengers on large junks and the smaller *wangkangs* (boat) did not help. Skippers dropped off their passengers on coastal strips where there was limited patrolling. To counter this, guards were placed at the mouths of several rivers. Registration by the authorities was unreliable: more Chinese entered Batavia and Java than could be registered.

The long list of regulations and restrictive measures showed that the authorities in Batavia were constantly, and mostly unsuccessfully, trying to get a grip on Chinese



1.3. Number of inhabitants in Batavia by population group, 1675–1785.

migration. At times it was allowed, or encouraged, because of labour needs, while at other times it was curbed. The effect of these push and pull factors on the Fujian population proved stronger than the administrative measures taken on both sides of the Fujian–Batavia trade route.[35] Migration from China was like a leaky tap fed by a large water supply. There were times of steady outflow, but every now and then the water spurted out. And even though the tap was properly turned off, it kept dripping.[36] This inability to control immigration was one of the causes of the Chinese massacre in 1740.

The Chinese Massacre of 1740

In the years leading up to 1740, increasingly stringent measures to limit Chinese immigration had yielded limited results. Corruption among both VOC officials and Chinese officers tasked with controlling and managing immigration was rampant. Invariably, they seized their duties in registration and control as an opportunity for corruption, deception, bribery, and extortion. People were more concerned with self-interest than with proper compliance. Also, the period before 1740 under Governor-General Diederik van Durven (1729–1732) had been one of much abuse and mistreatment for the Chinese. Van Durven's financial and organizational mismanagement had led to his dismissal. Batavia and the Chinese population within the city had gone through a difficult economic period. In the Ommelanden there was too little work for the wandering groups of newly arrived Chinese. If there were disturbances, the finger was always pointed at them.

The stricter measures to control immigration in place from 1727 also affected the Chinese who had settled in Batavia for some time, many of whom lived within the city walls. Like many new migrants, they needed a permit to stay in the East Indies. In the Ommelanden, the Chinese were forced to repeatedly provide themselves with new permits costing two *rijksdaalders*, otherwise risking assault, robbery, and imprisonment. Besides discontent and confusion, great bitterness arose among the Chinese over the way they were treated. The lower administration, though, turned a deaf ear to complaints.

More and more prohibitions were put in place. From July 1740, a state of disorder, arbitrariness, lawlessness, injustice, and terror developed towards Chinese people wandering around the periphery of Batavia and deemed suspicious. They were rounded up, and the rumour that they would be thrown overboard on their way back to China led to great unrest. It erupted in October 1740, when a group of disorganized and poorly armed Chinese wanted to attack the city of Batavia. Inside the city walls, the administration was insufficiently informed about the situation. No action was taken, partly due to internal division and tension among city administrators and

the indecisiveness of Governor-General Valckenier. Nie Hoe Kong, the Chinese captain, had also been mainly concerned with his own affairs. When riots against the Chinese broke out within the city, killing, mutiny, arson, looting, and pillaging began in which residents and VOC servants also participated. The violence against the Chinese inside and outside the city led to the death of about 10,000 Chinese. No Chinese house was left standing in the city after the massacre and destruction. Before the Chinese massacre, in late December 1739, 4,389 Chinese (men, women, and children) were said to have lived within the city; the number of Chinese in the Ommelanden was estimated at 10,574. The population report made a year later stated that in late December 1740, only six Chinese women and one girl under the age of 14 remained in the city.

The death of an estimated 10,000 Chinese and, as a result, the depopulation of Batavia and its environs, the destruction of the city, the looting of Chinese people's property, and the burning of their homes, completely paralysed the city's commercial and social life. Everything ground to a halt and a shortage of food and other products developed. Leases fell sharply, and there was a dearth of economic activity. Other labourers were sought to replace the Chinese. An act of amnesty a year later, on 17 October 1741, which allowed the Chinese to return, had little effect. It was only in 1742 that the Chinese began to slowly return. Especially after Van Imhoff took office as the new governor-general (1743-1750) in 1743, measures were taken to attract the Chinese back to Batavia. A total of nearly 6,000 Chinese were deemed necessary for sugar mills, arrack distilleries, agriculture, and horticulture, and for many different trades and manual labour.

Governor-General Valckenier was dismissed, and Captain Nie Hoe Kong was exiled on suspicion of treason for a period of 25 years. He died on 25 December 1746, in Ambon. The institution of Chinese officers was restored in Batavia by Van Imhoff on 19 August 1743. Also in Semarang, where there was no Chinese officer from 1741, a new officer was appointed on 20 September 1743. In this period, the realization came that the Chinese and their officers were essential for Batavia and the VOC in their operations. This made the position of the Chinese stronger than ever, as Van Imhoff also noted in his letter to the *Heren XVII*, VOC's managing board. It led to further economic development of the Chinese until the end of the nineteenth century.[37]

The Chinese massacre also caused great unrest in other parts of Java. Chinese gangs that had fled Batavia towards the north coast of Java attacked and destroyed VOC posts located there. It led to the Chinese War (1741–1743) in Central and East Java, in which the Chinese fought against the VOC together with the armies of Javanese princes. The VOC's eventual victory in this area meant it gained a foothold throughout the north-eastern coast of Java. These coastal areas were a major supplier of rice and timber for Batavia and the other VOC trading posts. Previously,

it had already traded there with the Chinese and with Javanese princes, but now the VOC held the reins. For the Javanese princes, the defeat meant that they had to make important territorial concessions in the coastal region. By the second half of the eighteenth century, the VOC controlled more than half of Java.[38] The VOC administration's initial fears of repercussions from China on account of the massacre, in the form of junks staying away, did not materialize. The emperor was apparently little concerned about the Chinese who had left the country. They were considered rebels.[39]

In the last half of the eighteenth century, there was a decline in junk shipping to Batavia, and thus a decline in migration. Competition from the British over maritime routes in the archipelago was one of the causes. Trade at ports other than Batavia was more favourable and attractive to Chinese ship owners. There, products could be obtained more cheaply as port duties and taxes were not levied or were lower than in Batavia. Nor did these ports suffer from the corruption prevalent among VOC officials. The VOC tried many ways of curbing junk shipping at other ports, but without success. For the Chinese people in those other ports, junk shipping meant supplying and trading various goods needed for the growth and prosperity of their own community. For them, it was an important lifeline connecting them to China.[40] The decline of the VOC, meanwhile, was not only due to the drop of junk shipping to Batavia. Contributing to the trading body's downfall was its personnels' aforementioned corruption and illegal trading, competition it faced from other European states protecting their own trade, and the effects of the Fourth English War in Asia (1780–1794).

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II From Migrant to Major (1800–1900)

Crucial Intermediaries in the Colonial State

On 17 March 1798, the Batavian Republic (1795–1806) took over all of the VOC's debts and capital. This marked the end of the VOC, a trading company with certain public law authorities. Lodewijk Napoleon, who came to power in the Republic of the Netherlands in 1806, sent Herman Willem Daendels (1808–1813) to the Dutch East Indies. Daendels introduced a centralized administration, with all the power in the hands of the governor-general. With this, he laid the basis for a colonial state. Under Daendels, the economic penetration of Java was consolidated and further developed.

The war between France and England during those years was not only fought on European soil, but also in Asia. In the battle against the British, Daendels set up an army – mostly consisting of local soldiers – to defend Java. He constructed the *Grote Postweg* (Great Post Road) so that his troops could travel smoothly across the island. Alas, this did not prevent an English victory, and a period of British rule under Thomas Stamford Raffles started in 1811. From a European perspective, this was a transition from a French–Dutch administration to a British one, but for the Javanese and Chinese people, conditions did not change much. After the Dutch returned to power in 1816, Daendels' administration was resumed. After this period of war, the Netherlands was in a dire financial situation. The East Indies had to come up with a solution and become productive[1].

Trade and profit, the goals of the VOC, were presented in a new light in the colonial state. Their new label was 'state income from a colony'. The Chinese, given their economic position, which developed during the VOC era, also had to contribute towards the goal of maximizing state income.

Institutions originating from the VOC period, such as that of the Chinese officers, the lease and revenue system, and the ownership of private estates, were continued. Daendels expanded the issuance of private estates in West Java when the administration of Batavia, responsible for generating its own income, suffered from severe financial shortages. Most buyers, besides Europeans, were Chinese. They mainly bought land west of the Cimanuk River. Daendels also sold land in East Java, in the vicinity of Surabaya, Probolinggo, Besuki, and Panarukan.

In the nineteenth century, the Chinese involvement in the lease system grew, particularly in that of opium. This was related to the government's interest in revenues from leases. At the same time, trade relations expanded between European trade and the Chinese as intermediaries, resulting in an increase in trade conflicts. For both trade and the lease system, freedom of movement, i.e. the implementation of the pass and district system was of great importance, and sometimes even crucial.

Pass and District System

In the colonial state, the policy of admission and settlement for the Chinese from the VOC period was further regulated. After the Chinese were admitted in the colony, the colonial administration aimed to control their freedom of movement and residency through the *passen- en wijkenstelsel* (pass and district system). As intermediaries, the Chinese were important for the colonial economy, particularly in the lease system due to its contribution to state income, and in trade. Maintaining peace and order was another important aspect.

The district system meant that the Chinese had to reside in the locations assigned to them. This was already mandatory during the VOC era. Chinese people who, due to various circumstances, lived outside the assigned areas could be forced to move back to those designated areas. Their freedom of movement was controlled by a pass system. In order to travel beyond their residential district, they had to apply for a pass. When travelling, this pass had to be checked and signed off more than once, which took a lot of time and caused plenty of discomfort. One characteristic of this system was that it contained relatively few government regulations, and instead gave local officials ample authority to implement and execute regulations. This freedom bestowed on local administrators paved the way towards arbitrariness and corruption. Due to the government's varying goals and interests, it was imperative that the system was implemented to varying degrees. The system not only had a significant impact on commercial life, for which freedom of movement is essential, but it also deeply affected the daily life of the Chinese. Policy modifications could result in people losing their livelihood, and/or force them to leave homes in which they have dwelled in for many years.[2]

The Opium Lease System

Opium was a drug that – in addition to the Chinese – was mainly used by the Javanese in the nineteenth century. Out of all the lease systems in the Dutch East Indies, opium was the most profitable. For the government, lease was an easy and reliable way to generate income. As long as the lease was free of problems, lease returns came in regularly and with minimal costs. Investments, organization, and risks were all on the shoulders of the leaseholders.

Java and Madura were divided into various 'opium lease' districts. The most prosperous ones were those in Central and East Java. The opium lease in Batavia and the vicinity was less significant because land ownership there played an important role in the economy. The majority of leaseholders were Chinese, with some Arabs also taking part in this. Many of the Chinese leaseholders were Chinese officers.[3]



2.1. Map of Java with locations that had Chinese officers, 1867. From top to bottom: major, captain, lieutenant.

The direct link between Chinese officers and leaseholdership was much stronger in Central and East Java compared to West Java. Obtaining a lease – especially an opium lease – and the appointment of a Chinese officer were often related to one another. Due to inner-circle marriages, an influential *peranakan* Chinese elite was formed. For generations, many Chinese officers – who often were also holders of the most lucrative leases – came from these circles.[4]

Opium lease auctions were important occasions as much was at stake. A leaseholder's exclusive rights to legally sell and distribute opium for a certain period of time (between one and three years) in a particular area – usually a residency[5] – was auctioned at large, public ceremonies. Java's richest merchants competed for the leases, with the auctions often being dubbed as the 'contest among kings'. These competitions did not end with the auction, but continued throughout the whole lease period.

At the auctions, the highest European officials in the region, local leaders, and Chinese officers were present in full regalia. In order to create a favourable and generous mood among the bidders, some European heads of residencies served champagne at the festivities preceding the auctions and provided transport to the auction location.

While the opium itself was not auctioned, the winning leaseholders were able to buy the goods from the government at a fixed price. The import and purchase of opium were government monopolies. In exchange for a regular supply of opium from the government, and its tacit support for maintaining and protecting the lease monopoly, the leaseholders were required to punctually fulfil their monthly obligations. They had to follow the lease regulations and carry out proper administrative duties. The most important regulation was that only legal opium was allowed to be distributed, in certain quantities and proper qualities.

2.2. A *mantri* (indigenous civil servant) of an opium selling point posing with his family. Ubud, 1908.

By various means, the regional head – the resident – strived to influence the outcome of the auction towards a bid with maximum financial gains and reliability. If these goals were achieved, it would mean not just a generous addition to the state's coffers, but also proof of the residents' successful administration. However, if the bid was disappointingly low, then a new bidding round would take place. As soon as the auction was finished, the resident would telegraph the results to the director of financial affairs in Batavia. Once the results from all residencies were received, the governor-general would send them off to The Hague.[6]

As the value of the leases continued to be pushed upwards, aspiring leaseholders tried to make arrangements amongst themselves in order not to overbid, and to keep prices as low as possible. No efforts were spared to obtain information from the authorities in Batavia on any policy changes, as great interests were at stake. Policy changes – which were frequent indeed – could play out very unfavourably for leaseholders and the execution of the lease.

The 1880s were golden times for the opium lease. The lease sum in Semarang soared to an exorbitant f26 million in 1881 (compared to f903,000 in 1846 and f960,000 in 1856), and continued to rise that decade.[7] For opium leaseholders – actually leaseholders for the treasury – it was important to also have less important leases in the region under their control, such as those for ferry tolls and meat slaughter. While the income derived from these leases were not particularly significant, the successful execution of an opium lease could be jeopardized if those less important leases were to fall into other people's control.

The government was also familiar with the complementary yet important aspects of these other leases, and organized auctions for these leases after that for the opium. It knew that bidders who lost out at the opium auction would try to get hold of the smaller leases in order to have access to the opium leaseholder's territory and smuggle opium. Sometimes, government officials would decide to allocate these smaller leases to the opium leaseholder at a lower price. The officials did this to protect and strengthen the opium lease, and prevent competition from a black marketeer in that region.[8]

The government wanted assurance that the leaseholders, or the group of leaseholders, were financially strong enough to carry out their obligations. Due to this financial 'trustworthiness', the leases went almost exclusively to Chinese leaseholders from a limited circle of families, who were almost all related to Chinese officers. Basically, in the nineteenth century, leaseholders of government revenue were either Chinese officers or someone with family ties to those families, or a person who was to be appointed as an officer once a vacancy arose. Over time, the wealth and power of these elites grew in virtually all the non-European economic activities in Java as a result of their network. These officers' families obtained lease contracts from generation to generation and, when business went well, they amassed great wealth. In some areas they would expand their activities with government contracts, such as sugar contracts in Pasuruan. Such contracts allowed them to supply the state with sugar, timber, or transport plantation products for the government. In many instances, an officer's family would have one or more leases under its control, and the same goes for government contracts.

For Chinese bidders, obtaining an opium lease would not just mean control over the most lucrative lease, but also patronage and prestige within their own

community. The leaseholders also acted as guarantors for, e.g. Chinese companies, other leaseholders, or providing Dutch credit to individual Chinese businessmen and traders. Often, these people were blood relatives, or people who knew each other, such as distant relatives.[9] For the Chinese community, a Chinese officer who was a leaseholder was viewed as an employer, protector, and patron. Consequently, the person could count on authority and prestige, as well as loyalty, from the community.

There was great pressure on Chinese officers to obtain one or more leases and government contracts, because – in addition to wealth – these were sources of authority and influence within the Chinese community. Often, families would employ reckless methods to obtain as many leases and government contracts as they could. This came with grave risks. A sudden fall in prices, a slight economic dip, or alterations in government policies could be enough to cause a major bankruptcy. Debt payments, sometimes followed by bankruptcy, resulted in tensions between the Chinese leaseholder and the colonial government, as well as within the Chinese community.

It was a big problem for the government when a Chinese officer went bankrupt or lost his wealth due to bad speculation. Without his wealth, and the associated authority, patronage, and organization within the Chinese community that came with it, an officer was of little use to the government. He would be unable to adequately carry out his duties and, moreover, the dignity of the office did not tolerate bankruptcy. When problems of fulfilling payments arose or bankruptcy had to be faced, the colonial administration tended to blame the officers for trying to avoid their financial obligations by keeping much of their wealth hidden. In these situations, many officers would be asked to resign from their office, if they had not been fired beforehand.

Most leaseholders and their agents actually also functioned as collectors for the treasury, and were thus exempted from limiting regulations such as the pass and district system. For leaseholders, access to the interior and freedom of movement was not just important: it was crucial. People employed by the leaseholders were also allowed – officially on a temporary basis – to travel without a pass, and to settle outside their appointed district. The freedom to move around and settle elsewhere was also utilized to conduct trade. Goods such as textiles were transported from ports to interior regions while agricultural products went in the opposite direction; leaseholders would also seek positions such as being creditors. Lease contracts became key to trading inland and became the path towards a monopoly in trading within the lease region.

In the nineteenth century, having leases was the best way to access inland trade. This meant, in addition to substantial income for the government, great profits for the leaseholders, particularly the head leaseholder. Of course, this was the case as long as things went well. There was a strong relationship between the lease and the

Chinese people involved in that system. Thus, whenever a lease was withdrawn or abolished, those Chinese who had lived outside their appointed districts due to their involvement in the lease would have to return to their original living locations. This occurred, for example, in 1851, when the *pasarpacht*[10] (market lease) and the lease on ferry tolls were withdrawn and taken over by the government. An annual permit was given out for the market leaseholder to travel inland and live outside of the Chinese districts. After the withdrawal, most Chinese families – even those who had already lived outside the appointed districts for generations – had to return to their original districts, or other locations newly created for them. Besides being forced to move, those Chinese families also lost their livelihood. Exceptions were made, however, for those people who worked in areas related to government interests.

The same thing happened when the government terminated the opium lease system at the end of the nineteenth century.[11] As a result of the market lease's termination in 1851, the opium lease became the most important means of economic activity for the Chinese in the interior regions of Java.[12] Good personal relationships with the local European and indigenous administrations were indispensable and played a big role in carrying out the lease. European and indigenous administrators were kept happy with a regular flow of gifts, subsidies, *sumbangan* (contributions), and *tanda hormat* (tokens of respect). All parties became invested in the lease being carried out smoothly.

From 1870, opposition against leasing in general, and opium lease in particular, started growing. Since 1880, the 'opium issue' became a focus for the media and parliament in the Netherlands. At the same time, the government collected large sums from the opium lease. The period starting in 1884 was also characterized by an economic crisis, which also hit the indigenous communities and reached its nadir in 1888. Falling prices of cash crops resulted in significant problems for local people. They moved away from the markets and had to fall back on a system of self-sufficiency with rice as staple food. Not enough money was in circulation, purchasing power fell sharply, and this downward spiral also impacted leasing, and the opium lease in particular. In 1889, only four out of the nineteen opium leaseholders survived this recession. Leaseholders' debts to the state amounted to almost three million guilders that year. In 1893, the government was forced to forego almost six million guilders of those debts. Despite this, returns from opium leases between 1886 and 1895 were the highest ever in the history of opium leasing.[13]

The image of Chinese leasers was heavily tarnished due to the losses. They had been viewed by the government as strong partners, but when tides turned, leasers were seen as businessmen who, once they were no longer able to fulfil their financial obligations, had to be dealt with 'without delay and without further

consideration'. Trust and credibility were replaced by distrust. The Chinese became the perfect scapegoat in the economic crisis. They were blamed for the visible impoverishment of the local people, for the small local protests that became more common, the increased violence from robberies and other crimes, and roaming gangs that caused great unrest inland. The Chinese activities and presence inland were considered as a threat for the indigenous communities. To make things worse, the constant influx of poor Chinese migrants was untenable in these crisis years. The migrants were unable to make connections within the colonial society and could not always count on support from their fellow countrymen.[14]

The End of the Opium Lease

In the public debates of the 1880s, in which ethical thoughts were clearly present, the opium lease and its immorality were fiercely attacked through a stream of articles, pamphlets, and publications. The ethical course had its roots in humanitarian ideas, which emerged after the publication of *Max Havelaar* in 1860. The book was a protest against the exploitation (not by the Chinese) of the local people, and gradually started resonating in Dutch circles. Not the exploitation of the colony, but rather the well-being of the population must be the main focus of the government policy. In 1877, journalist Pieter Brooshooft wrote that the harsh economic conditions (read: poverty) suffered by the indigenous population was caused by opium and the opium lease, in which the Chinese were involved. The realization that the Netherlands had a responsibility towards the indigenous population was vocalized by lawyer C.Th. van Deventer in his publication *Een Ereschuld* (A Debt of Honour). The objections against the lease as well as the feeling that the Dutch had a responsibility towards the local people led to the ethical politics that was officially announced by Queen Wilhelmina in 1901.[15]

Under increased pressure from the public and the press, the East Indies government, in cooperation with the Minister for the Colonies, decided to conduct two studies, which, in turn, came under the responsibility of W.P. Groeneveldt. Due to his many years of work as a Chinese interpreter, Groeneveldt was deemed an expert on the Chinese community, and was a member of the Council of the Indies. The first study (1889) involved the question of whether the *Opiumregie* (Opium Management) in French Indochina (Vietnam) would be a possible alternative for the opium lease. The second review (1892) provided an overview of the economic activities of the Chinese, Arabic, and other Foreign Orientals in Java and Madura, and their influence on the local population.[16] In 1893, Indochina's *Opiumregie*, based on the results of Groeneveldt's research, was tried out first in Batavia. Its favourable

2.3. The inside of an opium factory in Weltevreden (an area of Batavia) where opium is packaged, 1907.

results meant the beginning of the end for the opium lease. *Opiumregie* – the sale of opium by the government – started in 1896.

The second review, concluded in 1894, became known as the Fokkens report. Fokkens, inspector at the Home Affairs Administration, finished what Groeneveldt had started. At Groeneveldt's urging, the report had to be as objective as possible, as it should become a trustworthy source on Chinese economic activities. The assignment was that this final report should be decisive and ready for publication. Although the public and the media insisted that the report be made public, the Minister for the Colonies refrained from doing so in 1896. Everything in the report, it was argued, was already known. In reality, the report showed that the local population were not just exploited by the Chinese, but also by the Europeans, Madurese, and sometimes even by the Javanese themselves. Making the report public in the Netherlands could result in unwanted reactions.

Thus, the negative image of the Chinese was not nuanced by the report's outcome. In 1897, Fokkens used the unpublished report in a presentation at the Dutch Indies Society, in which the Chinese were again presented – without subtlety – in a bad light. Consequently, Groeneveldt responded to Fokkens' presentation with a headline article in leading newspaper *NRC*. Fokkens, he

2.4. Two men at an opium factory in Batavia fill wooden boxes with tubes containing opium, 1907.

wrote, had spoken about an unpublished report with great authority. This, Groeneveldt continued, threatened to give a 'powerful and even official sanction' to this negative image of the Chinese. While Groeneveldt did not deny that there were problems with the Chinese, he pointed out that blame should not be sought where it was not present.[17] Groeneveldt, together with Alting Mees (see 'Regulating Trade'), were among the few people who stood up for the Chinese in the nineteenth century, and voiced dissent against the one-sided, negative image of this community.

In 1893, Batavia and its surrounding areas started with a trial of the *Opiumregie*. This system saw the colonial government take the sale of opium into its own hands. *Opiumregie* encompassed imports, processing, and opium sales, all under the direct management and organization of the colonial administration. When the trial proved successful, the opium lease was definitively replaced by a government monopoly in 1896.

In Batavia, a state-owned factory produced opium with consistent taste and quality, with a neutral chemical product added to the opium to differentiate it from illegal opium. The government set up its own distribution system, in which the final product was sold to registered users through an extended network of its own sales outlets. By 1904, this system was implemented throughout Java, and the opium lease was completely replaced by the *Opiumregie*. It turned out to be a very profitable system, which earned the state even more income than the 'morally reprehensible' lease practice.[18]

Opium Lease in Numbers

The following statistics regarding opium leasing are known: between 1836 and 1865 it supplied 16.8 per cent of the Dutch East Indies total returns. Those returns covered 31.9 per cent of the local administration's daily costs. Starting from 1860, opium lease was the most important source of state income. Returns from all the leases between 1826 and 1895 amounted to 22 per cent of the total state income. Out of this amount, between 60 and 80 per cent came from opium leases. In the period 1876–1915, when state deficits in the colony rose to f195.3 million, returns from opium soared to f703.3 million. Without these returns (under the *Opiumregie* after 1896), the total deficit would have been f898.6 million. Thus, opium reduced the deficit by up to 70 per cent.[19]

The end of the opium lease in 1896 did not, however, mean the end of state returns from opium. With the *Opiumregie*, opium sales remained an important source of income. In 1905, almost 16 per cent of state income (f20.25 million) came from opium. Sales in most residencies was similar to, or even higher than, that during the period of opium lease. Opium production and sales remained booming businesses, and with the government as opium seller, the narcotic consistently provided the state with healthy returns between 1910 and 1920. In the 1914–1929 period, returns were between f32.6 million and f52.6 million guilders. Relatively speaking, though, income from opium in relation to total state income decreased from 13.5 per cent in 1914 to 5.3 per cent in 1929. Profit margins for opium were very high. In the *Opiumregie*, each guilder in costs would bring three to four guilders of profit.[20] Meanwhile, other leases still continued until around 1920.

Consequences for the Chinese

For the Chinese, the end of the opium lease had a significant impact on their position. Their economic position in general, and the position of the elite in particular, were profoundly affected. The termination of the opium lease hit the

2.5. Chinese lieutenant (wearing a bowler hat) surrounded by his family, assistants, and employees and their families, in front of a house, probably in Java, around 1910.

2.6. Kong Koan: the Chinese Council of Batavia, 1902. Sitting left to right: secretary Nie Liang Soeij, Major Tio Tek Ho, Lim Liong Boe, and Lieutenant Tio Tek Soen. Standing left to right: assistant to the secretary, assistant to the major.

elite Chinese hard, especially those in Central and East Java. Not only did they lose income directly from, or related to, the lease, but they also lost returns from various business ventures they had on the side, and all kinds of direct and indirect profits and benefits associated with leases. Organizations they had set up inland for the lease, and which gave them access to markets there, were no longer necessary. The Chinese elite not only lost their source of income, but also the prestige and authority that came with their status. The institution of the Chinese officers lost much of its significance, and the position of Chinese officer became less attractive. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, it became difficult to seek candidates for the function.

Thousands of Chinese directly or indirectly involved in leases lost their livelihoods due to the termination of leases and had to return to their original home districts. Many tried their luck in cities. In 1896, the *Soerabaiasch Handelsblad* daily wrote that unemployment among the Chinese was extremely high. In answer to a vacancy asking for eight Chinese carpenters and 40 coolies in Banyuwangi, 527 people applied in just two days. When news of these job vacancies spread further, the number of people applying for the jobs rose above a thousand. People were willing to relocate anywhere for work. Poverty was rife among the unemployed.[21]

Several leaseholders who were part of the Chinese elite did not survive the end of the opium lease era and fell into poverty. Others succeeded in making a new start. Chinese capital was reinvested in new sectors, such as banking and mining. Investments were also made in a variety of medium-sized and small industries, such as food and beverages, batik, furniture, cigarette factories, and rice mills. This meant that the Chinese were entering sectors where the Arabs, Sumatrans, and Javanese were dominant. Inevitably, this soon led to frictions.[22]

The Chinese and Trade

Prior to the arrival of the VOC, the Chinese in the Indonesian archipelago engaged in inter-Asian trade. The VOC's basic rule was that the Chinese could enjoy freedom in trade as long as it did not run counter to the VOC's interests. Should this be the case, then the repercussions would be harsh and immediate.[23] During the VOC era, the Chinese gradually became intermediaries between the VOC and the local Javanese residents.

In the intermediary trade, distinctions were made between collecting and distribution. Collecting was buying up goods meant for export, while distribution referred to spreading merchandise, i.e. sales of import goods. In its early years, the VOC was the only wholesaler, obtaining products through its monopolies or

its tributary relationships with the local elite. It was also the sole distributing wholesaler for European products. The Chinese were only allowed to handle goods from China. After the VOC's demise, other parties took over the role of collecting and distributing wholesaler.

However, the Chinese were not allowed to take over the role of distributing wholesaler. In 1804, the Chinese and other non-Christians in Batavia were barred from directly buying goods originating from Europe, America, and Africa. After the VOC folded, the Chinese – without permits – bought up freight in bulk from ships originating from the Batavian Republic or other European ports, and then sold them in parts or smaller quantities. In fact, this kind of trade was reserved for 'European representatives, civilians, and residents'. It was strictly forbidden for the Chinese to do direct trade.[24] The Chinese were allowed to do second- or third-hand buying in small quantities from Christian sellers, and to then sell these goods to others. This ban would be decisive for the further development of the Chinese's trading position in Java: starting from 1804, they were only allowed to function as intermediaries between the European wholesalers and the local population.[25] The Chinese in Java were also entrepreneurs, owning small- and medium-sized enterprises such as sugar factories, rice mills, batik factories, and cigar, cigarette, and straw factories. There were very few large Chinese enterprises.[26]

Collecting and Distributing Trade Intermediaries

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the economy in Java was reasonably developed, and was certainly no longer a basic economy that merely produced goods to be consumed.[27] During the VOC period, goods in Java were produced both for the domestic market as well as for inter-island and global markets. Commercial crops such as coffee, sugar, cotton, and pepper were grown by the local Javanese, as well as quinine, copra, *krosok* (dried tobacco leaves), kapok, cassava, corn, rice, leather, and *gula jawa* (brown sugar). Cottage industry goods, such as straw hats, mats, and pottery, were also produced. Retailers who supplied collecting intermediaries also bought – sometimes in very small quantities – local agricultural or industrial products, which were then sold in larger quantities to intermediaries. A dense market network existed in inland Java, with permanent markets at the district level and village markets every five days. The collected products were then taken to harbour areas to be traded elsewhere. In these transactions, advances were often given in the form of seeds or raw materials. Private parties controlled some 60 per cent of maritime trade in the VOC period, with the remaining 40 per cent in the VOC's hands.[28]

2.7. Chinese store at Pasar Senen in Batavia, around 1890.

The distribution side of intermediary trade, i.e. sale of import goods, in the Dutch East Indies was usually defined as 'the second hand'. This branch of trade bridged wholesalers (importers, sometimes called the first hand), and the retailers (the third and fourth hands) and consumers. In the early periods, when industry was still sparse in Java, imports mainly consisted of industrial products such as textiles, goods sold in small stalls, food and luxury items (biscuits, tinned butter, chocolates, cigars), machinery, hardware, and local manufacturing and agricultural products. The Chinese were mostly active as second handers, alongside some Arabs and Indonesians. In large cities, Europeans were also intermediaries, but only for European customers. Retailers (third hand) were largely locally owned, with a minority of them in the hands of the Chinese. Retailers could be divided into mobile trade (*klontong* or travelling traders and street vendors) and traders on location (stores, stalls, markets).

2.8. Chinese silk trader (*klontong*, travelling trader), 1910.

2.9. A Chinese hardware and household store in Batavia, year unknown.

2.10. Streetscape in Glodok, Batavia, around 1930.

2.11. Streetscape in Glodok, Batavia, around 1950.

The Credit System

For the Chinese and their trade, the nineteenth century was characterized by three other factors aside from the previously mentioned pass and district system: the credit system, bankruptcies, and regulations in commercial law.

At the dawn of the nineteenth century, several trading houses were already active in Java: Dutch, British, and Armenian trading houses had been established in big cities.[29] There was a constant shortage of money in the East Indies, which led to a large demand for loans, for trading as well as other investments, such as the improvement and development of agricultural land. There was also a dire shortage of cash, with money circulation largely consisting of coins, which was wholly inadequate for working capital and as a payment method. There was also a great need for financial institutions to serve and promote trade. Thus, the Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij (Dutch Trading Company NHM) was set up in 1824, followed by the Javasche Bank (Java Bank DJB) in 1828, where private entrepreneurs could go to apply for credit. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, when the Dutch East Indies opened up for private businesses, more trade associations and merchant banks were established.

An extensive credit system was developed between the European wholesale traders and the middle and retail traders both for the distribution and collection intermediary trade. These intermediaries – mostly Chinese – had little to no working capital in cash, and instead were given loans and advances in the form of goods, seeds, products, and raw materials. For exports, goods came directly from the producers or through intermediaries. For production of these goods, an advance was usually required, and the necessary loan came from a trading house or a bank. Goods from the credit applicant – producer or intermediary – were used as collateral. These collateral goods had to have a higher value than the loan it represented. That surplus value was dependent on the demands of the credit provider and the calculated risks, such as the nature and quality of the export goods, and the creditworthiness of the applicant. Sometimes, extra security was demanded from Chinese clients in the form of a mortgage on real estate.

Import was another story. European importers were at the top of the pyramid. From the nineteenth century until World War I, they basically had a monopoly, since trade with Europe was strong during this period, while trade with China and Japan was marginal. Distribution in the colony was in the 'second hand', which usually meant the Chinese. They handed over the goods to third or eventually fourth hands. For their sales, European importers and wholesalers were dependent on providing credits to second-hand parties. These credits were given as an advance in the form of goods, which the importer would hand over to the distributor. This was the only way for goods to make their way to consumers. The only guarantee for those goods

was trust in the second-hand party. Thus, information on what was going on within the Chinese community was crucial. As long as the second hand was able to sell the products, he would be able to fulfil his payment obligations. Sales, however, could be disappointing. Markets could be unreachable due to floods and impenetrable roads, with disastrous results for trade.

There was sharp competition among European importers and wholesalers. This competition came in the form of pricing and giving larger advances and longer credit terms. Prior to World War II, both import and export were mostly controlled by Dutch trading houses, in addition to American, German, British, Japanese, and several other European trading houses. Only a small number of Chinese were active in export and import, mostly to and from China. They had a small import association.[30]

Regulating Trade

In the nineteenth century, Europeans frequently complained about the bankruptcies among Chinese trade intermediaries and debtors. In cases of bankruptcy, Dutch trading partners often accused the Chinese of intentional fraud to avoid financial obligations and to enrich themselves. Similar patterns were seen in bankruptcies during the period of lease systems. It is important to bear in mind that, in the 1850s, Chinese traders were unable to counter complaints from the Europeans due to language and cultural barriers. The European trading community joined hands to strive for trade regulations. They were seeking tools with which they could legally proceed against Chinese opponents in trade conflict situations and suspected fraud in bankruptcy cases. These Europeans submitted several requests to the colonial government regarding such trade regulations. Due to the separate legal systems implemented in 1848 in the Dutch East Indies,[31] it was anything but easy for lawmakers to bring Chinese and other Foreign Orientals under the European commercial law. Finally, a trade regulation was issued in 1855 and published in the East Indies Statute Book (*Indisch Staatsblad 1855 no. 79*).[32] Based on that, parts of Dutch civil and commercial law became applicable for the Chinese and other Foreign Orientals. From that moment, trade conflicts between Europeans and the Chinese and other Foreign Orientals could be brought to a European court. The European commercial law meant legal certainty for Europeans and provided them with the necessary means of coercion to recover their losses.

In practice, however, the regulation did not lead to desirable results. For the Chinese, the European judicial procedure represented high costs and a plethora of problems. These include the great distances to get to the European courts (Councils of Justice in Java were only present in three major cities), fulfilling the procedural

requirements, the difficulty of explaining their case on paper due to the language barrier, and the absence of legal support. The courts also had insufficient capacity to deal with all the cases. Sometimes, this meant that cases had to be dropped. For the European side, it was sometimes impossible to prove bad faith, such as in cases where it was not possible to inspect the bookkeeping done in Chinese. Since 1865, catering to the demands of the European trade community, the trade regulations were expanded with obligations for the Chinese to maintain proper bookkeeping and make an annual balance. The original demand that the bookkeeping must be done in the Malay language and written in Latin script, or in a European language (Dutch, French, English, or German) was deemed unreasonable and unattainable by the government.

There were divergent opinions regarding causes for bankruptcies. Some believed the Chinese wilfully committed fraud, while others thought European traders should take their own share of the blame. Among the latter was lawyer F. Alting Mees, who wrote several times about the complaints regarding the many bankruptcies among the Chinese. In a legal note (1869), followed by an advice to the governor-general (1870), and an article in *De Economist* (1884), he gave his view on the trade situation. Alting Mees based his arguments on data from the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in the disaster years between 1866 and 1868. He had ample experience in trade cases as a lawyer, a prosecutor, and as head of the Javasche Bank. He believed that bankruptcies were caused by the European trade community itself, and how it handled the credit system. Wholesalers would deliberately give their products to second-hand parties, even though they knew that prices would fall due to too much supply. Thus, the wholesaler would know beforehand that, as a consequence of the above, second-hand parties would not be able to meet their financial obligations. When, in practice, the Chinese were unable to fulfil these financial obligations, they would be accused of bad faith and intentional fraud.

On the other hand, the Chinese were no fools when it came to trade. They were very skilled, and aware that doing bookkeeping in the Chinese language made it difficult to prove any deception, such as falsification for tax evasion, undervaluing assets, and artificially hiking expenses. In Surabaya, Chinese interpreter P. Meeter believed that bookkeeping was often made 'bankrupt ready'. From the Chinese side, there was worry that control over Chinese bookkeeping by powerful importers could be used to 'snoop around' and find out what prices their competitors were charging, and how much was bought from them, or how much was paid off. Based on the information, some parties could then take control over trade conditions. The unfamiliar and impenetrable Chinese language was therefore a shield against the Europeans.

From the European side, there was too little knowledge on Chinese bookkeeping, the Chinese language, and the Chinese themselves. There was a huge language

and cultural gap, as people lived in their own separate worlds. The first Dutch interpreters of the Chinese language, educated in Leiden, only arrived in the Dutch East Indies in 1878.[33] The trade regulations set up to safeguard European trade interests did not take these matters into consideration. It unintentionally gave the Chinese opportunities for defence. Sometimes, the law even offered them 'help' or 'rescue'. As the dawn of the twentieth century arrived and Western influence grew, these trade regulations would benefit the Chinese. Legal certainty and equal status with their European trade partners in European courts had strengthened their position. In big cases, the Chinese were able to hire European law offices, often prominent ones, to defend them.

Bankruptcies

Bankruptcies continued to occur, and thus complaints from trading partners of the Chinese endured. The economic depression in the 1880s, the end of the opium lease, and the start of the *Opiumregie* and the ensuing strict implementation of the pass and district system hit the Chinese traders and elite. These developments resulted in a wave of bankruptcies after 1895. The commercial sector suffered great losses, and enterprises requiring major investments quickly turned from being lucrative to suffering deficits. In intermediary trading, the Chinese were also dependent on internal markets, in which they had built the necessary organizational structures. Due to the strict implementation of the pass and district system, the Chinese were barred from travelling and residing inland. This lack of freedom severely limited their trading opportunities. Their sales fell sharply, and they were also unable to collect outstanding loans. Retailers were unable to pay their debts to intermediaries, and thus the intermediaries could not pay what they owed to wholesalers. At the time, wholesalers had just recuperated from the economic crisis.

In 1895, the commercial sector in Surabaya fell deeper into trouble because many Europeans were also confronted with bankruptcies. The press usually viewed these bankruptcies as self-inflicted. The *Bataviaas Nieuwsblad* wrote that the European trade should look in the mirror to examine their own mistakes. They were accused of not having learned from the past. They continued to supply Chinese and Arabic trade intermediaries with loads of goods under deeply speculative payment terms. Instead of cooperating, the Europeans competed among themselves. Things had to change. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, European trading was indeed being done in a healthier manner. They were more careful with giving credit, and that led to positive results. Gradually, the Chamber of Commerce and European trading companies changed their ways. Complaints about Chinese bookkeeping and suspicions of fraud were becoming

less frequent. The second-hand traders were believed to 'generally smoothly fulfil their obligations'.[34]

Image Forming

As already mentioned earlier in this chapter, the image of the Chinese changed in the eyes of the Europeans in the nineteenth century. It went from diligent, hard-working people who were indispensable as traders, craftspeople, and useful labourers, to competitors. Much of the displeasure about this competition was expressed in the characteristics that were used to describe the Chinese as a group in the latter half of the nineteenth century. They were described as a 'cancer on society', vultures, hyenas, or downright scum. Since the 1880s, an added view was that the Chinese were harmful for the indigenous communities. This was a big difference with the era of Jan Pieterszoon Coen.

In the same period in which the situation surrounding leases was ongoing – around 1880 – several developments in intermediary trading played a role in the attitude towards, and image of, the Chinese within the colonial society. While leases reached their peak in the 1880s, the colonial economy was going through tough times. After a re-orientation of colonial policies in 1870, with the colony opening up to private initiatives, the Dutch East Indies' financial position worsened from 1878 onwards. The colonial administration was also dealing with large expenses due to the Aceh War (which started in 1873), the termination of profits from the *Cultuurstelsel* (Cultivation System) after 1877,[35] lower returns from coffee plantations, disasters such as the cattle plague, and the economic crisis of 1884.[36] In November 1884, the Dutch East Indies was hit by what was called a banking crisis and a sugar crisis, which abruptly put an end to an era of economic growth. The crisis was at its worst in the 1888–1889 period.[37] Both European trade and Chinese intermediary trade suffered. In these bad times, it became clear how deeply involved European creditors were in Chinese trade. The indigenous community was also hit hard by the crisis: the depression of 1884 meant a decline in purchasing power and impoverishment. It is common to find a scapegoat during hard times, and in this case, it was the Chinese.

Clashing government interests played a role in the implementation of the pass and district system. In order to realize the lease system, a great number of Chinese people were necessary inland. This led to the relaxation of the pass and district system. The government, however, was weary that the inland coffee plantations, also a state monopoly, would suffer from this increased freedom of movement, fearing that the Chinese would steal coffee. To protect the coffee plantations, as many Chinese as possible had to be banned from the interior regions. This clash

of government interests was a familiar quandary. It was a fact that the Chinese were needed and useful for the colonial economy, and that policies should support them. In some areas, the Chinese came to hold key positions due to policies that had evolved historically and were dictated by Dutch interests. Sometimes, these policies even demanded that Chinese trade activities be encouraged to prevent the economy from grinding to a halt. At the same time, however, the policies had to draw clear lines for Chinese trade activities, even though it was debatable when and where those boundaries had to be set.

Chinese Share in Colonial Economy

Statistics from 1892 give the following illustration of the Chinese's economic position. From land allowed to be legally owned by non-indigenous people, 45 per cent was in Chinese hands, out of which 63 per cent were private estates. The Chinese also owned 31 per cent of buildings and plots on land not owned by private entities. They owned 22 per cent of the registered ship cargo space in the colony, 18 per cent of sugar mills under government contract, 34 per cent of free indigenous contracted labourers working on farmland, and 26 per cent of contracts for the transports of salt and government goods. As a group, the Chinese in Java paid 38 per cent of total taxes, 22 per cent of business taxes, and 38 per cent of special taxes for landownership on leased ground. The Chinese also had 26 per cent of imports in their hands, and some 12 per cent of exports.[38]

For the Dutch administration, this crisis period made it increasingly clear how big a part the Chinese played in the colonial economy. In the Batavia region, the Chinese made a big leap in landownership. In the VOC's early years, big plots of land were sold as *woeste gronden* (wild land) and subsequently developed and cultivated by the new owners. In the early nineteenth century, Governor-General Daendels again sold large plots of land either informally or in public auctions. For the Batavia administration, which was responsible for its own income, the sale of land was a saving grace in times of need. The Batavia residency consisted almost solely of private estates. Most of the buyers were Europeans, while the Chinese mostly bought land west of the Cimanuk River. In 1811, Chinese landownership consisted mostly of seven private estates. In 1899, that number shot up to 137 (the total number of private estates was 339). In 1904, Chinese ownership continued to grow to 164 out of 309 estates, or some 55 per cent of the total number.

In less than 100 years, Chinese landownership became an integral part of their economic position. On the Dutch side, there was a belief that communities living in those areas were being exploited by Chinese and Arabic landlords. However, on the other side of this one-sided attitude was the fact that the indigenous people

preferred to live on Chinese-owned land. The Chinese developed their land with the goal of remaining in the Dutch East Indies: they were there for the long haul. Europeans, in contrast, developed land with the aim of selling it with profits, and return to the Netherlands. The long-term vision of the Chinese resulted in a strong bond with the land, and thus the realization that great care was to be bestowed on the land and its residents.

In 1910, the government started buying back these plots, as they were needed for industrial development, and later for the infrastructure of Batavia. Thus, in 1920, Chinese landownership in the region was reduced to 10 per cent of the total land. Some landowners succeeded in turning their private estates into businesses, which functioned as nameless agricultural companies in the East Indies economy. In the twentieth century, land repurchasing was continued by the Indonesian Republic.[39]

Masalah Cina, or the Chinese Problem[40]

The term *Chineezenquaestie* (Chinese issue or problem) was first coined in Groeneveldt's 1897 *NRC* newspaper article about Fokkens and the image of the Chinese.[41] Although the *Chineezenquaestie* in the article was not clearly defined, it became clear from the description that the Chinese presence and activities in Java were experienced as a problem by the colonial administration and the Dutch trading community. Aspects of the Chinese problem mentioned in the piece were immigration after 1860, the demoralizing consequences of leases, the so-called lack of honesty of the Chinese in trading, and their alleged exploitation of the indigenous population. Groeneveldt stated that there should be no generalizations, and that the Chinese had the right to a just and fair treatment. He further said that the Chinese suffered from the 'torment' of the pass system, and the lower criminal justice system known as the *politierol*.

What was seen as a problem did not always match reality. In 1885, the government expressed worries that Java was flooded by Chinese migrants. The statistics, however, presented a different story. Chinese influx actually diminished because of the economic depression of the 1880s. Many Chinese left Java for other Southeast Asian destinations. Chinese migration would only start increasing again in 1905.[42] In Dutch circles, there was often talk about the bad character of the Chinese and their rogue practices. Crime statistics from 1905 from various courts in the Dutch East Indies showed that crime in the Foreign Oriental communities were the lowest compared to the European and indigenous societies.[43] In 1892, negative sentiments towards the Chinese were such that it even came to the attention of the Minister for the Colonies in the Netherlands. He saw that the handlings of Chinese requests for ownership titles and rights for property building or ground lease stumbled on many

objections that had little to do with the applicants' trustworthiness. Instead, these applicants were accused of defects and vices dubbed as 'intrinsic' to them, such as greed and extortion.[44] The demoralizing consequences of the government-installed lease system were not just caused by the executors of the leases. The system itself made abuse possible, and the government also consciously allowed these abuses due to its own interest and the generated income from the leases.

The Chinese problem of 1897 seemed to be connected with their position, which, in turn, was a result of centuries of policies in which the VOC's economic interests – and that of the ensuing colonial government – was the main focus. Those interests brought about both limitations and opportunities for the Chinese. Since the VOC's early years in Java, the Chinese, through their leases, were used as tax collectors. Between 1619 and 1896, the Chinese had established themselves in a variety of economic sectors. They started on the bottom of the economic ladder as labourers, craftsmen, or in farming and horticulture. In the nineteenth century, they were the intermediaries for the European traders, and were also active in areas such as the service sectors. A wealthy Chinese elite emerged, consisting of landowners, leasers, and owners of government contracts, in which many Chinese officers were represented.

Regulations implemented to provide the Europeans trading community with legal certainty and coercive tools in instances of trade conflicts with the Chinese did not always reach their desired results. Access to European civil and commercial law gave the Chinese the same legal certainty as well as equal position to their European counterparts. This equality had inadvertently strengthened the position of the Chinese. They became competitors to be reckoned with. The image of the Chinese as a segment of the population with a strong economic position would stick well into the twentieth century, and sometimes plague them in certain situations where they would be seen as a problem. The lease system in which the government and the Chinese had common interests gave the image of cooperation between the two sides.

Alexander Claver, who studied trade relations between the Europeans and the Chinese between 1820 and 1942, saw the Chinese as a minority operating in a trade environment dominated by European credit providers. They were fully aware of the colonial economy's fluctuating circumstances and its many uncertainties. They were able to deal with these conditions, and with the support of their family and enterprise structures as well as their networks, they tried to stand their ground and survive. Some were very successful at this. At the same time, Chinese entrepreneurship was no guarantee for success. Sometimes, grave risks had to be taken. In the space of several years, one could become wealthy and fall into poverty again. Their resilience and ability to recover were key to their survival, and also their capacity to deal with both the Dutch and the indigenous

communities. Not everyone, however, was able to successfully combine all these aspects.[45]

In the late nineteenth century, the Chinese ended an era. The new century arrived, and with it came initiatives that had nothing to do with trade and the economy. Education became important, specifically education with a reflection on Confucian values.

III Education, Equality, and Political Awareness (1900–1942)

Emancipation

The year 1900 was a special year for the Chinese in the Dutch East Indies. Almost symbolically, the beginning of the new century fell together with the establishment of the Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan (THHK, the Chinese Association) in Indonesia. A new period started with education initiatives, striving towards a better position within the colonial society, and a growing political awareness.

Developments

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, several developments took place that led to changes in the Chinese society at the dawn of the new century. Until 1896, it appeared that much, if not everything, within the Chinese community revolved around trade and the colonial economy. The end of the opium lease also marked the end of the historical growth of the favourable position of the Chinese elite, the authority brought within its own community, and the entanglement with the government. The position of the Chinese officers, previously so coveted, received much less interest.

On a completely different note, a movement focused on the teaching of Confucius had started. The reorientation on Confucian writings, and the initiatives coming from that direction, led to the establishment of the Chinese Association THHK, followed by the formation of the first THHK school. There were also discussions around a growing need for Dutch education. Prior to 1900, the government had never provided education facilities for Chinese children. For European children, there was the *Europese Lagere School* (European Elementary School ELS), and for Indonesian children – mostly children from the aristocracy – there was also provision for education, albeit to a lesser extent. Chinese children could, under special circumstances, go to the Dutch ELS but entrance was dependent on whether the parents could use their position and connections to get their children into the school. The Chinese themselves took care of their children's education by organizing private education, with teachers from China, and the establishment of Chinese schools. Education in those schools, however, left a lot to be desired. After the establishment of the THHK schools, the Chinese community also strived for Dutch educational facilities from the Dutch East Indies government. Following the

establishment of the Dutch-language *Hollands-Chinese scholen* (Dutch Chinese Schools HCS) in 1908, the pursuit of Dutch education was the common thread through the history of those Chinese who ultimately found their destiny in the Netherlands in the twentieth century.

Since the late nineteenth century, China had started to show a growing interest in the Chinese in the Dutch East Indies. From around 1860, migration from China increased. After the forced opening of China in the wake of the Opium Wars, migration spiked in the 1850–1860 period, leading up to a large migration wave. In 1863, slavery was abolished. Globally, demand for cheap labourers was high. Technical advancements in transport and communication brought countries closer to one another. In China, people who suffered from famine and civil war due to the Taiping uprising saw migration as their only way out of a dire situation. Political and cultural barriers, which previously prevented people from leaving, were replaced by new opportunities. Consequently, migration to Southeast Asia and the Indonesian archipelago rose. In addition to the Hokkien people, who had a long history of migrating from China to Java, people from other language groups and coastal provinces in China also took part in the migration wave. The characteristics of the migration process had also changed. Previously, those leaving the home country were mostly men, often departing out of necessity. However, after 1860, migration was seen more as an investment approved of by the family. Women were also leaving, either alone or with family members.

Labour migration of coolies to destinations like the tobacco plantations in Deli, Sumatra took off. News about the horrible labour and living conditions there, however, were such that China felt it necessary to investigate and supervise its nationals. From 1890, China regularly applied for the admission of Chinese consuls to the Dutch East Indies due to abuses suffered by Chinese coolies in Sumatra, and to serve the overall interest of the Chinese in the Dutch East Indies. Despite the absence of a Chinese Nationality Law – which would only come in 1909 – China viewed the Chinese in the Dutch East Indies as its nationals. On the Dutch side, these admission requests from Chinese consuls were received with reservation until 1910. The issue kept being postponed. On the matter of Chinese nationals – as the Chinese government viewed the Chinese in the Dutch East Indies – the Dutch government believed that contact with China had to be handled with great care.

Due to the gap in the 1892 Law on Dutch Nationality, the Netherlands had no legal basis to claim the Chinese in the Dutch East Indies as their nationals.[1] The 1892 Law was meant to establish one Dutch citizenship for the whole kingdom, including all residents in the colonies. After an amendment, however, it was decided to exclude 'indigenous people and those equal to them' in the Dutch East Indies from Dutch nationality. This decision was made out of fear of the consequences that could arise from granting Dutch citizenship to all residents of the Dutch East

Indies. As a result of this exclusion, Indonesian people became foreigners in their own country in the eyes of the law. Those equal to them, including the Chinese and other resident Foreign Orientals who had made the Dutch East Indies their home, were also excluded from Dutch citizenship.[2] This law on Dutch nationality would play an important role in the relationship between the Dutch and Dutch East Indies administrations on the one side and foreign powers such as China on the other side. The urgency for clarity regarding the Netherlands' authority over its non-Dutch subjects in the Dutch East Indies led to the Dutch Subject Law in 1910.

The Chinese elite in the Dutch East Indies also maintained ties with China. For example, they offered assistance during disasters in China. Appreciation from China for this support came in the form of medals and distinctions. The Dutch East Indies administration, however, prohibited the wearing of these Chinese medals.

Besides reorientation on Confucianism in Singapore, political developments abroad, such as attempts at reform in China, had an impact on the Chinese in the Dutch East Indies. In the colony, the already prevailing sentiment of discrimination was amplified in 1899 by the adjustment of article 109 in the Government Regulations, which was considered an important article of the 'constitution' of the Dutch East Indies.[3] Japanese people, who until that year were equated with the indigenous people, were made equal to Europeans in 1899.[4] The Chinese in the Dutch East Indies viewed this amendment,[5] which was made based on trade considerations, as a humiliation. The small number of Japanese people in the colony, who were mostly working in fisheries and prostitution, were made equal to the Europeans. Meanwhile the Chinese and its elite, including Chinese officers, prominent businesspeople, and powerful landlords, were denied this position.[6]

Another development in the legal sphere was the possibility for an individual to become equated (*gelijkstelling*) with Europeans. The governor-general had the authority to grant indigenous people – or those equal to them – equality with Europeans if they sought to do so. After being granted equality, they would have the same rights as Europeans in the Dutch East Indies. Those made equal could claim facilities available to Europeans, such as access to the European Elementary School (ELS), which was important for the Chinese and their children. For these individual equations with Europeans, the criterion of religion was applied until 1894, which entailed the applicant converting to Christianity. When that criterion was no longer mandatory, it opened the path for the Chinese, as non-Christians, to apply to the governor-general for equation.

Around the turn of the century, the Chinese realized that their position in the Dutch East Indies left a lot to be desired. Changes made in the late nineteenth century in general and economic policies related to the Chinese made those sentiments even more jarring. After the termination of the lease system there was widespread unemployment. They needed to find new opportunities, yet inland access was very

difficult because of the strict implementation of the pass and district system. The limitations of this system were felt at all levels of daily life, work, and trade. This was exacerbated by the Dutch distrust of the Chinese.

Several authors[7] have used a variety of terms for the developments within Chinese society at the turn of the century: Chinese nationalism, cultural nationalism, the Chinese movement, the pan-Chinese movement, political nationalism, and many more. I have chosen not to put these emancipatory developments under one term, but rather to divide them into three categories. The first one is about initiatives in the field of education, which started with the establishment of the Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan (THHK) in 1900. The general aim was to have both education in Chinese schools using the Chinese language, provided by the Chinese community, and Dutch education provided by the government at the Dutch-Chinese Schools (HCS). I view these developments – which arose partially due to the growing influence of China in this area – as expressions of Chinese nationalism. The ties with China were intensified due to China's active involvement in Java, which, in turn, resonated within the Chinese community.

The second emancipatory development was the struggle for legal equality by abolishing discriminatory regulations. P.H. Fromberg, legal official and member of the Supreme Court of the Dutch East Indies, pointed to this legal inequality and called this objective for legal equality the 'Chinese movement'.[8] These legal emancipatory goals were mostly reached around 1920, and legal equality with the Europeans was a reality achieved in most domains.

The third development was that of political emancipation: the rise of political awareness and the choices that came with that. Where did the Chinese stand as a minority within the colonial society, and how did they see their future? During the colonial period, from 1918, a growing awareness manifested around these matters in three political streams: pro-China, pro-Dutch, and pro-Indonesia. The Japanese invasion in 1942 and the subsequent occupation years terminated this emancipatory period.

Chinese Nationalism and the Return to Confucianism

Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan was established in Batavia on 17 March 1900. The reason for its formation was the need to align Chinese customs in the Dutch East Indies to the principles of Confucianism. There was a wide proliferation of customs surrounding funerals and weddings. Many customs and rituals from the Javanese and Muslim cultures were gradually introduced by indigenous women (Malay, Javanese, Balinese, Buginese, etc.) with whom the Chinese men had relationships with. While sons born out of these bonds were largely given a Chinese upbringing, the daughters were left

with what their mothers instilled in them in the form of their own culture. This way, a compilation of inconsistent rituals arose, which were viewed as meaningless, chaotic, onerous, and burdensome. To tidy this up, a path back to a moral system that could be a guide and source for social life was required. This meant revisiting traditional Chinese norms, found in Confucianism, which experienced a revival in the last decade of the nineteenth century in Southeast Asia.

Interest in a revaluation of Confucian teachings was already visible in several initiatives coming from individual Chinese people in the Dutch East Indies. These people, with a few exceptions, did not belong to the Chinese elite. This renewed interest in Confucius began in the colony when Lie Kim Hok translated Confucius's biography into Malay in 1896, and added a supplement to it. This translation, titled *Hikajat Khong Hoe Tjoe* (The History of Confucius), was published in 1897 by Kolff in Batavia. This was the first attempt to familiarize readers of the Malay language with Confucius. In 1900, Malay translations of two more works by Confucius followed. Inspiration for these developments were found in Singapore, where a strong Confucianism revival bloomed at the end of the nineteenth century under Dr Lim Boen Keng. This Western-educated physician established the Confucian organization Kong Kauw Hwee.[9]

Confucianism served as a source of inspiration and reform for the Chinese in the Dutch East Indies, as well as the basis for their knowledge. An organization was needed to promote Confucian principles, and this became the Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan. Among the 20 founding fathers of THHK were the previously mentioned writer Lie Kim Hok (1863–1912) and the *peranakan* leader Phoa Keng Hek (1857–1937).[10] Lie Kim Hok came from a modest background, while Phoa Keng Hek was the son of a rich Chinese captain. They shared the same Dutch missionary school, and while their careers went different ways, they found each other again in the establishment of THHK.

To be able to read the books on Confucian principles and the Confucian classics, it was necessary to have schools and teachers who were well-acquainted with Confucianism. The next step was taken a year later, when the first Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan school was established in Batavia. The first Chinese to fulfil the THHK teaching requirements was Louw Koei Hong from Singapore.[11]

The First Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan School

Initially, there were insufficient funds to set up a school, and thus the necessary sum of f8,000 was gathered through donations and the issuance of bonds. The school was housed in the THHK organization building in Patekoan, Batavia. THHK's goal was access to education for all Chinese children. As many schools as possible were meant to be present in locations with a Chinese community. The schools were not just meant for the children of the well to do, but also for those with less

money, and for both boys and girls. The monthly tuition was between f2.50 and f10. Educational material was free of charge. The THHK also did not differentiate between children of *peranakan* and *totok* families. *Peranakan* children came from families that have lived in the Dutch East Indies for several generations, and often no longer spoke Chinese, while *totok* children were either born in China or had parents who were born there. At the beginning of the twentieth century, a growing number of families (men, women, and children) came from China to the Dutch East Indies. They still spoke Chinese within the family. Although the Chinese were not a homogenous group, the need for good education for their children was widely shared. Traditionally, education has always been deemed important in the Chinese culture.[12]

THHK began with a school for boys. The curriculum consisted of Chinese language, Chinese tradition, Chinese writing, maths, geography, and other subjects. Education for girls, which came sometime later, came with Malay in Romanized script, some lessons in Chinese characters and writing, maths, geography, and other subjects. Lessons in the Chinese language were given according to a new method and good results were booked within a year.

Under the old teaching methods, only some texts were learned by heart, without an understanding of the characters' meaning. In the new method, modelled on the Western system, texts were made more easily comprehensible for pupils through numerous illustrations. The books, which first came from Japan and later from Shanghai, were presented in an attractive way. As a result, the children learned to read and write faster, with a better understanding of the characters' meaning.

The success of the new teaching method led to the closing of the 'old' Chinese school Gie-Oh in Batavia. The Kong Koan (Chinese Council) decided to give Gie-Oh's funds to the THHK schools, provided that children from parents who did not have enough money for school tuition would also be allowed to enrol. In addition to a modern teaching method, the THHK schools consciously chose to teach in Mandarin. Not only was Mandarin the official language in China, but the use of a neutral and a common Chinese language should prevent the Chinese who spoke regional dialects, such as Hokkien, Cantonese, and Hakka, and the *peranakans*, from feeling left behind. Initial objections, particularly from Hokkien speakers, gradually dissipated. These different aspects of the THHK education appealed to the Chinese community, and the THHK schools became an instant success.

The establishment of the THHK schools and education initiatives of the Chinese in the Indies attracted the attention of the Chinese government. This was evident from the numerous visits by Chinese officials, who were initially welcomed by the colonial administration. In 1903, Kang Yu-Wei, a pioneering reformer in China, visited the THHK schools during a trip to the Dutch East Indies. He was received with great enthusiasm by the local Chinese people. Afterwards, the viceroy of

Kanton sent civil servant Lauw Soe-Kie to inspect the THHK schools. To do this, he was given the title of admiral in the Chinese marines, and he attended meetings with the governor-general and other key colonial officials in his uniform.

Starting in 1906, civil servants from China – sometimes arriving in war ships – came for annual visits. The Chinese government stationed an education inspector in Java. This person regularly inspected schools and provided subsidies to establish a secondary school in Semarang.

After the formation of the Chinese Republic in 1911, China maintained its support for education in the Dutch East Indies. This entailed more than just visits from education inspectors and other state officials. As the THHK schools initially worked largely with teachers and education materials from Japan, the education ministry in Beijing began sending teachers from China to the Indies. Textbooks started to come from Shanghai. The uniformity in planning, textbooks, and educational methods was thus further stimulated. To streamline the THHK schools to secondary schools in Nanjing, the Khay Lam Hak Tong school was set up. China provided all the study and living costs, and some pocket money. The only thing the students needed to finance was the trip to China. In 1907, 21 boys were the first ones to go to China, and in 1909 a group of 38 boys followed. Until the outbreak of the Chinese revolution in 1911, some 200 boys enjoyed this schooling in China.[13]

Siang Hwee and Soe Po Sia

Chinese nationalism first reared its head in the Dutch East Indies with the establishment of the THHK in 1900. In the ensuing years, China not only supported Chinese education in the Dutch East Indies, but also assisted in setting up two other Chinese-related institutions: Siang Hwee (Chamber of Commerce, or Chinese trade organizations), and Soe Po Sia (Chinese reading clubs).

The interest and support from the Chinese state for the Chinese in the Indies, the success of the THHK schools, and the Sinification that resulted from all of the above, was cause for worry, particularly among the local colonial administration. The establishment of the Tiong Hoa Siang Hwee, better known as Siang Hwee, mirrored the Chinese policy of strengthening its ties with overseas Chinese. In Amoy (now known as Xiamen), the capital of Fujian province, the Bureau for the Affairs of the South was established. The first Siang Hwee was set up in Batavia in 1901, followed by the formation of Siang Hwee in all significant locations. Siang Hwee operated under the Department of Agriculture, Industry, and Trade in Beijing. Thus, there was direct contact with China, which the government invested in maintaining. Chinese commissioners regularly went to the Dutch East Indies to report on matters of Chinese trade there and the circumstances in which the trade was carried out. These visits were sometimes accompanied by a small fleet of war ships, and this

show of power certainly did not go unnoticed by the Chinese community in the Indies as well as the colonial administration.

Siang Hwee activities were not limited to trade. These trade organizations worked closely with the THHK, and, through their membership, they were able to increase pressure on the colonial government. Sometimes, Siang Hwee would lead boycotts organized in the interest of Chinese trade. On the social front, the organization was active in China as well as in the Dutch East Indies. In the Indies, for example, Siang Hwee would make an annual donation to a Chinese orphanage in Surabaya. Conversely, donations were given to China when the country was struck by disasters such as famine or flooding. Support was given and received from both sides.

Before Chinese consuls were allowed to represent China in the Dutch East Indies in 1912, Siang Hwee acted as a semi-official institution representing Chinese interests. Its tasks included issuing passports. The Chinese community as well as the Europeans and the local administration saw Siang Hwee as an institution representing the Chinese in a specific city. Indeed, Siang Hwee representatives sometimes enjoyed more respect than the Chinese leaders appointed by the Dutch East Indies government.[14]

While the THHK underlined the cultural aspect of Chinese nationalism, and Siang Hwee secured the economic aspects of the above as well as maintaining contact with China, Soe Po Sia – clubs for books, newspapers, and reading – focused on political and revolutionary elements. The organization gave out free reading material so that Chinese readers could be introduced to modern political ideas and develop their political awareness. Meetings, lectures, and courses – sometimes in Mandarin – were organized for this purpose.[15]

All these developments would influence the political awareness and sense of identity of the Chinese in the Indies. China obtained a permanent space in their thoughts. In the early twentieth century, even those Chinese who had already lived for generations in the Dutch East Indies, and who were familiar with the Dutch people and culture, were greatly attracted to, and influenced by, anything related to being Chinese and Chinese education. For adults, the THHK organized events such as lectures on Confucianism and Chinese culture. There were regular educational, social, and cultural activities in the club house in Batavia. While the THHK and Siang Hwee mostly attracted Hokkien members, the Soe Po Sia consisted mainly of the more revolutionary Hakka and Cantonese *totok* youngsters.

The THHK was the most ambitious of the three institutions. It was also the most visible, with 75 THHK schools with 5,500 pupils by 1908. In 1926, these numbers had grown to 442 THHK schools with almost 20,000 students.[16]

During this period, China opened new opportunities for the Chinese in the Indies, in contrast with the colonial administration, which aimed to maintain the

status quo as much as possible. The East Indies administration only paid attention to developments in the Chinese community if Dutch interests were at stake. Fearing that the growing influence of China on the Chinese in the Indies would estrange the Chinese from the Netherlands and the Dutch, the colonial government finally took action in 1906. A wall had to be erected to block China's influence, and that wall came in the form of Dutch education.

The Need for Dutch Education

Until 1905, local administrators' worries about developments in the field of education within the Chinese communities and China's growing influence on them went unheard by higher officials. Neither the director of educational affairs nor the Council for the Indies took this seriously. Until 1900, the Indies government took the position that nothing needed to be done for the education of the Chinese people. Government Regulation article 128[17] made it clear: the government only had to provide schools for Europeans and Indonesians. It was not its task to establish and maintain schools for Chinese youth.

In practice, this meant that no money was made available for the education of Chinese children, be it in the form of subsidies or any other means of support. In 1893, a request for subsidies from Tan Siang Soei for a Chinese school in Batavia was rejected. There was no reason to grant the request, the administration said.[18] A request in 1900, submitted by the resident of Rembang, head of the regional administration, to set up a state school for Chinese children in Lasem was also rejected. The resident deemed it reasonable that, given the large sums bestowed on European education and schools for indigenous communities, something should be done for the Chinese in Lasem. The previously wealthy town in Central Java had fallen on hard times. He believed that a state school with Dutch education for Chinese children would help them prepare for a better future. At the same time, it would bring the Chinese closer to the Dutch administration.[19] Nevertheless, his request was rejected. This reluctant and unwilling policy continued after 1900.

Since its establishment, the THHK had been eager to include the Dutch language into its curriculum. Within the organization, people were aware that Chinese children who wanted to move upward in colonial society must speak Dutch. However, hiring a Dutch teacher was very expensive. A request to the colonial administration to organize a lottery to raise the necessary funds was rejected, as was a request in 1903 to set up a Dutch school in a Chinese neighbourhood in Batavia. An appeal by the resident of Batavia for an alternative education policy that would include Chinese children also fell on deaf ears. Provisions for educational facilities for Chinese children would inevitably cost money, while not enough was set aside even for the educational needs of the indigenous community.

As instruction in Dutch at THHK schools did not seem possible, they switched to English. It was cheaper to hire English teachers from Singapore. The fact that THHK schools, in addition to Chinese education, also started teaching in English – a language commonly used in trade – conjured up worries within the colonial administration. This could further widen the gap with the Dutch, and the trading position of the Chinese could become stronger at the cost of the Dutch. Govaars-Tjia, who studied Dutch education in colonial society, suggests that it was competition with the English language that finally cracked the rigidity of the colonial education policy. In 1906, support for education for the Chinese became negotiable.[20]

Dutch Chinese School (HCS)

1906 marked a turning point in the attitude of the Dutch East Indies administration towards access to Dutch education for the Chinese. On 11 July 1906, J.G. Pott was appointed as the new director for educational affairs. Meanwhile, the political landscape had shifted. On the Chinese side, the population had become more assertive, and passivity was replaced by a more confident positioning. An awareness grew amongst the Chinese that they should no longer be passive about the government's restrictive policies. Emancipation became an issue, and the Chinese felt supported by the attention they received from the Chinese government. Requests for access to Dutch education acquired a more pressing tone. The Chinese wanted access to the European Elementary School (ELS) under the same conditions as European children, and with the same tuition. Joint education for Chinese children together with other pupils in the European schools was preferred over a separate school specifically set up for Chinese children.

Until then, it was very difficult for Chinese children to gain entrance to Dutch state schools such as the ELS. This was only possible if the father had friendly relations with the resident or deputy resident. The deputy resident was usually the head of the ELS committee. Even then, access could still be denied, with the school principal giving the excuse that there was no space. Tuition for Chinese children was also set at the highest category of f15 per child. Only offspring of very wealthy and influential parents, or those of Chinese officers, were able to sign up for European state schools. Chinese children would also only be allowed into the schools on the condition that they spoke Dutch and were familiar with Dutch morals and customs. For the children to fulfil these requirements, parents often felt it necessary to have their children lodge with teachers from the school, which, in turn, entailed exorbitant costs.

The suggestion from the Chinese for joint education at the ELS met with resistance within government circles. While this development would have likely meant acknowledgement of equality for the Chinese, on the Dutch side people were afraid

that the expected flood of Chinese children into European schools would lead to a decline in educational quality. The assumption was that the Chinese students would have little to no proficiency in the Dutch language and that native Dutch people would see this as a reason to send their children to private schools. And as was often said in the Dutch East Indies of that era: 'Difference in race and standing should certainly not be ignored!'

Pott, meanwhile, understood that China's involvement in education was basically an attack on the ruling Dutch authority over the Chinese population. The success of the THHK schools, the Sinification of the Chinese, the support from China, the increasingly pressing requests from the Chinese population for Dutch education – in short, the matter of education for the Chinese – made the consideration of another education policy a matter of interest for the government. Actually, it was a serious matter of interest for the government. Pott gave a negative advice regarding the Chinese request to ease access to European schools. He suggested that they should be informed that the government was working on a government regulation. This would win him time. Pott hoped that, with this promise, the matter of education could be removed from the Chinese nationalist movement. However, the colonial government's policy of delaying, slowing down, and pushing the matter to the background was not received well in The Hague. There, Minister for the Colonies D. Fock wanted immediate action to be taken. The Hague was under great international political pressure. The Chinese government continued to push harder for the abolishment of the pass and district system. The colonial government, meanwhile, was working on reforming that system. This, however, would take time to be realized. Thus, it was decided that measures had to be taken without delay, and the choice fell upon the issue of education, which would take a shorter time to process.

One year later, in 1907, Director Pott introduced the establishment of the Dutch Chinese Schools: separate schools for the Chinese where Dutch was the language of instruction. Free tuition was not possible, and school fees had to be the same as those for Indonesian children in European schools. Thus, the schools would only be accessible for children in the upper classes of Chinese society. For the majority of Chinese children, it should be sufficient to follow the same education as that for children in the indigenous schools. There was supposed to be enough space for these Chinese children at the schools, and admissions into these schools would be the same for them as they were for indigenous children. Pott estimated that 10 per cent of the total number of Chinese children would attend the Dutch language schools. He calculated that 42 HCS schools must therefore be set up, spread over 26 locations in Java and nine outside of the island. Only then would the new schools be able to compete with the THHK schools, and the Chinese would realize 'how much better and proper the government schools are compared to their own (schools)'.

Pott's plan was elaborate, as was the budget. Schools had to be built, and additional European teachers had to be hired and trained. Nevertheless, according to Pott, this was the only answer to the government's request to provide for the educational needs of the Chinese in the Dutch East Indies. He pointedly warned that it would be politically risky to raise Chinese expectations that could not be realized. The planned educational facilities must be secured with powerful regulations, and money had to be shelled out. Finally, it was decided to start with four schools in Batavia, Semarang, Surabaya, and, later, in Makassar.[21] On 1 May 1908, the decision to set up the Hollands-Chineesche School (HCS) was published in the Government Gazette. For the Chinese, the establishment of the HCS meant a second step towards their emancipation in the field of education. The chapter 'Educational Services (1900–1942)' would dive deeper into Dutch-language education.

The Chinese Movement

The Pass and District System: Reform or Termination

Of all the discriminatory and limiting provisions, the abolishment of the pass and district system was the most important for the Chinese. After the lease system was terminated, the government had no interest in giving the Chinese access inland. Pending the revision of the access, residence, and travel system as a whole – the outcome of the Fokkens report – the pass and district system was implemented more strictly. In practice, it would sometimes be executed in an aggressive manner, as the Chinese were marked as a danger to the indigenous population.

Travel limitations, even for short distances, led to great discomfort and delays for all Chinese, from rich to poor. In trade, it was sometimes the cause for heavy losses as making quick decisions and swiftly reacting to changing circumstances were impossible. Transport was also a problem. Also, a 'tipping system' was developed among civil servants involved in handing out and inspecting the passes.[22]

Very little happened before 1907, as revision of these systems in the Indies stalled due to delaying tactics of the advisory boards involved in the process. With far-fetched and complicated legal interpretations from the Justice Department, and later the Indies Council, this process was stretched for years.

The pass system was eased for the first time in 1904, after a request from Chinese trading company N.V. Kian Gwan. The application dated from 1901. The Kian Gwan board (directors, commissioners, and proxy holders) received permission from the local authorities to travel at any time to destinations where their presence was necessary for business purposes. In 1905, the district system was eased locally when the governor-general allowed Chinese people who had resided for more

than 20 years in villages outside the allotted district in the Kediri Residency, to remain living there. The overall application and implementation of the system varied widely, and was dependent on the judgement of the residents as heads of the regional administrations. This uncertainty posed big problems for enterprises such as plantations, which needed Chinese labour.[23]

Meanwhile, the East Indies government realized that the shifting political balance in Asia had to be seriously considered. Chinese matters were becoming more than just internal issues. Developments in the Indies surrounding the Chinese – their initiatives and demands – took on an international nuance. Due to the changing political sphere in Asia, international attention for events in the Indies – and the meddling, complaints, and pressure from the Chinese government – also became a matter for The Hague. Thus, the Minister for the Colonies and the Minister of Foreign Affairs had to get involved. China had appointed an envoy to The Hague, the dynamic Lou Tseng-Hsiang, and the Dutch had Chargé d'Affaires W.J. Oudendijk in Beijing. From their stations, both diplomats dealt intensively with the situation in the Indies and the goals and demands of the Chinese movement. The Chinese and international press closely followed those developments.

Everything collided in the 1906–1911 period. While it was not obvious to the public eye, the envoys played a big role in this. All reforms related to the Chinese, even if they had not yet been completed, had to be at least announced before Chinese consuls were allowed access to the Indies. The Dutch government realized that holding off and biding time – its policy since 1890 – could no longer hold due to the increasingly urgent demands that China's consuls should be allowed admission. As objections and demands regarding the pass and district system increased, pressure from China's side also intensified, with Chinese state organizations, press, and the envoy in Beijing involving themselves in these matters. It was crucial, however, not to give the impression that changes had been made because of the arrival of the consuls, and thus due to pressure from China.

The Indies, however, continued to procrastinate. In 1907, Minister for the Colonies Fock ran out of patience. Time was of the essence. He was not convinced that the Chinese were indeed the threat to the indigenous population that many said they were. He also believed that Chinese grievances were not unreasonable. Fock himself thought that the existing pass and district system was untenable, and that it should be abolished. In the meantime, the Indies administration was still considering a revision of the system. As more Chinese officials visited the Indies 'to be informed of' education and other matters, Fock was seriously worried that the Chinese government's attention would lead to complications. Fock had preferred to solve the matter in the Netherlands, but in fact it came under the jurisdiction of Governor-General J.B. van Heutsz. This meant that The Hague had to wait for Batavia.

In the background of these developments were several decisions made in 1908, which only affected the Chinese elite. These provisions were felt necessary to diminish tension, and thus, in 1908, Chinese community leaders were allowed freedom of movement. This was also done in the hope of enhancing the prestige of Chinese officers and making these positions more attractive. In the years after the termination of the lease system it had become increasingly difficult to find candidates for those positions. Other Chinese functionaries, such as members of the Orphans and Estate Chambers and local councils, were also granted freedom of movement. Their legal spouses and children, however, did not get that privilege, though they did not have to show their passes when travelling with their husband or father.[24] Another comparable exception made that year was a *forum privilegiatum* (exception to jurisdiction[25]) for Foreign Oriental leaders. This gave these leaders the right to appear before a European judge in a European court in criminal as well as in civil cases, instead of having to appear in a court for indigenous people and those equal to them.[26]

The Police Court: The Case of Loa Joe Djin

No efforts were spared to solve the Foreign Oriental issue, which was an alternative way of referring to the problems around the ultimate abolishment of the pass and district system. At the same time, however, the case of Loa Joe Djin came to light in 1909. With that case the *politierechtspraak* (administration of justice at the *politierol* or police court) landed at the offices of the Chinese and Dutch governments. The institution of the police court was a lower criminal court for the indigenous population and those of equal status to them. One key characteristic of this form of administration of justice was that it had very few regulations in all its procedural phases. Regulations, which were considered crucial in securing an independent and impartial sentence or verdict, were absent. The administrator of justice was a civil servant with no formal training as a regular judge. In this position, the civil servant had a lot of freedom, paving the way for arbitrariness and power abuse. There was no possibility of appeal. Once a sentence was pronounced only a pardon by the governor-general could bring a different outcome. This court was feared as well as hated by the people that had to appear there.

In 1908, Loa Joe Djin, a storeowner in Batavia, was handed a police court sentence of 90 days forced labour in chains for stealing some gramophone records. Loa contended that the sentence was unfair and based on false testimonies. He was not given the opportunity to prove his innocence, and his request for a pardon was denied. In addition to causing him great humiliation, Loa felt that this sentence was also a stain on his reputation, which was very important for him. After carrying out his sentence, Loa decided not to take the matter lying down. He published an

article in the Malay-language daily *Kabar Perniagaan* (Business News). He wrote that he had been unjustly accused, and that the sentence was based on the false testimonies of two Dutch women. Loa sent a telegram to the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs in Beijing, the viceroy in Nanjing, and the Chinese envoy in The Hague. In the telegrams, he explained his case, and stated that he was arrested without due process, and sentenced to 90 days of forced chained labour without proof or possibility of appeal. He said that he would prefer bankruptcy from the exorbitant costs of sending the telegrams rather than stay mum over the unjust and arbitrary judgement that had befallen him. Sending the telegrams cost him f600, which, at the time, was equivalent to a month's salary of a Dutch judge in the Dutch East Indies with ten years of experience. Loa may have lost in the police court, but he succeeded in his subsequent efforts. He was heard: his plea was headline news in Dutch and Dutch East Indies media. In the Indies, it was front page news in the dailies *Bataviaas Nieuwsblad* and *De Locomotief*, which were then picked up by other Dutch and Malay dailies. The papers' editorials, with the exception of the *Indische Gids,* all called for the dismissal of the existing police court. The local administration downplayed the media comments and deemed them inflated and highly exaggerated. The administrators, in turn, contended that the media had a twisted understanding of the case, and that they were way off the mark. The Chinese Council got involved and sent a petition demanding that the Chinese in the Dutch East Indies be made equal to the Europeans in the lower criminal court system, e.g. the police court. In The Hague, Chinese Envoy Lou Tseng-Hiang reacted immediately after receiving Loa's telegram. He asked the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs to investigate the matter. The minister, in turn, had also received a telegram requesting information from his counterpart in China. In The Hague, opinions on the matter ranged from 'there is a basis of truth in Loa's story' to 'improper interference from a Chinese envoy'. Batavia was held accountable for the administration of justice.

In 1909, parallel to the Loa Joe Djin case, there was still little progress on the Foreign Orientals issue, despite pressure from Fock. The arbitrariness of Loa Joe Djin's case attracted attention both in Java and beyond. China put pressure on the swift admission of consuls in the Dutch East Indies. There were already Chinese consuls or chargé d'affaires in The Hague, in other European countries, and on other continents. The Netherlands could no longer afford to lag behind and wait any longer in allowing consuls into the Dutch East Indies. The Chinese envoy in The Hague exercised pressure, where necessary, and refused to be ignored. The Dutch chargé d'affaires in Beijing informed the Minister of Foreign Affairs about reports in the Chinese press and the overall mood in China. He urged for swift solutions because, in addition to the Chinese press, the international media was also taking notice of Chinese matters in the Indies.

The Hague wanted a far-reaching revision of the pass and district system, and was even open to completely abolishing the discriminatory regulations. Batavia, in contrast, aimed for a regulation that still allowed the government to have control over admission, residence, and travel. Finally, following international pressure and urging from The Hague, an interim solution was adopted in the regulations, which then had to be made public immediately. First in the Indies, so that the Chinese there did not get the impression that regulations by the Dutch East Indies administration were the result of meddling by the Chinese envoy in The Hague.[27]

Almost simultaneously with the revision of the pass and district system, the matter of the police court in the Indies was also addressed. In 1909, A.W.F. Idenburg,[28] who had just stepped down from his position as Minister for the Colonies, took over the office of governor-general from Van Heutsz. Despite this changing of the guard, there was a certain measure of continuity. Governor-General Idenburg and Director of Justice I.A. Nederburgh thought along the same lines: they no longer wanted to procrastinate, and reforms on the administration of justice could still be done out of apparent goodwill. Political necessity became a political emergency. Resentment from the Chinese side, in the Indies as well as in China, regarding existing conditions had to be removed. At the same time, Idenburg also took into account the displeasure on the side of the indigenous community if he were to cater to the Chinese by making only the latter equal with the Europeans in this field of law. However, the political aspect had become so important that everything had to take a backseat to the revisions, including the grave objections and stumbling blocks such as great financial sacrifices and an expansion of judicial personnel.

The solution came in the form of replacing the police court with a magistrate's court (*landrechter*). The lower criminal court cases were taken out of the hands of civil servants and put under the control of a legally trained judge. The extraordinary aspect of this change was that the magistrate would also pass judgements on all ethnic groups, including Europeans and Indonesians. By doing this, the lower criminal courts were unified. It was a major step in the history of the Dutch East Indies' separate legal system – and the only possible step, given the circumstances.

There were delays, as was always the case in the Indies. There were some practical objections: the unavoidable higher costs, and the lack of judicial officials for the new judicial institute of *landrechter.* Beyond government circles, there was relative calm in the first half of 1910, but the second half of that year was marked by actions from the Chinese side. Petitions were offered by individuals as well as Chinese groups. One secret flyer called on Chinese teachers, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, and school associations in the Dutch East Indies to take action to demand the abolition of the police court and the pass and district system. There were also petitions sent to the authorities in the Dutch East Indies, China, and the Chinese envoy in The Hague. These petitions were followed up by telegrams. Should

these actions not lead to positive results, then other activities would follow, such as meetings in Batavia, a mass meeting at the governor-general's, and telegraphic protests to Beijing and the Chinese envoy.

It was no longer possible for the Indies government to announce the police court reform prior to the conclusion of the consular treaty. However, it was important that plans for the police court reforms were made public before the Chinese consuls arrived in the Indies. In the short term, however, the only possibility was to announce this in the 1911 annual Queen's speech.[29]

The revision of the pass and district system was announced on 15 October 1910, before the consular treaty was sealed.[30] The reform was not well received by China and the press. China appeared displeased, because the easing of the pass and district system also came with limitations on Chinese immigration.

Ultimately, the pass system was abolished in 1914. There were no signs whatsoever that the indigenous population had suffered from the presence of the Chinese inland. The district system was eased in 1915 by revoking the regulation in neighbourhoods with few Europeans. It was feared that Europeans would find it difficult to share living space with non-Europeans, given the Chinese's different way of life and their view on hygiene. The complete abolition of the district system came in 1919. Prior to that, the Semarang municipality independently shifted the borders of the Chinese district so that they fell together with the municipality's borders in 1917. This meant that the district system in the city was practically lifted.[31] Starting in 1919, the Chinese were free to travel inland and to settle in villages, and no problems seemed to arise there.[32] The police court was replaced in 1914 by the institute of the magistrate's court (*landrechter*). With this, the lower criminal courts were sufficiently guaranteed to provide proper administration of justice for all residents of the Dutch East Indies.

Individual Equation (*Individuele Gelijkstelling*)

With the removal of the pass and district system in 1914 and 1919, respectively, and the unification of the lower criminal courts for all ethnic groups in 1914, two major grievances of the Chinese were taken away. These two victorious battles improved the legal status of the Chinese as a group, but complete equality with the Europeans was not yet within reach. Without equality, the Chinese remained in a subordinate position. If individual Chinese wanted to be made equal with the Europeans, a request for equation had to be made to the governor-general, who had the authority to grant this request.[33] Until 1894, the condition for equation was that the applicant was Christian. That year, however, this compulsory religious criterion was lifted. Another criterion came in its place: the suitability of the individual Chinese applicant for European society. This suitability could take the form of Christianity,

the ability to read and write in Dutch, having passed an exam, position in society, a European upbringing, and anything that could contribute to that suitability. None of these criteria were mandatory or crucial for the granting of equation. When making his decision, the governor-general received advice from the resident, the head of the local administration. The suitability criteria were open standards with a variety of aspects that gave way to subjective interpretation.

Until 1894, very few Chinese were given equal status. The first one was in 1886, given to a Chinese Christian, followed by eight others in 1889, 1891, 1893, and 1894. They were all from Ambon, which had a large Christian population. After the religion criterion was scrapped in 1894, seven equation applications came in: five from Ambon and two from Ternate. Even these minute numbers caused some worry within government circles. They believed that too many of such requests were coming in from the Chinese.[34] Consequently, the requirements were tightened. In 1897, every applicant for equal status had to answer three questions: 1. Did the applicant have a European upbringing (brought up in Europe), or was he brought up in a European environment as a European. 2. Could the applicant function well within the European community. 3. Did the applicant no longer feel at home in the community he came from and felt like he no longer belonged there.

These were basically impossible criteria to fulfil. An upbringing in Europe was expensive, and only possible for the Chinese who were able and willing to do this. To bring up a Chinese child in a European environment could be done by having the child board with the family of a European (teacher). Nevertheless, costs for this were high. The other requirements were also virtually impossible as, within the highly segregated colonial society, the European social circles were basically closed for the Chinese. The requirement that the applicant 'no longer feels at home in the community he came from' was in fact a demand to uproot oneself, and of self-denial. These new criteria were clearly meant to decrease the number of equal status requests.

Further obstacles were raised, such as the plan that, after getting equal status, a Chinese marriage that was done prior to the new status would be deemed illegal, as would the children born out of that union. Such a marriage had to be 'redone'. Another point of discussion was the clothing and hairstyles that equated Chinese had to adopt: European or Chinese style. In Indies government circles, great effort was made to keep the granting of equal status to the Chinese to a minimum.[35] This policy of minimizing equal status of the Chinese remained until 1912.

In 1912, both the Dutch envoy in Beijing as well as Governor-General Idenburg believed that the Chinese issue had to be dealt with differently.[36] The Chinese, Idenburg thought, would continue to exercise pressure until every distinction between the Europeans and Chinese was scrapped. He also expected the Chinese government to come with demands of equal status if civil legislation in China were

to be based on European standards. This latest development was in the preparation stages.

Idenburg wanted to maximize efforts to reduce or eliminate Chinese inequality on several terrains. Complete legal equality, however, was not possible due to the large indigenous population he had to reckon with. Thus, requirements were adjusted for individual equal status applications. It was decided to move away from 'suitability for European society', and to focus more on the 'existing legal needs' of the applicant. The institution of equation had to be more flexible in its implementation if it were to serve as an emancipatory tool and as a 'safety valve in these times of great tension'.

In 1913, the new criteria were meant to open the door towards equation. In practice, however, it was not that easy. It was an old trick in new packaging. The questionnaire remained the same. The altered criterion of 'existing legal needs' was still too general and vague, giving little assurance and allowing the assessor to go down various paths. Out of the 18 items in the questionnaire – which gauged the development, refinement, and the social status of the applicant – the key one was 'notability and standing'. From this, the wealth of the applicant would be apparent. Care was taken that no Chinese people of modest background would be given equal status. Some requests were also denied when it became clear that the application was only done so that the applicant's children could go to European schools, which, in the eyes of the government, should not be the purpose of the equal status.

The criteria changes did not lead to basic policy changes. The decision to no longer bring forward unnecessary objections that barred the equation process only came in 1918. The applicant's social standing would only be taken into account if it were necessary. Hardly any statistics are available on the number of acceptances or rejections of equation requests.[37] Women and children were included in the numbers of those made equal in status. The largest number of Chinese given equal status was 600 in 1937. Percentage wise, out of a population of 1,233,214 Chinese people in the Dutch East Indies, 582,431 of whom were in Java and Madura, it was 0.048 per cent and 0.10 per cent, respectively. A very low percentage of the Chinese population in Java and Madura, and almost negligible given the total population in the Dutch East Indies.

At the core of the equation policies for individuals was setting, formulating, and then applying and assessing the criteria. The criteria had to give enough space to push the interpretation in the desired direction. The criteria suggested that the Chinese found it important to be able to participate in European society, i.e. that the Chinese wanted to gain social access to that society. However, there were doubts about whether this was truly the case, because the Chinese actually had very different concerns. They wanted equality in all aspects: the same legal position as the Europeans, without having to mingle socially with them. The Chinese

wanted to secure legal certainty for themselves and be free from discriminatory and humiliating regulations. Moreover, for many Chinese the most important aspect of getting equal status with Europeans was access to Dutch education: the European Elementary School ELS.[38]

Dutch Subjects under Western Family Law

In the first two decades of the twentieth century, two other changes in the law were important for the position of the Chinese in society: the Dutch Subject Law (*Wet op het Nederlands Onderdaanschap*), which was enacted in 1910, and the applicability of the European Family and Inheritance Law on the Chinese in 1917. Both developments were unrelated to the Chinese desire for greater equality. These initiatives came from the Dutch and colonial administrations, respectively, and were considered necessary on account of international developments.

Since the establishment of the Chinese Nationality Law in 1909, it became crucial for the Netherlands to clarify to China that the Chinese in the Indies were Dutch subjects, even though they did not have Dutch nationality according to the 1892 Dutch Nationality Law. By establishing the Dutch Subject Law of 1910, the Dutch government constructed the legal basis to exert authority over the Chinese in the East Indies as its subjects. With the Dutch Subject Law established, the Dutch and Chinese governments agreed, in an addendum accompanying the consular treaty in 1911–1912, that Chinese consuls had no authority over the Chinese in the Dutch East Indies. In other words, Chinese consuls stationed in the East Indies could not look after the interests of the Chinese as long as these Chinese were residents on Dutch territory.

The impending law reform in China, with a family law and law of inheritance on a Western basis, made it imperative that the Chinese in the Dutch East Indies were also brought under the European Family and Inheritance law. This also needed to be done before China's reforms materialized. The traditional Chinese family law and law of inheritance, which was by then deemed outdated by China, could no longer be maintained in the Dutch East Indies. This occurred in 1917, and the law was implemented in 1919. In addition, a civil registry was set up and, starting in 1919, this government body registered Chinese births, marriages, and deaths.

In 1920, a period of improvements and changes in the legal position of the Chinese in the Indies came to an end. The pass and district system was completely abolished, and the police court was replaced by the magistrate's court (*landrechter*). For individual Chinese, after 1918, the door to getting equal status with Europeans opened wider, with more flexible equation criteria. The Dutch Subject Law made the Chinese Dutch subjects but without Dutch citizenship. They became 'non-Dutch Dutch subjects'. The 1917 applicability of the European

family law and law of inheritance (with some exceptions) on the Chinese was met with little resistance. It did, however, lead to several lawsuits in which daughters appealed to European inheritance law to demand an equal share of their father's inheritance. Under the Chinese law of inheritance, daughters did not have any right to inheritance.

Leadership in a Changing World

Until the end of the nineteenth century, it was clear who the leaders were in the Chinese community: the Chinese officers, the Chinese Council in Batavia, Semarang, and Surabaya, and wealthy Chinese businessmen. The decreasing authority of the Chinese officers after the scrapping of leases was unavoidable. The institution's esteem fell sharply within its own community, and it was even viewed in a negative light.

As the glory days of the institution of the Chinese officers was coming to an end, the relationship between the government and the Chinese officers and the Chinese councils also changed. The composition of the Chinese Council in Batavia had to reflect the Chinese community in the Dutch East Indies. It had become more heterogenous due to migration.[39] After 1870, the number of Hakka and Cantonese migrants from China increased. The administrative unity within the Chinese Council was shaken because the members were no longer exclusively Hokkien, as Hakka officials were also appointed. The colonial administration also started actively discouraging family ties among officers. The loss of status and authority in the institution of the Chinese officers was also visible in appointments. Very little was left of the lavish ceremonies and parties that used to accompany the appointment of a Chinese officer.

The decay of the institution was not only a matter of status within its own group or the changes in the Chinese Council constellation. Especially after 1900, there was less need for their role as intermediary or advisor. Individual Chinese began having more direct contact with new institutions and had less use for Chinese officers to mediate. When the administrative institution of municipalities was introduced in 1905, together with mayors and city councils, all these took over most of the tasks that used to be in the hands of Chinese officers. The 1917–1919 civil registry established by the colonial administration for the Chinese ended the registry and mediation tasks of the officers in marriages and divorces.

The Chinese also started taking more advantage of legal advisors and notaries to solve their problems, even in divorces that were usually handled by the Chinese Council. The Chinese officers were left with less desirable tasks such as collecting taxes and maintaining peace and order. As mentioned before, the officers and other

3.1. Lie Ngo An, Chinese captain of Yogyakarta, around 1920.

officials did get handed additional privileges in 1908, including dispensation for the pass and district system, and the granting of a *forum privilegiatum.*

Compensation for their tasks had been considered but was not realized. The position remained unpaid. In 1908, the decision was made to add an official uniform. While it was meant to add and emphasize status to a position that had weakened, it actually had the opposite effect. In changing times, the official attire actually drew attention to the relationship with a disobliging colonial administration, while the Chinese society needed a different type of leadership. In their leaders, the Chinese longed to see the personification of their aspirations as a minority group: someone who stood for their own ethnic identity.

The institution of Chinese officers had seen its best days, and attempts to reorganize it or to merge it with European or local administrations failed. The stringent colonial and social hierarchy prohibited the merging of the Chinese administration into the European one, as this would be seen as an insult for the indigenous civil servants. Within the Chinese community itself, there was great resistance towards

merging the Chinese administration with the indigenous one. Given the relationship among ethnic groups, this was unacceptable for the Chinese.

There was explicit opposition against the continuation of the institution of Chinese officers from within the community itself, especially from the Chinese-Malay press, and the daily *Sin Po* in particular. Ultimately, only the Chinese Council of Batavia survived the negative developments and publicity. The Chinese in Batavia wanted to keep the institution, and this was decided in 1927. The reason for this was that the Chinese Council in Batavia differed from those in other cities. Batavia had a large Chinese population, and most council members were landowners, which meant that the end of the lease system had not hit them as hard. The council remained an important administrative institution that not only owned large plots of land, but also had large funds and institutions important for the Chinese such as schools, cemeteries, and temples. There were also worries that the takeover of the council by the government would bring consequences for the Chinese community. In Dutch hands, the Chinese community feared that important social, educational, and cultural structures and institutions could be affected, or even disappear. This was much less of an issue in markedly smaller Chinese councils, such as those in Semarang and in Surabaya. These were closed in 1931 and 1934, respectively. The Kong Koan – the Chinese Council of Batavia – continued to play an important role in the Chinese community until the initial years of the Indonesian Republic.[40]

The Rise of Political Awareness: Three Movements

The wave of renewal and emancipation at the turn of the century did not produce new leaders within the Chinese community. However, there were proponents of initiatives – advocates and foremen – who brought about emancipation movements. Only a small group of these foremen came from the circle of Chinese officers, with the majority having non-privileged backgrounds. They differed from the old Chinese elite in the Dutch East Indies in that they did not just focus on the economy. They were striving for more knowledge of Confucian teaching and, subsequently, for more and better education, and for better legal standing for the Chinese community. Not surprisingly, this spirit of emancipation also led to greater political awareness, not just within the Chinese community. Indonesians were also looking to improve their position within the colonial society and increasingly thought about independence.

As previously shown, the movement of Chinese nationalism on education, the Chinese movement on legal reforms, and the attention from China in the first decade of the twentieth century influenced the Chinese community. Also important for

political awareness was the establishment of the 1909 Chinese Nationality Law, and the Dutch Subject Law the following year. The admission of Chinese consuls to the Dutch East Indies in 1912 to look after the interests of the Chinese was felt as further support. This support strengthened the awareness of their own identity and culture. China's active help and support stood in sharp contrast with what the Chinese experienced with the passive and unaccommodating attitude of the colonial administration.

Political awareness grew in this period and was further stimulated by the Chinese and Malay media. The Chinese–Malay press, with many of their Chinese journalists born in the Indies, inspired the public with political ideas and thoughts. Journalism had a big influence on public opinion, especially after the establishment of the daily *Sin Po* in 1910.

'Once Chinese, Always Chinese'

The *Sin Po* group was the first of the three political streams to emerge after 1910. The two other groups were the more Dutch-focused organization Chung Hwa Hui CHH (1928), and the Indonesia-focused political party Partai Tionghoa Indonesia, PTI (Chinese Indonesian Party, 1932).[41]

The leftist, China-oriented *Sin Po* was set up in Batavia in 1910, first on a weekly basis and later daily. With a circulation of 10,000 copies, it was the largest Chinese–Malay daily.[42]

Since 1918, chief editor Tjoe Bou San had a clear imprint on the daily, particularly with his viewpoint on the issue of being Dutch subjects. Under his leadership, *Sin Po* became one of the most important political influences within the Chinese community.

Criticism from the *Sin Po* group, with chief editor Tjoe Bou San and followed up by Kwee Kek Beng after the former's death, consisted of three points. It was argued that becoming Dutch subjects under the 1910 Dutch Subject Law had brought the Chinese nothing. It did not change the fact that legal inequality for the Chinese was still anchored in the Dutch East Indies constitution. The demarcation lines between ethnic groups were also maintained.

Tjoe mentioned education and its segregation. There were separate schools for each ethnic group, with separately trained teachers. Tjoe posited that there should be one elementary school for all children. The segregation policy made it impossible for the Chinese to become united with the other ethnic groups.

Secondly, as Dutch 'subjects', the Chinese did not have Dutch nationality and the rights that came with that status. The 1910 Dutch Subject Law, Tjoe said, did not do anything for the Chinese in the Indies. On the other hand, Chinese nationality – obtained in the previous year – brought them equal rights in China. The Chinese

in the Indies did not choose to be Dutch subjects and did not have the choice to do otherwise. Moreover, being Dutch subjects stood in the way of China taking care of their interests in the Indies. The Dutch Subject Law was a political weapon of the colonial administration with the aim of isolating the Chinese from the fatherland and destroying their national identity. This viewpoint resonated in the community.[43]

The third point that *Sin Po* criticized was the Chinese representation in various councils and bodies such as the Volksraad (People's Council). In 1917, there was a heated discussion during a congress in Semarang regarding the advisability of appointing a Chinese representative to the Volksraad. This institution, officially set up in 1918, was to have 39 representatives from ethnic groups in the Dutch East Indies, two of whom would be Chinese. Despite resistance against representation, two Chinese entered the Volksraad under their personal titles: Kan Hok Hoei, also known as H.H. Kan, a prominent public figure well-known in Dutch circles, and Liem A Pat, a Chinese officer from Muntok, Bangka. Later, in 1927, during the Chung Hwa congress that preceded the formation of the organization Chung Hwa Hui, *Sin Po* chief editor Kwee Kek Beng again raised the subject of representation in the Volksraad. In the years that the Chinese were part of the Volksraad, very little was achieved in the sphere of legal equality. Promises from the government remained just promises.[44]

'Loyal Subjects of Her Royal Highness the Queen'

The second movement was the establishment of the Chung Hwa Hui (CHH) organization in 1928. The establishment followed the Chung Hwa congress organized on 17–18 April 1927, in Semarang. Options were sought for setting up an organization that would safeguard the interests of the Chinese community, and 'look after all the interests of the Chinese in the Dutch East Indies using all legal and permitted means'.[45]

Initiators were largely former members of the student organization Chung Hwa Hui CHH in the Netherlands. The ten members of the commission consisted of academics, prominent community leaders, and businessmen who were part of the economic elite. Attendance was high for the congress, with some 200 people present. Notable attendees included several high colonial officials such as Jonkman from the Education Department, and Bruineman from the Office for Chinese Affairs. Volksraad member H.H. Kan became CHH chairman. Two other members who would play a role in the organization in the coming years were Thio Thiam Tjong and Oei Tjong Hauw. These two men came from prominent and wealthy Chinese families. Thio Thiam Tjong later became an advisor to Governor-General H.J. van Mook after the Japanese occupation. Oei Tjong Hauw was the son of Oei Tiong Ham and director of the famous trading company bearing his father's name.

During the Japanese occupation, Oei Tjong Hauw was part of several important organizations.

As 'loyal subjects of Her Majesty the Queen', CHH members – most of them embedded in comfortable positions within the colonial ranks and its economy – had no reason for activism. At the time of CHH's establishment in 1928, the organization did not seem to consider that the Indonesians' struggle for independence could lead to the end of the colonial era. This was in contrast with journalist Liem Koen Hian, who, already in 1932, had an image of a future that could become reality – a future of an independent Indonesia.[46]

'Born and Raised in Indonesia, Dead and Buried in Indonesia'

A group of *peranakan* Chinese people supported Indonesia's struggle for self-governance. This group was represented by Liem Koen Hian, journalist and chief editor of several newspapers, and lawyer Ko Kwat Tiong. In the middle of 1920, Liem left behind his nationalistic Chinese ideas and declared himself an Indonesian nationalist. Through his fellow Indonesian lawyers, Ko got to know and understand the feelings of educated Indonesians.[47]

With other pro-Indonesian *peranakan* Chinese, Liem Koen Hian established the Partai Tionghoa Indonesia PTI (The Chinese Indonesian Party) on 25 September 1932. In those years, political parties in the Dutch East Indies were seen more as political organizations. The only form of people representation was the Volksraad, which only had an advisory function, and where the population was not proportionately represented. Liem believed that of the three existing political movements in the Dutch East Indies, his movement was the most realistic and the most favourable for the *peranakan* Chinese, who by law had become Dutch subjects. According to Liem, Indonesia was the *peranakan* Chinese homeland. Hence, it should be obvious that they would choose the Indonesians' side. In fact, it was an unconditional obligation, since 'our mothers are Indonesian'. *Peranakan* Chinese are not guests, Liem said; they are part of the country, part of the Indonesian nation (*bangsa Indonesia*). In order to be Indonesian, neither religion (practise of Islam) nor assimilation was required, and it was also not necessary to be a native Indonesian. Liem defined Indonesians as those who, regardless of their ethnicity, felt and thought as Indonesians, and shared the same ideas for the future.

Liem believed that *peranakan* Chinese should be more aware that they were Indonesians in the broadest sense of the word. As descendants of two ethnic groups, they were more Indonesian than Chinese, because they had settled and remained in Indonesia, lived and thought as indigenous Indonesians, and spoke the Indonesian language. *Peranakans* were not like the native Chinese. In the future, there would be Indonesian citizenship not just for indigenous Indonesians, but also for the

peranakan Chinese. Although Liem suggested Indonesian political identity for the Chinese, he did not insist on full assimilation of the *peranakan* Chinese with the Indonesian population.[48]

Indonesian Political Organizations

The spirit of emancipation in the first decade of the twentieth century emerged not just within the Chinese population, but also amongst Indonesian society. For the latter, it was a short distance between emancipation and political awareness. Amongst Indonesians, this was reflected in the establishment of Boedi Oetomo (Noble Endeavour), the first nationalistic Indonesian movement in the Dutch East Indies. In 1912, it was followed by Sarekat Islam (Islamic Association).

Boedi Oetomo was established on 20 May 1908. It strove for the advancement of the Javanese, including through the spread of education. Gradually, the organization's focus shifted towards political and nationalistic activities, and realizing the idea of Indonesian unity. Sarekat Islam, set up in 1912, grew to become the biggest and best-known nationalist organization. While it had started as an association of batik traders who tried to protect themselves from Chinese competitors, its goals gradually shifted towards politics. After some years, some of its members set up the Indonesian Communist Party PKI in 1914.[49] In 1927, both Sarekat Islam and Boedi Oetomo joined the Permoefakatan Perhimpoenan Politik Kebangsaan Indonesia PPPKI (Union of Indonesian National Political Associations).

In this period, two anti-Chinese riots occurred, which characterized the relationship between the Chinese and the Indonesians. The 1912 riots in Surakarta and Surabaya were attributed to Sarekat Islam. The 1918 unrest in Kudus broke out due to a conflict between Chinese and Indonesian business owners. During these riots, several Chinese were killed, many others were wounded, and many houses of the Chinese were torched. Deep racist sentiments and resentment against the large wealth gap between the two groups rose to the surface.

After the communist uprising against Dutch authority in 1926–27, and the quelling thereof, the Indonesian nationalistic period started with the formation of the Partai Nasional Indonesia PNI (Indonesian National Party) in 1927. Several more political parties were established in the 1930s, including the Persatoean Arab Indonesia PAI (Arab Indonesian Association) in 1934, Partai Indonesia Raya Parindra (Great Indonesia Party) in 1935, and Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia GAPI (Indonesian People's Movement) in 1939. The parties embraced a variety of concepts such as the Indonesian people, the Indonesian nation, and the Indonesian state. Race did not always play a role in these ideas.

The constant struggle in colonial society with the division between Indonesians and the Chinese obstructed a merger. In political parties, for example, this was reflected in the two types of memberships. As a rule, only Indonesians could have full membership of a party. The Chinese could only be listed as 'associate' members. Gerindo was the only political party in which the Chinese could become full members. For this reason, Liem Koen Hian left PTI, the party he had founded. Shortly before the Japanese invasion, the Indonesian nationalistic parties united under GAPI, which was applauded by the Arabs (PAI) and the Chinese (PTI). These two parties were allowed to join, but only as associate members. The PAI joined but the PTI refused. The press saw this as opportunistic. The PTI reacted by saying that it was ready to take on the responsibilities and consequences of being a full member of GAPI, but not as an associate member. It did not want to be 'the stepchild of an Indonesian mother'.[50]

The Visman Commission: Prospects of Change

On 23 February 1940, petitions were filed by three Indonesian members of the Volksraad. The first petition was regarding greater autonomy in the Dutch East Indies, and the second one was about implementing one citizenship for both the Dutch and the Indonesians. The third petition demanded that the terms 'Dutch East Indies' and 'indigenous' (*Inlanders*) be replaced by 'Indonesia' and 'Indonesians' in all official documents. The Visman Commission, which was installed half-a-year later, was given the assignment to conduct a study on the wishes and views of the different ethnic groups in the Indies regarding the political developments, and what consequences these ideas would have. The Commission had to look into the possibilities and the consequences of an Indies citizenship and replacing the terms *Inlander* and *Inlands* (native), which generally had negative connotations.

The Commission,[51] unusual in the Indies, held hearings with representatives of different ethnic groups. It wanted to really examine the wishes and views of the different ethnic groups. One of the deepest impressions left on the Commission after the hearings was the overall urge of all non-Europeans for complete equality with the Europeans. The fact that this made such a deep impression on the Commission members showed how little the Europeans were aware of how this inequality was experienced.

The legal differences according to race were deemed hurtful, and experienced as an attack on one's dignity, the Commission said in its report. This unequal treatment was felt as even more hurtful in social life. The Commission concluded that the government should take a more leading role. Giving an example was not enough: all legal differences based on race and deemed discriminatory must be dissolved.

The Commission concluded its report on 9 December 1941, almost simultaneously with the outbreak of the war with Japan.[52]

One year later, on 7 December 1942, when Japan had already occupied the Dutch East Indies, Queen Wilhelmina – in a speech she gave in London – said that after the war, the relationship between the Netherlands and its colonies, the Dutch East Indies in particular, would be different. Three years later, on 17 August 1945, after Japan surrendered, Sukarno proclaimed the independence of Indonesia.

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IV Educational Facilities (1900–1942)

The Dutch Chinese School (HCS) and the Dutch Chinese Teacher Training School (HCKS)

With the establishment of the Hollands–Chinese School HCS (Dutch Chinese School) in 1908, the Chinese population had gained access to Dutch education provided by the Dutch East Indies government. New schools were established for the HCS in new school buildings. Taking into account discontent about this in Indonesian circles, the Hollands–Inlandse scholen HIS (Dutch Indigenous schools) were established a few years later in 1914. To this end, 85 of the already existing 95 first-class *Inlandse scholen*[1] (Indigenous schools) were converted into HIS schools.

Dutch primary education for the people of the Dutch East Indies now included three separate schools for each of the three population groups: the ELS, the HCS, and the HIS. The schools were set up as equals, and the prevailing segregation was also implemented in the education. When it came to admission to the schools, however, the divide was not always strictly enforced. When not all types of schools were present in a certain area, pupils could attend a school other than the one intended for them. However, such 'transfers' were rare.

As the language of instruction at the HCS and the HIS was Dutch, pupils at both schools lagged behind linguistically. Most Chinese children spoke little or no Dutch when they arrived at school. Limited language proficiency was sometimes a major stumbling block, as there was a large gap between school and home. An attempt to bridge that was a 'zero class': a preliminary class to learn the Dutch language. However, due to budget cuts, this preliminary class was abolished after 1932. Except for language, there was little difference in level between students at the European schools and the HCS in many subjects. School results did not differ much. There was, however, a divergence between the HCS and the HIS. Malay was used in the lower HIS grades, although Dutch began to be taught as early as the first grade. In the highest HIS classes, the language of instruction was Dutch.[2]

The HCS was a school for the elite: a prestigious school intended for a minority of Chinese *peranakans*. The Dutch Chinese education reached only 10 per cent of the Chinese children, as had been envisioned and intended by the government. The schools' exclusive character was reflected in their expensive tuition, the impossibility of free admissions, the almost equal curriculum with the European schools, Dutch as the language of instruction, and their admissions procedure. Students were taught by (expensive) European teachers who were paid the same as those at the ELS. The students came from Chinese elite circles, some of whom barely spoke

Chinese: Chinese officers and socially respected Chinese businessmen, who were already more familiar with Western society.[3]

The HCS curriculum followed that of the non-first[4] ELS schools. It included the following subjects: reading, writing, arithmetic, Dutch, geography, natural sciences, history of the Netherlands and the Dutch East Indies, singing, and drawing. French was also taught in some schools and, from 1912, English was added as an extra after-school afternoon course. This allowed students to move on to secondary education, such as the Hogereburgerschool HBS – an option that was considered important by Chinese parents. The useful handicrafts courses for girls were moderately attended, as Chinese girls had no interest in them.[5]

Dutch education was considered important, but Chinese education at the HCS was also something that many Chinese parents wanted for their children. These parents were keen for their children to connect with Chinese culture and maintain their Chinese identity, even though many of these parents no longer spoke or read Chinese themselves and had their own *peranakan* culture. This desire became stronger after the establishment of the Republic of China in 1912. The importance of Dutch education was also realized because it offered more opportunities in colonial society than Chinese education in THHK schools. These considerations matched one of the goals the Dutch government had when it set up the HCS schools: to disengage *peranakans* from their orientation towards China and Chinese culture through education. Except for some limited pilot projects, Chinese-language education was not given at the HCS.[6]

After the opening of the first four HCS schools in 1908, the number of schools increased sharply for several years. That growth, however, already declined as early as 1913, and ended in 1930 due to the international economic crisis. At the same time, between 1905 and 1930, the Chinese population had more than doubled, and the need for Dutch education increased because of the growing influence of the West. Due to lack of space, many children had to be disappointed every year. The resulting gap was filled by the special HCS schools founded by Catholic and Protestant institutions, and with schools and courses from private initiatives, the so-called wild schools. However, the wild HCS, the HIS, the MULO (Meer Uitgebreid Lager Onderwijs, or secondary trade schools), and other educational institutions did not reach the level of the government schools. In the 1939–1940 school year, there were 62 state HCS schools, consisting of 58 government and four municipal HCS schools. In contrast, there were 48 government-approved and subsidised denominational HCS schools: 29 Protestant, fourteen Roman Catholic, and four neutral.[7]

There was always a shortage of teachers in the Dutch East Indies. For the state HCS schools, the solution for this shortage was to start a training college for Chinese teachers, thus moving away from exclusively European teachers. At the same time, the establishment of the Hollandsch-Chineesche Kweekschool HCK (Dutch Chinese

4.1. Class photo of the HCS Chung Hwa Hui school with school director C.M. van Giessen, Semarang 1937–1938.

4.2. Teachers of the HCS Chung Hwa Hui school with school director C.M. van Giessen, Semarang 1937–1938.



4.3. Number of students at the Dutch–Chinese School HCS, 1908–1939.



4.4. Number of Chinese students in various schools: European Elementary School ELS, Dutch Chinese School HCS, and Chinese schools between 1892 and 1939. Information about Chinese schools for 1922 and 1929–1939 are not available. The first HCS schools were established in 1908.

Teacher Training School) in 1917 served a political purpose. It was to be an additional measure against the influence of the Chinese movement.[8] The number of girls who began the course in 1924 was greater (eighteen) than the number of boys (eleven). By 1928, boys outnumbered girls: 63 boys versus 54 girls. As the annual number of graduates increased, so did the number of Chinese teachers at the HCS. In 1924, the state HCS schools employed 30 Chinese, in addition to 219 European teachers. The denominational Dutch–Chinese education system hired virtually no Chinese teachers. These schools preferred teachers of the same church affiliation. With the general reorganization of educational training (*onderwijsopleiding*) in 1927, the phasing out of the five-year Dutch-Chinese teacher training school began. The last 'old style' final exam was in 1931.[9]

The Malay Chinese School (MCS)

The HCS was an elite school that, partly because of its high tuition, was only accessible to 10 per cent of Chinese children. There was no other state school for the remaining Chinese youth. Meanwhile, the education system for the indigenous population allowed children to start at basic first- and second-class schools, which would then give pupils the possibility of continuing to MULO or HBS schools. These native schools were not open to Chinese children, or only if there was room. Thus, for the vast majority of Chinese children who could not attend the HCS, there was no affordable elementary state education that matched and adapted to their living situation and provided access to further education. These children had to rely on local Chinese schools that had sufficient funds.

For these children of less fortunate parents, the Maleis-Chinese School MCS (Malay Chinese School) was only established in 1927. The MCS was intended to provide simple education for children of the large group of poor *peranakan* Chinese who lived in small villages and wanted to stay in the Dutch East Indies. Their children would benefit from several years of education in Malay: an education that also suited their social environment and future. The school also best matched the parents' circumstances. Because these children often had to help out with the families' daily existence, they could not enjoy education for an extended period of time.

The initiative for the MCS came from Koo Liong Ing of Malang, who had been struggling to maintain a Chinese school. In 1927, he was forced to turn to the government for help. He wanted to give students the opportunity, similar to that of the native education system, to eventually enter the MULO, the AMS (a three-year continuation of the MULO) or the HBS. Initially, the idea of a Malay Chinese School[10] was not enthusiastically received among the Chinese. They suspected the colonial government of wanting to replace the HCS with inferior and cheap

education: a disguised indigenous second-class school.[11] A decline in the general level of education was feared. Education in the Malay language was also deemed to be of lower value. But at least the MCS met the need for basic education for this particular group of Malay-speaking Chinese children, who would otherwise be deprived of schooling. It was better than nothing.[12] According to the 1930 census, 60 per cent of Indies-born Chinese children over the age of nine were illiterate.

Until the outbreak of World War II, the number of Malay Chinese schools slowly increased from seventeen in 1937 to 26 in 1940. The Chinese community gradually became more accepting towards these schools. This growth was attributed to the increasing willingness among the Chinese to have their children receive Malay education.

The economic crisis of the 1930s also deeply affected the Chinese population. Cuts in education reached almost 50 per cent. In 1934, a crisis school was established in Batavia to provide some kind of education. There was great interest in it. In 1935, the students' association of the THHK in Batavia took the initiative to provide its own education for children of underprivileged parents during these crisis years. The lessons were given as an afternoon course by advanced THHK students, whose academic levels were comparable to second-year MULO pupils. The Chinese language and some other subjects were taught. This education was made possible through the cooperation of the school's board, its teachers, and students, aided by a small grant from the Chinese Council.[13] It was education born out of necessity and solidarity.

Chinese-language Schools and Dutch-language Schools

In addition to the Dutch-language HCS, primary education was also provided by the Chinese-language THHK school and other Chinese schools. Students at the THHK schools mainly had Chinese parents who were China-oriented and were able to have their children study there. *Totok* Chinese from various backgrounds (Hakka, Cantonese, Hokkien) who planned to go back to China once they had accumulated some capital also sent their children to the THHK school, or had their own schools.

As the HCS schools attracted more students, the number of THHK students decreased. This was a positive development for the Dutch East Indies government because it achieved its goal of using the HCS to counterbalance the nationalist Chinese movement. However, practical issues also played a role in the declining interest in THHK schools. The curriculum of these schools was too focused on a life in China. The Chinese language gave fewer prospects for well-paid jobs in the Indies. A government job, for example, would be out of reach. Moreover, THHK schools offered only primary education, and there were few provisions for further

education. For higher education after a Chinese-language high school, students had to go to China, or if they mastered English sufficiently, to universities in Hong Kong, Shanghai, or in Western countries. Preliminary training for English-language higher education in Hong Kong was offered by, among others, the Chinese–English school in Semarang, established by the Chinese community in 1916.[14]

Attempts, first in 1919 and then in 1927, to reform the THHK curriculum and make it more attuned to the conditions in the Indies failed. In 1927, it was proposed to include Dutch in the curriculum. This plan failed because it would require a complete reorganization.

The government did not interfere with Chinese-language schools. In fact, the schools were free to set their own curriculum and textbooks, and hire teachers from China unless they were considered 'subversive' or posed a danger to public safety.

In 1926, there were 27,802 Chinese students at Dutch-language schools versus 32,668 at Chinese-language schools, including THHK schools. From the mid-1920s, the number of THHK schools decreased. *Totok* Chinese, such as Hakkas, Hokkiens, and Cantonese, established their own schools, as they were dissatisfied with the THHK schools, where Mandarin was the language of instruction. These schools also stopped carrying the THHK name. In 1932, a Chinese newspaper reported that Batavia had fifteen Chinese-language schools, of which only two bore the name THHK. The increase in Chinese-language non-THHK schools was caused by the rapid growth of the *totok* population, which consisted of various dialect groups. Chinese migration to the Indonesian archipelago peaked in 1927.[15]

In 1934, the then largest Chinese-language news magazine *Hsin Pao* published a survey of Chinese schooling in the Dutch East Indies. At that time, there were 450 Chinese-language schools, twenty of which had a secondary school section. About 45,000 Chinese children received a Chinese school education, including 1,251 secondary school students. The number of Dutch-language elementary schools without a secondary school section was 117. In the Indies, Dutch school education had one secondary school system that was accessible to all segments of the population. The same newspaper estimated the number of Chinese students attending Dutch education at 23,353. Among them were 1,651 secondary school students. According to Loe Ping Kian, a *peranakan* doctor who was heavily involved in education, *Hsin Pao* underestimated the number of Chinese children attending Dutch schools. He estimated the number to be double that, based on government statistics: 53,000.[16]

Dutch Secondary and Higher Education

A completed Dutch elementary school education through the ELS or the HCS did not always lead to further education at a Dutch secondary school.[17] The number

4.5. Class photo of HBS Semarang class 3-D, with teacher Claessen, 1939.

of secondary school students was relatively small. Money played an important role. Not only did school cost money, but the mandatory entrance exam was also expensive. Also, lodgings for the children at these secondary schools – often not located in their city of residence – involved high costs. There were not that many HBS secondary schools in the Dutch East Indies, and they were mostly located in the big cities.[18]

In secondary education, the distinction between the population groups was never implemented, as was the case in primary education. The numbers of Chinese and Indonesian students in secondary schools were too small for this. Thus, students from different ethnic groups shared the same classes.

Dutch secondary education in the Dutch East Indies in 1930, just like in the Netherlands, was divided into the lyceum, the HBS, the MULO, and the AMS. The Algemene Middelbare School AMS (General Secondary School) was a three-year continuation school after the MULO.[19] The first lyceum was the King Willem III School, founded in Batavia in 1860, first with a gymnasium and, from 1867, also with a HBS. Surabaya and Semarang also had HBS schools in the nineteenth century. Five more HBS schools were added in the twentieth century, with only two outside Java. Almost all major towns in the Dutch East Indies had a MULO and an AMS.

After the introduction of the HCS in 1908, it took about seven years for the first Chinese students to go from the HCS onto further education. In 1927–1928, 47 per cent of HCS students went to MULO, which did not give access to higher education. Another 14 per cent went to vocational school, and it was unknown what 37 per cent of them did. Only 2 per cent of HCS students went to secondary schools that gave access to higher education.

As for higher education, until the twentieth century, further study at a university or college was only possible in the Netherlands. In principle, any field of study was possible. Only children from the elite, regardless of which ethnic group they came from, had these opportunities. The counterpart of the university in the Netherlands became the college of advanced education (*hogeschool*) in the Dutch East Indies.

In the Dutch East Indies, several options existed for higher education. The first one was the School for the Training of Indigenous Doctors (Stovia) in Batavia. Stovia opened its doors in Weltevreden in 1899 after a successful trial of training native vaccinators. The preliminary training lasted three years, with the actual training totalling six years. Students lived on campus and lectures were given in Dutch. The medical education was of European standard. After 1913, women were also admitted. Graduates were referred to as *dokter Djawa* (Javanese doctor), later *Inlands arts* and *Indies arts* (Indigenous and Indies doctors). With their Stovia degree, students could enter a Dutch university in the 1920s for additional medical studies lasting several years. When the Medical Faculty (Geneeskundige Hogeschool or Medical College) opened in Batavia in 1927, the Stovia education was discontinued. The faculty went on to deliver fully qualified doctors. In 1934, this medical education was made equal by law to the medical schools in the Netherlands.

In 1913, the Netherlands East Indies School of Physicians (NIAS) was founded, which was a medical school in Surabaya for Javanese students. The teachers were mostly Dutch army doctors. Despite the institute's promising name, the multi-year education only led to a level no higher than knowledge and administration of primary healthcare, including the authority to administer vaccinations. The 'Indies doctors', as they were officially called, usually returned to their native village or region to practice their profession. In 1942, the school was closed by the Japanese occupying forces. After 1945, the school grew into today's Universitas Erlangga.[20]

Other colleges included: the Technical Institute in Bandung (1924), the Law Faculty in Batavia[21] (1927), the Indies Dentists School (Stovit) in Surabaya (1928), the Humanities Faculty in Batavia (1940), and the Faculty of Agriculture in Bogor (1941).[22]

Dutch East Indies society was not just divided by population group. Just like in the Netherlands, there was religious segregation. Segregation by ethnicity and religion were present in various areas of school and student life, such as in sports and scouting associations. Within a school, there could be a separate Chinese student association for a particular sport in addition to the respective school association. In

sports competitions, it was common for Chinese students to compete both for and against their own school association.[23] The distinction was also visible in student associations. For example, there was the non-religious Bataviaasch Studenten Corps, as well as the Christian Student Association and the Chinese Student Association Tsa Hsioh Sing Hui.

It is noteworthy that Dutch, Chinese, and Indonesians alike could become members of the Catholic Student Association. Christianization, which often came through education, may have played an important role in this. Catholic and Protestant schools have traditionally been considered as breeding grounds of faith. Catholic Chinese students such as Teng, Max Goewie, and Cornelis Njo were actively involved in the establishment of the Catholic Student Association in 1929. Other Chinese who were active in this association were J. Koei San Lim and Hap Lie Tjoa. The shared ethnic background allowed for cooperation with the Chinese student association Tsa Hsioh Sing Hui, especially with their orchestra.

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V ‘Asia for the Asians’ (1942–1945)

The Japanese Occupation

After Japan’s surprise attack on the US naval base Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, the United States declared war on Japan. During World War II in Asia, Japan faced the Allies (the United States, Great Britain, Australia, and the Netherlands).[1] In Europe, World War II had already broken out in 1940.

Japan’s rapid advance in the Dutch East Indies began with the landing on Borneo on 27 December 1941. After seizing oil fields there, which were crucial for Japan, Java was taken in March 1942. On 8 March 1942, the Royal Dutch East Indies Army capitulated. This marked the beginning of the Japanese occupation period that would end three-and-a half years later with Japan’ capitulation on 15 August 1945. Two days later, on 17 August 1945, President Sukarno proclaimed the independence of the Republik Indonesia. This was followed by the Indonesian Revolution – a military and diplomatic war with the Netherlands – which ended on 27 December 1949 with the transfer of sovereignty and the establishment of the United States of Indonesia RIS (Republik Indonesia Serikat). On 15 August 1950, it became the unitary state of Republik Indonesia.

For Japan, the Indonesian archipelago was important because of its richness in raw materials such as oil, tin, and rubber. At the same time, Japan wanted to become an Asian superpower and strengthen its position and dominance in Asia. It put forward the concept of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. It summarized the ideal of freedom and independence for Asia, free from Western colonial rule, with a leading role in it for Japan. ‘Asia for the Asians’ was the slogan.

With the Japanese occupation, the administrative unit of the Dutch East Indies disappeared. Java and Sumatra came under the administration of the 16th and 25th Japanese armies, respectively. The eastern islands, administered by the Japanese Navy, included the island Borneo (South and West Kalimantan), Celebes (Sulawesi), the Moluccas, and Dutch New Guinea.

The army and navy operated independently from one another and were sometimes rivals. In Java, the Japanese acted less repressively towards the Chinese population than in other occupied areas. The Japanese hoped that this mild and conciliatory approach would help them exploit Java’s economic resources and sustain the local economy. The Japanese Navy maintained a more repressive regime. The counterpart of the dreaded Kenpeitai, the Japanese military police in the Japanese army, was the Tokkeitai in the navy.

For the Chinese, the Japanese occupation meant a drastic change in their established position in the colonial state. In the revolutionary years that followed, the

struggle between Indonesia and the Netherlands – for an independent republic and preservation of the East Indies colony, respectively – meant there was no stability. These two periods of 1942–1945 and 1945–1949 were a time of transition for the Chinese people towards a different position in the new Republic of Indonesia.

Japanese and Chinese

The arrival of the Japanese meant something different for each ethnic population in Indonesia. The Netherlands was part of the Allies, with which Japan was waging war against in East Asia. For the Dutch and Indo-Europeans, 1942 was the beginning of an internment period, hardship, and a complete conversion of social position. For the Indonesian population, the end of the colonial period meant the prospect of a free and independent country. Preparations for this were also made by Japan at the end of the occupation.

Japan's relationship with the Chinese was completely different. The Chinese in the East Indies were Asians like themselves. Because of their connection to their country of origin, China – which was at war with Japan – there was great suspicion on the part of the Japanese. In this second Sino-Japanese War, which would not end until 1945, both China's National Revolutionary Army under Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Communist Party Army under Mao Tse-tung fought – anything but in unison – against Japan. When General Wang Ching-wei of the Nationalist Army defected in 1940 and collaborated with the Japanese, the latter managed to set up a puppet government in China. The situation changed for China after the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor. With American support, it was no longer alone in its struggle against Japan, although that support was given only to the Chinese nationalist government.

An uncertain time dawned for the Chinese in the East Indies in 1942. They were closely following this second Sino-Japanese war,[2] which had been going on since 1937. It was a bloody war that claimed many victims from the start.[3] The fact that a part of China, such as the city of Amoy (now Xiamen) where many migrants came from, had already been occupied by the Japanese for several years was a bitter pill for the Chinese. The war evoked anti-Japanese feelings amongst the Chinese.

Various forms of help for the war victims in China was organized by the Chinese in the Indies. The best known is the Indies Ambulance Mission, which was launched in 1937–1938. This expedition aimed to provide actual medical aid in war zones in China. The ambulance mission left with nine cars, three of which were to be turned over to the Department of Health in China. The volunteers included three doctors, nine nurses, three mechanics and drivers,

and an interpreter-translator who was also a photographer. They performed their medical work in various places in China in sometimes very dangerous war and combat situations.[4]

The Japanese, often not unjustly, suspected the Chinese in the Dutch East Indies of sympathizing with nationalist China, and were therefore not to be trusted. If, on the other hand, the Chinese had ties to Wang Ching-wei's puppet government in China, or were sympathetic to the Japanese cause, then they could be seen as 'allies' of Japan, or even as Japanese citizens.[5] Even before the Japanese occupation, there had been very active anti-Japanese and pro-nationalist Chinese movements within the Chinese community in the East Indies, although these were less aggressive than similar movements in Singapore and the Malay Peninsula.

There was also great suspicion on the Japanese side of Chinese whom they suspected of being part of an anti-Japanese conspiracy, or of plotting subversive actions and attacks. These were enough reasons for the Japanese to take them prisoner. The same mistrust was held by the Japanese against the Chinese whom they suspected of sympathizing with the Dutch. For example, because they had ties to the colonial administration in the past or had cooperated with the administration through their companies or businesses. Anything that could be associated with the Netherlands was forbidden or suspect. A European upbringing, marriage to a Dutch person, or being of equal status with Europeans could lead to problems, or result in property being confiscated, auctioned, and sold. Possessing a document of Dutch citizenship could be risky.

The Dutch language was forbidden; telephone calls in Dutch or any other Western language were cut off. Speaking Dutch in the public domain and exhibiting Western behaviour could result in mistreatment or arrest by the Japanese military police. Dutch-educated Chinese who had adopted Dutch names such as Marie or Wim stopped using them. This social and psychological pressure, in addition to internment, forced many of the pre-war business elites into inactivity and passive adaptation.[6]

At the beginning of the Japanese occupation, some of the Chinese in Indonesia were supporters of the nationalist Chiang Kai-shek and his Chinese National People's Party, the Kuomintang (KMT), while others were supporters of the communists under Mao Tse-tung. There were also Chinese Indonesians who were pro-Japanese and sympathized with Wang Ching-Wei's puppet government in China. Some Chinese were in solidarity with the Netherlands, while others supported the Indonesian push for independence. So, the Chinese formed a heterogeneous group with diverse loyalties. Running like a red thread through all groups was the realization that their community was vulnerable and that they could somehow be associated with activities considered hostile by the Japanese.

Internment, Resistance, and Violence

Even before the outbreak of war, the Japanese vice consul in Batavia – which name was changed to Jakarta during the Japanese occupation – had been monitoring the anti-Japanese activities of the local Chinese population. Barely a month after capitulation, the Japanese arrested several prominent Chinese whom the Japanese administration thought, or knew, were sympathizing with the nationalist government in China under Chiang Kai-shek or with the Dutch. Internment of the Chinese began in major cities in Java and Madura around 26 April 1942. More arrests followed on 27 May. In Java's Cimahi internment camp[7] alone, 542 Chinese were detained by the beginning of 1943, and they remained there until the end of the war.

Among those detained were many Chinese who had been socially or politically active. They had held positions in the colonial administration such as in the Volksraad. Then there were leaders and members of the Dutch-oriented Chung Hwa Hui and of the nationalist-Chinese Kuomintang, along with editors and journalists of Chinese news magazines. Others were members of Chinese relief organizations such as the Chinese Relief Fund and the Tjin Tjay Hui, and also many businessmen and entrepreneurs, including some of the business elite. Almost half of the internees were born in China, and the other half in Indonesia.[8] As far as is known, internment of the Chinese in Java was limited to these groups.

Some of the internees were known for the role they played in political and social life before and after the Japanese occupation: Volksraad members H.H. Kan/Kan Hok Hoei, Phoa Liong Gie, Loa Sek Hie, Thio Thiam Tjong (Thio later became Van Mook's advisor), Khouw Kim An (last major of the Chinese of Batavia, died in internment camp), and the following editors and journalists: Nio Joe Lan, Ang Jan Goan, Tan Po Goan, Injo Beng Goat. Nio Joe Lan[9] wrote in detail about his own internment and that of the Chinese elite in his well-known autobiography *Dalem Tawanan Djepang* (In Japanese Captivity).

Editors who felt to be in danger of internment or arrest tried to avoid the Japanese by going into hiding inland, where it was safer.[10]

Little is known about anti-Japanese resistance by the Chinese who were either oriented towards the Netherlands or China. In Java, such as in Jakarta, Surabaya and Malang, several Chinese resistance groups were active in anti-Japanese or pro-Dutch and pro-Allied resistance. These resistance groups did not appear to have been set up professionally. Their activities consisted mainly of working with Dutch resistance groups to gather information for the Allies in Australia. They were no match for the Japanese military police, the Kenpeitai, which had more than sixty years of experience in tracking down and eliminating opponents. The Kenpeitai

was known for its harsh and ruthless actions, including property confiscations and executions. From available information, the following are some examples.

In Jakarta, the Chinese Anti-Japanese Association Fuk Hsing She (Association for Resurrection and Progress) was founded by sympathisers of nationalist China in May 1942. Again, the goal was to gather information for the Allies. In the process, the association organized the secret Red Cross and City Guard in Java. Six months later, in November 1942, the organization was rounded up by the Kenpeitai. All collaborators were arrested and its leaders were tortured and killed. Sixteen collaborators, including two women, were sentenced as war criminals to between three- and ten-years imprisonment, and were only released in September 1945.[11]

Also in Jakarta, a resistance group with Chinese members was active for a short time. It was led by Dutchman Nol Wernink and his close associate Lie Beng Giok. A.L.J. (Nol) Wernink led several resistance groups in Batavia, including a Chinese resistance group from September 1942. Lie Beng Giok was his close associate and the main liaison. Toko Beng on Pecenongan Street in the city's Chinatown neighbourhood served as the centre of the resistance group and as a cover. A short time later, Toko Peng in Buitenzorg (Bogor), another central meeting place, was arranged as a contact location with resistance groups in that town. The purpose was to gather important information and relay it to the Allies in Australia via a transmitting system. Both Wernink and Lie were unaware that Toko Beng in Jakarta had long been under suspicion by the Kenpeitai. Three months later, in December 1942, members of the resistance group were arrested, including two Dutch resistance fighters and a group of Chinese. Lie Beng Giok was tortured, while another resistance fighter, Tjoa Tek Swat, was beheaded.[12] By mid-1943, virtually all organized resistance groups in Batavia had been rounded up.

In Surabaya, the Freedom Fighting Corps (FEC) was founded by the Chinese under the leadership of Willy Tan. In Malang, the Meelhuysen resistance organization was active.[13] The nationalist 'secret' organization Chungking, with its leader Yap Bo Chin, was also said to be active in Malang. The group Tjoa Boen Tek cooperated with this Chungking organization in the same city.[14] It is generally believed that these resistance movements also did not amount to much, and that the Japanese army quickly put an end to them. Courage and good intentions without a professionally set up organization were insufficient for success.

A Japanese source reported that in April 1943, 1,089 Chinese were known to the attorney general as hostile to Japan. Out of these, 46 escaped arrest, 456 were released, and the remaining 587 remained under arrest. Their personal property was forfeited.[15]

Journalist Pouw Kioe An was arrested in the last year of the occupation.[16] Early one Tuesday morning, on 23 January 1945, he was lifted from his bed in Malang by the Kenpeitai. The military police were looking for a radio transmitter allegedly

in Pouw's possession, through which messages had been sent abroad. At the time, after a career as a journalist, Pouw was secretary of the economics department of the Malang branch of Hua Ch'iao Chung Hui (Chinese Association HCCH), the Association for Overseas Chinese established by the Japanese. After his arrest, Pouw was detained by the Kenpeitai. After 49 days of torture, he confessed because, as he said, he no longer wanted to be tortured. He was released on 8 August 1945, a week before the Japanese surrendered.

In 1942, in Makassar, on Sulawesi, Major Thoeng Kiong Hoei, the leader of the Chinese people in South Sulawesi, was sentenced to death by beheading by the Tokkeitai for refusing to cooperate with the military administration. Five of his relatives suffered the same fate: Thoeng Kok Sang, Thoeng Kok Tjien, Thoeng Kok Tjeng, Thoeng Kok Leang (former lieutenant of the Chinese and administrator of Tjin Tjay Hwee), Tan Hong Teng (son-in-law), Lie Mo Cheng (editor Hua Chiao Yit Pao), and Lie Tjie Hong (administrator of Kuo Min Tang Makassar). At the same time, all the possessions of those executed were confiscated by the military administration.[17]

Extreme Violence in Borneo

Extreme violence – of a completely different order and magnitude than what took place in Java – occurred in Borneo during the period between May 1943 and January 1945. While in Java it often involved individuals or small resistance groups, in Borneo mass murder took place. The island was controlled by the Japanese Navy.

Borneo was vital to Japan from a military and strategic point of view because of its airfields, and for its raw materials such as oil and oil products. In the southern part of the island – rich in resources and sparsely populated – administered by the Japanese Navy, a long-term policy was established based on 'permanent possession/preservation' for the Japanese Empire.[18] The navy installed a civilian administration, the Minseibu. Overall, the occupying force in Borneo was harsh and repressive, and distrusted any political activity.

The situation of the Chinese in Borneo was entirely different from that in Java. Chinese migrants first came to West Borneo as gold miners with self-governing mining settlements. Numbering 108,000 in 1930, they made up 13.4 per cent of the entire population. Most Chinese lived in the coastal area of Pontianak, which extended northward to the Serawak border and about 100 kilometres inland. Most of Borneo's Chinese population had been born there. Unlike the Chinese in Java, they had largely preserved their culture and still spoke the Chinese language. They were very anti-Japanese and, despite their great distance from China, strongly oriented towards the homeland. On every appropriate occasion they raised the flag of Nationalist China. Since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, they had

contributed generously to China. Before the Japanese occupation, commercial life both on the coast and inland was mainly dominated by the Chinese.

Between May 1943 and January 1945, there were a large number of casualties – overwhelmingly Chinese – in Borneo as a result of mass killings by the Japanese Navy and the Tokkeitai. During that period, three consecutive mass arrests took place because of alleged conspiracies. It started with the Haga conspiracy. In May 1943, former Borneo Governor J.B. Haga was accused of leading an anti-Japanese conspiracy. Among the 200 arrested were Chinese people. Even before the Haga conspiracy was settled, the Pontianak affair began. On 23 October 1943, large-scale arrests of prominent figures, including Chinese and Malay leaders, took place in Pontianak. The Pontianak affair was followed in January 1944 with new arrests by the Japanese of leaders and prominent figures of various ethnic groups, including twelve indigenous rulers and the Chinese elite. The initial excuse of 'a general investigation' was replaced by charges plotting a multi-ethnic conspiracy against Japan, of maintaining secret ties with the Allies, and possessing weapons. Confessions were obtained through torture. A total of between 1,300 and 1,500 people from various multi-ethnic communities were arrested. The leading 'conspirators' were sentenced to death and shot. Many others were allegedly secretly killed without trial by the Tokkeitai.

The third massacre is known as the 'Chinese conspiracy', in which the Chinese were accused of plotting to create an autonomous state under the Nationalist Kuomintang government in Chungking. Prominent businessmen and traders, leaders of the Chinese community, and teachers in and around Pontianak and Singkawang were arrested in August 1944. Of the 170 arrested, seventeen were sentenced to death; the rest were murdered in Sungai Durian near Pontianak and buried in mass graves. Historian Mary Somers-Heidhues, who has done a lot of research on the Chinese in Indonesia, including those in Borneo, put the total number of deaths during the period described above at 1,500. That number included 854 Chinese, 559 persons from the multi-ethnic Indonesian population, eighteen people from India, and 21 Europeans.[19]

An investigation into these mass murders followed after the war. On the Japanese side, the conspiracy theory was maintained: a multi-ethnic plot was allegedly planned against the Japanese regime. However, no clues or evidence were found for this. Possibly, this conspiracy theory stemmed from fear on the part of the Japanese. They only had a limited number of troops (between 200 and 500 men) in Borneo, against a large local population (around one million). Outside the military administration, this conspiracy theory found no credence, even among the Japanese from the private sector. It was seen as a fabrication, a tale concocted by the Japanese authorities, and blown up and executed by the Tokkeitai. It was considered implausible that the diverse groups that made up Borneo's multi-ethnic population

(Malays, Buginese, Javanese, Minangkabau, Bataks, Menadonese, Chinese, Dayaks and Eurasians) could overcome their mutual tensions and enmities to conspire together for a revolution against the Japanese. And all that without leadership, without an organization, and without weapons.

An alternative, more plausible explanation for the Japanese desire to wipe out the top layer of ethnic communities was the 'clean slate theory': a calculated strategy of the top naval echelon in South and West Borneo, along with the Japanese secret service, to purge the Pontianak communities of their leaders. Without them and their ideas, the path would be clear for Japanese-style re-education of the youth. At the same time, the property and wealth of those who had been made to disappear could be confiscated and made available for the Japanese war industry. It would fit in with the Japanese intention to take permanent possession of Borneo.[20]

It seems unlikely that the Chinese were capable of planning or executing the alleged plot, although they were the most anti-Japanese of all the ethnic communities in Borneo. There was, however, an anti-Japanese Chinese movement founded in 1943: the Xipoluozhou Fanri Tongmenhui, abbreviated to Ximenghui. Their activities consisted of organizing armed resistance, sabotaging communications equipment and roads, and stealing supplies. However, they had few weapons and ammunition, and were not professionally trained. They would pose no real threat to the Japanese, despite the numbers of the organization's membership. By the end of the occupation, they would have 1,000 members in fifteen divisions.[21]

The Press and Chinese Organization Hua Ch'iao Chung Hui (HCCH)

Propaganda played an important role in Japan's policy towards the population in the Dutch East Indies. The Japanese soon replaced the existing system of many newspapers throughout the Dutch East Indies with a more 'efficient' system. This basically meant that only one newspaper remained for each local community. Consequently, there were not many newspapers in circulation during the Japanese occupation, and all were affiliated with a Japanese publisher. After a brief transition period, during which the existing Malay newspapers and a single Dutch newspaper were still allowed to appear, the Japanese propaganda service established eight new Malay newspapers. All other newspapers were banned.

The first Malay newspaper under Japanese rule, the *Asia Raya*, was published in Batavia in 1942 on 29 April, the emperor's birthday. It was the official newspaper of the military administration's propaganda department. After the publication of the Malay-language *Asia Raya* (Grand Asia) and the *Pembangoen* (Developer) in Jakarta, Bandung followed with the *Tjahaja* (Light), Yogyakarta with the *Sinar*

Matahari (Sunshine), and Semarang with the *Sinar Baroe* (New Light). In Surabaya, the *Soerabaiasch Handelsblad* was published in Malay from 17 June 1942, under the name *Pewarta Perniagaan* (Trade News). The Chinese daily in the same city was placed under Indonesian control under the name *Suara Asia* (Asian Voice). All these periodicals were included in the Djawa Shimbun Kai, the body and publisher through which the Propaganda Service distributed its messages for the Malay newspapers across Java.[22]

For the Chinese, the existing pro-Japanese Chinese newspaper *Hong Po*[23] continued as *Kung Yung Pao*. *Kung Yung Pao* (*KYP*) was the official newspaper established by the Japanese administration for the Chinese community. The name means 'Newspaper for Shared Prosperity', which was the mission of the occupying force. The newspaper was published in Jakarta and appeared in two editions: a Malay edition for *peranakans* who did not master the Chinese language, and a Chinese edition for *totoks* and Chinese-educated *peranakans*. The two editions each had their own editor. In 1944, the Chinese edition of *KYP* would employ 22 journalists, while the Malay edition had only nine people. More than half of the journalists of the Chinese edition were from Fujian or had a Cantonese background, while the journalists of the Malay edition were all *peranakans* born in Java. The *KYP* was not only intended to support the new Japanese order in Java, but it also asked Chinese communities to support the Wang Ching-Wei regime in China rather than that of Chiang Kai-shek. The Japanese had a firm grip on the newspapers and magazines: the press was meant to be an effective propaganda channel.[24]

Political parties and large Chinese organizations, such as the Kuomintang of the Chinese Nationalist Party and Chung Hwa Hui (CHH pro-Dutch party), were banned and dissolved by the Japanese. For the Chinese, an overall organization was established in Batavia on 19 May 1942: the Kakyo Shokai or Hua Ch'iao Chung Hui HCCH (Association for Overseas Chinese). The HCCH was the only authorized Chinese association for both *totoks* and *peranakans* during the Japanese occupation. The first HCCH was followed by the establishment of HCCH branches in almost every city in Java.

The HCCH was intended to relay announcements and measures of the Japanese administration to the Chinese population. It was also used by the Japanese, for example, to recruit young Chinese men for the Keibotai, an organization that supported the police.[25] The HCCH was also commissioned to provide comfort girls for brothels for the Japanese. At the same time, the Chinese-led organization aided the Chinese community in several areas. For example, in Bandung, under the leadership of Yap Tjwan Bing, the HCCH provided clothing, blankets, medicine, and food to internees in the Cimahi camp. In Semarang, the HCCH established an economics section to replace the disbanded Siang Hwee – the Chinese Chamber of Commerce – there. In Yogyakarta, the organization helped the population pay the

foreigners' tax, which was a burden for them. It had several sections for matters such as funerals, social activities, and charity in the areas of work, youth, and sports. In commerce and economics, it replaced the Siang Hwee.[26]

Education and Culture

Japan's anti-Western policy meant that everything associated with the West and the Netherlands had to disappear. The Dutch language was banned, and Dutch schools were closed. For the Chinese youth, this meant the closure of Dutch–Chinese schools with Dutch as the language of instruction. The Japanese policy on education for the Chinese population[27] meant that Chinese-language schools, such as the Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan schools, suffered the same fate. The idea was that Chinese children could enrol in Indonesian schools after the HCS and Chinese schools were closed. That is, if there was enough space in the schools. Providing locals with as much access as possible to education in their own language, in part by significantly reducing school fees, meant that there was usually no room for Chinese children.[28] The implementation of this basic policy varied among regions, as Indonesia was administratively divided under the Japanese. Local initiatives were taken, for example by Chinese teachers in Jakarta and Yogyakarta, to provide some form of education for Chinese youth. The military administration gave permission for this on the condition that this education would be self-supporting. In other words, the schools themselves were responsible for financing, and providing teaching and educational material. The latter, however, was monitored and had to follow certain models. The language of instruction had to be Malay or Japanese as much as possible, although some subjects could temporarily be taught in Chinese.

On 1 July 1942, the Japanese gave permission for kindergartens and elementary schools to be reopened for overseas Chinese. Teachers had to be Indonesian or Chinese. Only if a Malay-speaking teacher could not be found was it possible to hire a Chinese-speaking teacher. Teachers had to submit a curriculum vitae and declare their loyalty to the Japanese. Their political orientation was monitored. The names of the reopened schools were the Japanese translations of *Sekolah Pertama* (Primary School) and *Sekolah Rakyat* (People's School). Some school buildings were used by the Japanese as POW camps or for other military purposes, forcing the Chinese to find alternative housing.

In September 1942, four Chinese schools were reopened in Yogyakarta under the condition that teachers and students would bow to the Japanese flag, learn the Japanese language and Japanese songs, including the national anthem *Kimigayo*, and practice Japanese gymnastics. Education in the Chinese language was only allowed alongside the Japanese language. The number of schools increased, as did

the number of students, including through the establishment of new Chinese schools in certain areas. As in the Dutch period, these Chinese schools were supervised, now by the HCCH, the only Chinese organization authorized by the Japanese. The fact that only limited Chinese kindergartens and elementary schools were allowed to reopen meant that many unemployed teachers sought other work. Some succeeded in business, while others became interpreters and translators for the Japanese. There was a great need for this as the language barrier made it difficult for the Japanese to communicate with the locals. Those slots were eagerly filled by young men who had been educated in Chinese schools. They could communicate more easily through Chinese characters. These former teachers were also able to find work in the Japanese military administration, the propaganda department, the education department, and in the notorious Kenpeitai.

No secondary schools were available after primary school during this period. For students who were in secondary school before the Japanese occupation, the power takeover meant the end of their schooling. In Bandung, Chinese students and graduates who could no longer practise their trade gave home schooling to secondary school students in various subjects such as mathematics, chemistry, physics, and English. It was anticipated that these tutored youngsters would be able to go straight into Dutch secondary schools, which were expected to reopen after the war. It was assumed that the Japanese occupation would not last long, and that liberation by the Allies would happen swiftly. Dutch was kept up – out of sight of the Japanese – by a small group of people with books and Dutch magazines offered for sale on the black market.[29]

To some extent, the Japanese encouraged *peranakans* to learn the Chinese language and script. According to the occupying force, Chinese people had to speak the Chinese language and know the culture of their ancestors. Because of this Japanese policy, Mandarin became popular. Many *peranakans*, young and old, learned Mandarin Chinese for the first time in their lives. Even Chung Hua Hui leaders who were in internment camps, such as Thio Thiam Tjong, began to learn the Chinese language.[30] Students who had been in Dutch-speaking HCS schools were put together in a special class (*kelas istimewa*), without regard to their education level. This special class lasted about six months, and the language of instruction was Mandarin. The method was to memorize and write the Chinese characters without knowing their meaning. Depending on their knowledge of Mandarin, students could advance further. In addition to the regular curriculum, which was the same as that of the Sekolah Rakyat (the People's School), some Japanese was taught. The level was low because the teachers were themselves beginners in the Japanese language.

During these years, the occupying forces' educational policies 'resinified' the Chinese whom they considered their enemy because of the war in China. Chinese

people were thus made more aware of their identity.[31] The Chinese education in THHK schools, and the orientation towards China with which the emancipation period began, were unintentionally continued during the occupation years. Not everyone wanted to go along with this 'resinification' through schools. Instead of sending their children to Chinese schools, some *peranakan* parents preferred to have their children taught by private teachers, or to have them participate in private courses. Self-study and private instruction in the Chinese language by a Chinese teacher were sometimes organized in groups at home. The book used for this purpose was *Guoyu zonder Guru*, or Mandarin Chinese without a teacher.[32]

The school situation could vary from place to place. In Bandung – in the middle of the Japanese occupation – there were four elementary schools with almost 1,700 students divided among 96 teachers. This was approximately the same number of pupils as in the pre-war period. In Semarang, by contrast, two Chinese schools were closed during the occupation and the only Chinese school that was open did not teach Chinese.[33]

As mentioned earlier, the Dutch language was prohibited not only in education but throughout the public domain. Its use could lead to mistreatment and could be classified by the Kenpeitai as an expression of pro-Dutch sympathies. Besides the language, the Western culture of Japan's enemy countries and its forms of expression, such as Western films,[34] dance, jazz, and the use of the Dutch and English languages were also banned. Music of neutral or friendly countries, however, was allowed. German classical music, such as Wagner's compositions, Hungarian rhapsodies, and Strauss' waltzes, remained available. They were played on the radio and used as background music for propaganda films. In early 1943, the playlists of radio stations controlled by the Japanese government also included Hawaiian melodies, rumba, and tango, as well as *keroncong* (traditional music found in different parts of the archipelago), Balinese, and Sundanese music.

With a few exceptions, Japanese cultural policy was basically anti-Western and encouraged Eastern traditions. This was in order to appeal more to Asian peoples and gain their support. Chinese New Year 2494 (as well as the three major Muslim holidays) in 1942 was declared an official holiday in Java and Madura. Traditional Chinese dances, such as the lion dance (*barongsai*) and the dragon dance (*liang-liong*), were often performed at official Japanese ceremonies to welcome high-ranking military or civilian officers, as well as at public celebrations and Japanese festivals and holidays. In addition to the official celebration of Chinese New Year, the Japanese allowed Chinese songs to be broadcast over local radio and Chinese music ensembles to give performances. Films from the 'New China', made under Wang Ching-wei's regime, were shown and traditional Chinese plays were popular entertainment during the occupation. Because they were performed in Malay, they were also accessible to the Indonesian population.

Proceeds from these performances, which Sukarno also regularly attended, were donated to aid Indonesian and *peranakan* prisoners of war, and to support schools in Jakarta.

The Japanese also actively supported local artistic expressions. They encouraged artists to dedicate their work to the development of a New Asia. Painters, writers, and composers received a lot of attention: art exhibitions and celebrations of public festivals were sponsored by the Japanese. The Emperor's birthday was celebrated with two major exhibitions: one featuring Indonesian painters and the other with Chinese artists. The latter also featured Chinese calligraphy.[35]

The process of resinification and de-Westernization during this period was also evident in the way *peranakans* wrote their names. Before the war, when many *peranakans* were striving for equality with Europeans, some had switched to writing their names in the Western way, with the family name at the end (for example, S.A. Boen instead of Boen Soen Ang). They also chose Dutch first names for everyday use. Japan's anti-Western policies changed this trend. During the occupation, many *peranakans* returned to their original names, and even wrote them with Chinese characters. Thus, during the Japanese occupation, there was a revival of various forms of traditional Chinese culture, albeit adapted to their Indonesian living environment.

After the Invasion

With the occupation of the Indonesian archipelago, Japan expanded its territory and sphere of influence, and secured access to rich resources. Other sources of income also had to be tapped to finance the war and the war industry. The Chinese, with their important position in the economy, had to play a role in this. Their activities in trade were not prohibited, but instead they were restricted or encouraged depending on Japanese interests. Sources of revenue for Japan included the seizure of businesses and factories from entrepreneurs and personal property from individuals. Other taxes were imposed in addition to war taxes. The Chinese people were introduced to a system of contributions, donations – voluntary or under pressure – and gifts for the Japanese war economy. They were called upon to do so individually or through Chinese organizations. Contributions had to be raised in various forms and on various occasions and were intended for the Japanese military administration or other organizations designated by them.

For the Chinese, the Japanese occupation brought a significant loss of property in the economic sphere. Besides destruction, which occurred in the beginning of the occupation, economic policies led to drastic changes in the economic position of the Chinese. Chinese businessmen and Chinese society in general had to constantly

adapt to new situations. For normal business life, which benefits from peace and stability, these were tough times.

The disruption of business began even before the Japanese arrived. Anticipating the invasion in the months before the outbreak of war, Dutch economic institutions began moving from the major cities to the interior, where it would be safer. Large Chinese companies were also moving their supplies to small towns in the interior, such as Sindanglaya, Cibadak, and Bogor in West Java. As the war drew closer, smaller businesses and individual Chinese also decided to evacuate. In some cases, Chinese businessmen were ordered to evacuate by the Dutch East Indies authorities, possibly because they wanted to employ scorched earth[36] tactics.

The Japanese army's arrival in Sumatra and Java was followed by widespread chaos marred by looting and robberies. During the first weeks of the Japanese occupation, the Chinese in Java's major cities – and not just the business elite – suffered great losses. Some lost everything. In Jakarta, in Pintu Kecil, the heart of Chinese wholesale trade, textile merchants suffered the greatest losses. The same happened in Tanjung Priok and Jembatan Lima, where most stores were completely looted.

Beyond the large cities, the same thing happened. Many factories were destroyed by the Algemeen Vernietigings Corps (General Destruction Body) and retreating Dutch soldiers. In the interior, Indonesians stole large quantities of rice from rice husking plants, mostly Chinese-owned, and factories were destroyed or damaged. Of the 130 sugar mills existing in Java in 1940, only 32 remained. Large Dutch warehouses and businesses were looted by Indonesians and, in some cases, the Japanese army opened the door wide for them. The Oei Tiong Ham Group[37] lost at least two factories this way: the rubber reprocessing plants in Palembang were set on fire and the Ponen sugar factory in Semarang was blown up.

Some Chinese businessmen managed to keep their possessions by buying off the leaders of *rampokkers* (looters). Owners of rice mills proceeded to distribute large quantities of rice, which did not always lead to the desired result. Probably the greatest losses were suffered in West Java, in comparison to Central and East Java. Between 70–80 per cent of businesses and companies were looted. The Japanese army dealt with this anarchy within weeks. Punishments were harsh, and those involved in armed riots received the death penalty.

In addition to factories and other large businesses, residential houses were also ransacked. In Java, the Chinese – without distinction between rich or poor – became the target of widespread looting and pillaging, both inland and in the cities. From the interior, thousands of Chinese fled (back) to the cities in search of safety;[38] and many stayed there, increasing the number of Chinese residents in the larger cities. Outside Java, the opposite happened. In some areas of Sumatra, the Chinese who had fled the city lived as farmers on the land until the end of the occupation.

There, too, the thinking was that the interior would offer more protection. The same thing happened in Borneo when the Chinese escaped the violence and fled inland with their families.[39]

A conservative estimate puts the damage suffered by the Chinese in those first weeks at f100 million. Violence against the Chinese came from various sides, including the Japanese. In March 1942, in East Java's Tuban, more than 100 Chinese who were fleeing were killed by Japanese.[40] The violence, destruction, and looting on the Indonesian side caught the Chinese community completely by surprise. In the calm before the storm, there had been no sign of anti-Chinese feelings; too much was taken for granted. Later, the *Kung Yung Pao* newspaper and Chinese leaders noted more than once that the violence was unexpected because relations between Chinese and Indonesians had been harmonious for years. However, the slogans of the looters told a different story: 'We are here to share in your possessions. You Chinese are rich, we are poor. Eliminate the Dutch, eliminate the Chinese'. This not only echoed the contrast between rich and poor, but also aggression against the Chinese. It was clear that the Chinese were not quite aware of the sentiment among the Indonesian population.

Not only the Chinese, but rich Indonesians also fell victim to Indonesian looters. In Pekalongan, Indonesian businessmen actually participated in the looting. It is possible that business competition played a role here. In Tangerang and Bekasi in West Java, where anti-Chinese violence was intense, the Chinese's traditional large land holdings – the private estates in the region – also played a role.[41] In the years of the Indonesian Revolution, Tangerang would again become the scene of anti-Chinese violence.

Enemy Property

It is common knowledge that Indonesia's economy dramatically deteriorated during the Japanese occupation. Japan began the war with the intention of gaining economic and political hegemony in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Japan's short-term goal was to secure resources strategically important to the war effort, while cutting off the enemy from these. The oil industry, mining, communications, and the export-oriented agricultural sector were vital to Japan. These strategic sectors were taken over immediately after the invasion and placed under direct Japanese control. Long-term plans were more unclear. The lack of a clear vision meant that there was no consistent policy for economic control and management in occupied Indonesia.

As the war progressed, overall socio-economic conditions deteriorated across the board. The policy in general was to seize, confiscate, liquidate, replace, or manage large and small financial institutions that were considered 'enemy property'.

It was summarized under the phrase 'control of enemy property'.[42] To manage this control, the *Tekisan Kanribu* (abbreviated to Tekisan, the Department for the Management of Enemy Property) was established in May 1942. Several other institutions were also created for other economic purposes, such as institutions for the management or control of private estates, plantations, and raw materials. The Tekisan was mainly active in the areas controlled by the two army units. In the areas controlled by the navy, which mainly involved the exploitation of natural resources, the navy preferred to work exclusively with subsidiaries of Japanese *zaibatsu*:[43] financial conglomerates and Japanese business groups with interests in the financial, industrial, and agricultural sectors.

'Enemy property' was initially defined as property owned by Japan's enemies, i.e. Dutch, British, and Americans, and those who were of mixed blood (Eurasians). However, the Japanese military administration in Java was reluctant to include Eurasians among the enemy. The Chinese population was labelled 'Asians', and they therefore became foreigners (see under contributions, donations and taxes in this chapter). Enemy property was broadly interpreted as enterprises, services, and investments owned by nationals of enemy states, by public institutions such as municipalities, and by legal entities based in enemy states. First, enemy banks were liquidated and replaced by Japanese banks, the most important of which were Nanpo Bank and Yokohama Specie Bank (YSB). The imperial family held the majority of shares in the latter. The YSB financed the 16th and 25th army regiments but was also involved with three other banks in efforts by the military administration to obtain gold and precious stones. These precious metals were essential to Japan's war industry. Establishment of the Japanese banks was then followed by the liquidation, confiscation, or control of major financial institutions such as trading houses, insurance companies, plantations, and, finally, also the smaller businesses and stores.

Only property of people considered 'the enemy' was supposed to be confiscated. In reality, personal property of non-enemies such as Indonesians, Chinese, and Arabs – even if they were small shopkeepers – was also confiscated under the guise of controlling and claiming enemy property. Silver, copper, nickel coins, jewellery, *keris* (traditional daggers), musical instruments, paintings by famous and less famous Dutch painters, Chinese porcelain, and valuable stamp collections disappeared through confiscations. Supplies of smaller trading houses and stores were sold to Japanese stores or confiscated by the military, and the goods were then offered for sale in military stores. The Tekisan itself often deviated from its own rules, although attempts were sometimes made to put an end to these arbitrary seizures.

Many Chinese shopkeepers and Indian ship owners were thus arbitrarily designated as enemies, resulting in the loss of their property. To escape confiscation and claims on their property, people resorted to a tried-and-true method in the history

of Southeast Asia: they buried their valuables. This even happened in internment camps. Valuables were also given to friends for safekeeping. The Japanese administration knew this, and constantly searched for hidden goods and intermediaries.

Plantations, a cornerstone of colonial business alongside finance and trade, were also put under administrative control between July 1942 and May 1944. It meant that the Japanese gave instructions for planting, harvesting, and storing commercial crops. In Java, all quinine, coffee, rubber, and tea enterprises were the first to come under Japanese control, followed by those for kapok, cocoa, and sisal. Owners and senior personnel were maintained in their positions for the first year-and-a-half and had to handle current business affairs. The Japanese military administration acted as the sole buyer. The policy was even more arbitrary with sugar companies. After several months under Japanese management, sixteen sugar enterprises were transferred to Japanese corporations in November 1942. In the period up to June 1944, some of these were liquidated and the refineries were converted into butanol factories and rice husking plants. The land was now used for growing rice, other food crops, and cotton. This, however, was a failure due to a variety of factors: shortage of labour in the villages because of the withdrawal of *romusha*s (Javanese labour forced to work elsewhere), poor maintenance of the irrigation systems, insufficient knowledge about cotton farming , and low official prices for rice.

Policies were arbitrary. There is no evidence of consistent policy or uniform practice in Japanese dealings with enemy enterprises. This could result in chaotic situations. Sometimes, companies were officially liquidated, while others simply ceased operations without clear instruction, or were placed under Japanese management. In some cases, it was not clear even to Japanese authorities whether a company should be considered 'enemy property'. At first, the general guideline for control of enemy property was maximum use of existing management structures, personnel, and their expertise. As a result, the original top management remained in their posts until August 1943. When management then passed into Japanese hands, the success of the managed enterprises depended in part on the technical knowledge and experience of the individual Japanese administrators and managers, and on the cooperation of the remaining personnel. Some of these enterprises were well managed, while others were neglected. Management during the occupation had a trial-and-error character.[44] The owners of these stores, businesses, factories, and plantations included Chinese people.

Chinese in the Japanese War Economy

As mentioned, the Japanese occupation was an economically difficult time for the Chinese. Early on, the tone was set for the Japanese administration's attitude

towards the Chinese. Immediately upon taking office in March 1942, General Moichiro Yamamoto, head of the military administration in Java, warned that the Japanese army would certainly guarantee the safety of 'life and property of the Chinese if the Chinese in Java understood the situation and faithfully assisted in the implementation of various measures of the Japanese army'. This may have been a disguised reference to the Japanese army's recent intervention in lootings by Indonesians after Japan's takeover of the archipelago. At the same time, it tied the protection and security of the Chinese in general to cooperation with the Japanese army. The warning was reiterated when registration of Chinese as aliens began a month later. Those who did not register would receive no protection from the military. The Japanese military administration's warnings to the Chinese did not miss their mark. The Japanese military was only too happy to exploit this situation and enforced cooperation in various forms. For the Chinese, cooperation became a survival strategy. In cooperating with the Japanese, making profits was not paramount for the Chinese, as they were too dependent on the policies of the Japanese military, whose basic premise was that 'Chinese capabilities and commercial talents should be utilized for Japanese purposes'.[45]

The occupation and Japanese economic policies also led to a disruption of the Chinese trade position. Economic patterns and trade structures were radically disrupted by the Japanese occupation. Relations with trading partners important to Chinese businesses, such as Dutch companies and economic institutions, collapsed; consequently, cooperative ties, trade lines, and credit facilities also disappeared. The loss of the European market, the shortage of ships, and the blockades that had been erected meant that import and export trade with countries inside and outside of Asia came to a virtual standstill. Shortages of all kinds of imported goods arose. The chain with trade intermediaries was broken. The shortage of textiles, for example, brought the batik industry to a virtual standstill.

The arrival of Japanese businessmen and Japanese conglomerates with great capital power (*zaibatsu*), such as Mitsui and Mitsubishi, also changed the position of Chinese trade. The new players in the economy wanted a piece of the economic pie: they wanted to fill the trade gaps following the absence of the Dutch; or, better yet, gain monopolies in various goods or materials. As a result, the role of Chinese firms was reduced to that of business agents for the Japanese, or tenants in their own business premises that were now under Japanese supervision. Chinese banks and companies were frozen, or could only operate in a highly downsized form with Japanese capital to serve Japanese interests. They operated under strict supervision of Japanese authorities. The Chinese were pushed out of the market so that these powerful Japanese competitors could develop at their expense.

In general, during the occupation, most Chinese businessmen were tolerated by the Japanese. They had to adapt to the new conditions. The grip of the Japanese

administration on Chinese companies and trade organizations was realized by replacing the existing staff at the top and in management with Japanese people. Profits from trading activities then found their way to the administration in the form of taxes or financial contributions and donations to the Japanese military. Twang Peck Yang, in his research on the Chinese business elite during the Japanese occupation and revolutionary years, described the cooperation of the Oei Tiong Ham concern, a large and well-known *peranakan* business empire, with the Japanese. In addition to sugar and rubber, the concern was active in several areas of the economy. This cooperation had been enshrined in a decree by the Japanese military. The concern was headed by Oei Tjong Hauw, son of Oei Tiong Ham. Even though Oei Tjong Hauw's sister was married to a Chinese diplomat in America (the enemy), and Oei Tjong Hauw himself had ties to the Dutch-friendly organization Chung Hua Hui, the company was not considered enemy property. Director Oei Tjong Hauw was willing to play the game during the Japanese occupation. When the military got involved with the concern, the working capital halved compared to before the war. Taxes were a big burden, and profits were used to finance the military administration's department gunseikanbu. Kian Gwan, the commercial arm of the concern, had to cash out its raw materials and its shares were confiscated. The sugar stockpile, which represented a huge value, was publicly presented to the army in the form of a gift because of the 'protection granted by the army' and its 'helpfulness'. The army appreciated that such contributions were publicly presented as a gift, as was usually the case with contributions from the Chinese.

This influence was related to the Japanese management's control over the concern. The managing director, his assistants, the accountant, and even the technician, were all Japanese, appointed by the military. After the introduction of these measures, Kian Gwan was allowed to go about his business. Director Oei Tjong Hauw became the designated leader of several Chinese organizations set up by the military. He was closely associated with Japanese officials from various departments, including the Kenpeitai. The concern became the army's supplier and amassed large profits. After the war, a Japanese man, Nakazushi, stated that the Oei Tiong Ham concern had been instructed to produce as much as possible for the army. The company was given great independence in this regard and thus had the opportunity to make exorbitant profits at a time when other Chinese companies were struggling or going bankrupt. According to a statement by a fellow Chinese entrepreneur, Kian Gwan was able to make huge profits on sugar sales because of its ties to the military and the monopoly it had been granted. Those profits partly flowed back to the Japanese government.[46]

Not all Chinese companies managed to survive the Japanese occupation in the same way. Confiscation could not always be avoided. Yet smaller businesses – often owned by *totoks* – were able to get by despite these difficult times. Some of

these businessmen were leaders of Chinese organizations. They gave the Japanese access to the Chinese community for that reason and were thus spared from the worst. Language was also an important factor in closing the gap between the Japanese and *totoks*. Japanese *kanji* (script language) and the Hokkian spoken in Taiwan (which then belonged to Japan) were good communication tools for the Japanese, who spoke neither Indonesian nor Dutch. Nevertheless, neither the Japanese nor the *totoks* used the Japanese or Chinese languages with each other in public.

Even outside Java – in Sumatra and Penang – the Chinese continued to control trade, albeit with 'silent' Japanese partners and with Japanese military protection. Black market activities and rampant hoarding were common, particularly among *totok* businessmen. Agile, tough businessmen who maintained ties with the Japanese were particularly successful in the black market. It was usually not the *peranakans*, but the *totoks* who seized the opportunity to get rich during that period. They were quicker to take risks. The business skills of the mostly Dutch-educated *peranakans* were used to continue managing large enterprises that had been confiscated or abandoned by the Dutch.[47]

Cooperation with Indonesian Businessmen

During the Japanese occupation, the Chinese in the economy felt pressure from 'above' and 'below'. From above, this came in the form of the Japanese administration's distrust and strict control, while the pressure from below came from the emerging Indonesian business class. Japanese distrust was expressed early on – in March 1942 – by the aforementioned General Yamamoto, head of the military administration in Java. He believed that while outwardly the Chinese appeared 'respectful and accommodating', it was a different story internally. Although, in the initial months, the Chinese often emphasized their sincerity in their contributions to the Japanese military, it was received with scepticism by the Japanese. Moreover, the military administration increasingly had to consider the demands of Indonesian businessmen and nationalists, who wanted to occupy a larger and more important place in the economy, and were thus given room to do so. To this end, the Chinese's traditional share was curtailed.

The Chinese also felt the pressure of an emerging Indonesian economic class. An important development in this regard was the introduction of the *kumiai*, a form of cooperation established by the Japanese administration between Indonesian and Chinese businessmen. Cooperation had to be realized in a variety of areas and levels of the economy, such as in trade and industry, distribution, transportation, and plantation products. The Japanese administration pursued cooperation based on equality among the various population groups. It is not clear

to what extent this equality was ideologically inspired, or merely implemented for practical reasons. The policy of equality was confirmed in a September 1942 decree. It aimed to treat *huaqiao* (overseas Chinese) equally with *pribumi* (native Indonesians). Colonial legal inequality had already been removed by the Japanese by this point.[48]

An example of a commercial *kumiai* was the Guild of Rice Wholesalers, which received provisions from the military for distribution. An industrial *kumiai*, for example, was the Soap Factories Guild, which received raw materials from Japanese organizations for soap production. The Japanese played a leading role in the *kumiai* and forced Chinese and Indonesians (as well as Arabs) to cooperate, for the first time in history, in trade organizations and in management. This gave Indonesians more opportunities to participate in the economy. Business relations between Chinese and Indonesians could develop on an equal footing.

The *kumiai* also filled the gap left by Siang Hwee, the Chinese trade organizations in Java. Even before the occupation years, these trade organizations had been unable to pursue a unified policy. After their leaders were interned, most Siang Hwee were disbanded.

From October 1942 onward, leadership of a *kumiai* was usually in the hands of an Indonesian, while members consisted of an equal number of Indonesians and Chinese. The number of shares a member could own was limited. This basic structure was maintained as much as possible. These measures were intended to assure Indonesians of a share of trade while preventing competition between the financially strong and economically weak. Indonesians also sat on the board of the *kumiai*, and they would contribute to it according to their ability. Chinese contributions consisted of their knowledge, skill, and experience. The Japanese recognized that the Chinese were disadvantaged by this new structure. However, this economic inconvenience was to be seen as a sacrifice for the common good, and the promotion of joint prosperity in Indonesia.

With the *kumiai* system – economic cooperation between Chinese businessmen and Indonesian partners – the foundation was laid for an important aspect of the later 'Ali-Baba' construction in Indonesian business.[49]

In addition to the *kumiai* organizations, many Indonesian businesses and companies emerged during the Japanese occupation. To develop Indonesian business talent, a trade school, to which only Indonesians (105 students) were admitted, was opened in July 1943. Education was provided by teachers from Japan. An economic training centre for 170 Indonesian students followed in May 1945. Almost simultaneously, a trade federation was established in Semarang, whose 24-member board consisted of two Chinese, two Japanese, and 20 Indonesians.

The Chinese watched the rise and progress of Indonesians in business with concern. The undercurrent of rivalry between the two population groups remained

beneath the surface during the occupation years; cooperation between the Chinese and Indonesians was encouraged by the Japanese administration.[50]

Self-sufficiency

Japanese policy was to be locally self-sufficient. In the first months of the occupation, this was difficult because transportation and traffic had been crippled by the destruction of roads and bridges by Dutch soldiers. Unemployment also became a problem for the Chinese. Thousands of refugees in the cities received help from Chinese organizations, with schools and temples providing shelter. Many unemployed Chinese turned to street hawking. The practice of *catut*, a form of black-market trade, flourished. There was no coordination of food prices between residencies. Shortage of food, exacerbated by hoarding, drove up prices. Price differences between urban and rural areas, and between cities, encouraged smuggling both by land and by sea. The result was an active black market that included the Chinese.

This started as early as April 1942 in Jakarta with rice. For example, because of the huge price differences, people travelled 15 kilometres to Cikampek to get rice. The same applied to beer and imported cigarettes. The large price differences between Semarang, Surabaya, Jakarta, and Yogyakarta sometimes yielded a 300 per cent profit. Transporting goods by bicycle along small roads for the *catut* trade was lucrative business. *Catut* offered Chinese the opportunity to make some money.[51] A lively informal trade also developed within cities in goods for which there was a major shortage, from matches to toothpaste.[52]

Contributions, Donations, and Taxes

As mentioned earlier, soon after the beginning of the Japanese occupation, Chinese people in general – and businessmen in particular – were called upon to contribute financially to war activities, to 'military expenditure and administrative funds', and war funds. Regular 'donations' and contributions were requested on occasions such as the founding of the 3A movement,[53] the Emperor's birthday, and days commemorating Japanese military victories. No statistics are known of the total amount raised by the Chinese in Java during the three-and-a-half years of occupation. Many of these fundraising activities in towns, villages, or residencies took place at the local level, without coordination from higher up. Yet, they must have been substantial sums; on the Emperor's birthday, for example, the Chinese in Jakarta raised f720,000, of which f566,000 was earmarked for the purchase of airplanes. The Malang regency alone contributed f202,786 to this aircraft fund. On

27 November 1943, five planes were purchased from this fund at a combined cost of several million guilders.

Chinese businessmen had to contribute financially not only to the Japanese administration, but also to Indonesian military youth organizations established by the Japanese administration. The most important one was Pembela Tanah Air PETA (Fatherland Defenders),[54] an Indonesian army unit established by the Japanese. In October 1943, two months after PETA was established, the Chinese in Jakarta contributed f7,000. Other contributions came from the regions of Priangan f140,000, Banten f31,004, Semarang city f35,000, Bekasi f12,000, and from a small village like Salatiga f9,330. Contributions also went to the heiho,[55] other military organizations, Muslim organizations, and to the Malay-language newspaper *Asia Raya*, which had been established by the Japanese. The Chinese organization HCCH was also called on to make contributions.[56] Similar campaigns by the military administration occurred in Sumatra and were also extended to Indonesians. The perception that Chinese businessmen were to fund Indonesian military organizations would continue after the Japanese occupation.

Other financial contributions the Japanese required the Chinese to make included the foreigners' tax – registration costs for Chinese aged seventeen and older – and the war tax. To oversee and control the number of Chinese in Indonesia, they were required to register. The registration of foreigners aged seventeen and older began on 11 April 1942.[57] After registration, they were given an identification card (*kartu penduduk*), which they had to keep with them at all times as proof that they had shown loyalty to the military administration and that they were registered as a foreign national.

Registration fees were high: f100 for men and f50 for women. By comparison, a low-ranking civil servant earned f200 per month in 1930.[58] If everyone paid, it would amount to a sum of about f100 million for the Japanese occupying forces. Thousands of Chinese could not afford these high costs and were later allowed to spread the payment over a longer period. In some cases, employers and wealthy businessmen were held responsible for paying their employees' expenses. In Jakarta, several large companies allowed their staff to pay the foreigner's tax from within the company. Another businessman reportedly contributed f100,000 to enable poor Chinese to register.[59] Not being officially registered meant 'not existing'. For example, for Thio, a young man of seventeen, it meant much less freedom. He was not able to work or travel officially and lived with the fear of being arrested without registration papers. Thio suspected that his parents had avoided registration for fear that he would be called up by the Japanese for some form of military service.[60]

The Chinese felt the increasing burden of ever-rising taxes. In addition to the foreigner's tax and war tax, other new taxes were introduced, or existing taxes

were increased. Often, the taxes levied on the Chinese were higher – sometimes much higher – than on other population groups. In the first year of the occupation, Chinese in the Solo principality had to pay more than four times the amount of tax charged to Indonesians and Arabs. In 1943, charges such as property taxes were increased by 50 per cent and corporate taxes by as much as 400 per cent.

On top of the taxes, Chinese contributions came in the form of monetary donations, household goods, and food. The strict Japanese control of goods meant that only a limited amount was permitted per household. Any surplus had to be recorded and then often bought at low prices; it was simply taken by the army or entered into the distribution system and sold at official prices. If the army needed metal, for example, then wire fences, iron gates, and scrap metal were requisitioned.[61]

Japan needed gold and other precious metals, such as diamonds, for the war industry. From the beginning of the Japanese occupation, but especially in the last year, efforts were made to collect as much gold, valuables, and diamonds from the population as possible. Not only from the Chinese, but also from prominent and wealthy Indonesians and Arabs. Diamonds were needed for aircraft instruments and in the munitions industry, while gold was used for inter-Asian trade. These mineral resources were vital to the war industry. The army and the navy were tasked with finding precious metals and gems in the occupied territories. At the instruction from army headquarters in Tokyo, campaigns were organized between August 1942 and January 1945 in Java, Borneo, and Sulawesi, as well as in Malaysia and Singapore. To this end, the Japanese proceeded to confiscate valuables kept in vaults, buy up and possibly sell them under duress, ask for 'voluntary' donations, and forced production in the mines. Proceeds were transferred to Japan by ship or plane.[62]

These campaigns were in sharp contrast to the living conditions of the ordinary population in the last year of occupation. Rice distribution no longer functioned; there were severe rice shortages, and daily rations were reduced to an absolute minimum. Medical care was no longer available, and there was a shortage of textiles. If one had anything left to wear, it was clothing made of burlap or scraps of rubber. People were dying of starvation, disease, and exhaustion.[63]

The End of the Japanese Occupation

Important changes and developments took place during the Japanese occupation years. First, there was a reversal in the attitudes of and relations between population groups that had been taken for granted during the colonial period. Hierarchical relationships changed radically, sometimes totally. Japan's initial victory and occupation had shown that the power of the West was not unassailable. A psychological

decolonization was taking place. The slogan 'Asia for the Asians' had resonated, also elsewhere in Asia. In the subsequent years of revolution, as Indonesia fought for independence, several states in Asia gained independence.[64]

Japanese policy was characterized culturally by Japanization, de-Westernization, resinification, and, of course, by war and occupation: resistance, repression, domination, and coercion. The revaluation of Chinese language and culture made the Chinese more aware of their Chinese identity. The economic situation of the Chinese changed partly because their pre-war networks had disintegrated and their economic position had to serve Japan and its war industry and, in some cases, the Indonesians. One new element was the Japanese administration's policy allowing Chinese and Indonesians to cooperate economically, e.g. in the *kumiai*. This was a great boost to the Indonesian business class. Financial contributions to the military and related organizations became firmly established in business and daily life. Those forms of support for the military would return during the revolution and beyond. In this sense, several developments during the Japanese occupation remained linked to the following years.

Starting in May 1944, Japanese forces suffered increasing defeats at the hands of the Allies. It became clear that Japan could no longer hope to win the war. This brought Indonesia's independence ever closer. On 29 April 1945, with Japanese surrender imminent, the Japanese administration established the Badan Penyelidik Usaha-usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan, BPUPK (the Investigative Committee to Prepare for Independence) – later BPUPKI with the 'I' standing for 'Indonesia'. This organization had 66 members, including four Chinese representatives, one Eurasian, and one Arab. The four Chinese members were Oei Tjong Hauw, Liem Koen Hian, Oey Tiang Tjoei, and Tan Eng Hoa. The BPUPKI was soon replaced by the Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia, PPKI (the Preparatory Body for Indonesian Independence), with Sukarno as chairman. The Chinese were represented by Yap Tjwan Bing in the PPKI.[65]

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VI Between Two Fires (1945–1949)

The Years of the Indonesian Revolution

On 15 August 1945, Japan capitulated and World War II ended in Asia. The Dutch East Indies was placed under the command of the Southeast Asia Command (SEAC) of the Allies and came under the leadership of the British. Two days after the surrender, on 17 August, the Indonesian Republic was proclaimed with Sukarno and Hatta as its leaders. In the last year of the Japanese occupation, preparations for that independence had already been initiated by the BPUPKI, the body set up by the Japanese for that purpose. However, Indonesia still had to battle the Netherlands, which wanted to retain its East Indies colony. As far as the Netherlands was concerned, an independent Indonesian republic lay in the future, and under Dutch leadership with the Queen as head of state.[1] The years of struggle after Japan's surrender until the transfer of sovereignty on 27 December 1949, are known as the Indonesian Revolution or the Indonesian War of Independence.

After Japan's capitulation, the authority of the Japanese was taken over by the British on behalf of the Allies. Japanese troops had to be disarmed and evacuated by them, and care had to be taken of the interned civilians and prisoners of war. Preparations also had to be made for the return of the Dutch administration. From February 1946, some Dutch combat troops came under the command of General Spoor. It was not until 30 November 1946 that the British formally transferred authority to the Netherlands.

The struggle for Indonesia's independence was fought both at the negotiating table and through weapons and violence. The Dutch negotiators were Lieutenant Governor-General H.J. van Mook and Dutch government officials. On the Indonesian side were the leaders of the Republik Indonesia –Sukarno, Hatta, and Sjahrir – and other negotiators. From the beginning, the two sides differed on the future of Indonesia. The Netherlands wanted a federation of states under the name 'United States of Indonesia' as part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The Republic, on the other hand, wanted an independent Indonesia as a unitary state separate from the Netherlands.

On 12 November 1946, the Linggajati Agreement was signed. It stated that the Netherlands would recognize the authority of the Indonesian Republic in Java, Madura, and Sumatra, and that the federation of the 'United States of Indonesia' would be established no later than 1 January 1949. The Republic would be one of the states with the Dutch queen as the symbolic head of state. The agreement was the result of the British demanding some form of agreement before they withdrew all troops from Java and Sumatra in December. There was great distrust on both the Dutch

and Indonesian sides about the concessions made, and bitter political controversies arose. The following months were marked by Captain Westerling's bloody terror in South Sulawesi, increasingly strong nationalist and pro-republican sentiments among Indonesians, and problems surrounding the ratification of the agreement.[2]

In May 1947, the Dutch decided to attack the Republic directly. The Netherlands proceeded with the first *Politionele Actie* (Police Action, 21 July–5 August 1947), a military action known in Indonesia as *Agresi Belanda*. This Police Action was called 'Operation Product'. The goal was to force the Republic into a political agreement and gain access to the important products in Java (sugar) and Sumatra (oil and rubber). Under great international pressure, the first Police Action ended on 5 August, before Yogyakarta could be captured and another, more willing Republican government installed.

On 17 January 1948, the Renville Agreement was signed, agreeing to the withdrawal of Republican troops from Dutch territories and mutual demarcation of territory. Dutch hopes for a decrease in fighting proved in vain. On 19 December 1948, the Netherlands began the second Police Action. The goal this time was to capture not only Yogyakarta, but also the remaining part of Java and as much of Sumatra as possible. The Republican government had to be overthrown and the Republican forces destroyed. The Republican top brass, including Sukarno and Hatta, were captured. In fact, they had allowed themselves to be captured in the hope that international opinion would turn against the Dutch victory. The remaining Republican army continued its guerrilla war.

By the end of December 1948, when the main Republican towns in Java and Sumatra had fallen into Dutch hands, the Republic's hopes were answered. Two weeks later, on 5 January 1949, the second Police Action was halted, again under great international pressure. The Van Roijen-Roem Agreement, concluded on 7 May 1949, offered the prospect of a final political solution to the conflict. Dutch troops were to evacuate Yogyakarta, the city they had captured a few months earlier. The subsequent Round Table Conference (23 August–2 November 1949) negotiated an early transfer of sovereignty.

The Hague was under great pressure from the international community as there was much support for an independent Indonesia. However, the Netherlands insisted on forming a federation of Indonesian states allied with the Netherlands in a union. On 27 December 1949, sovereignty was transferred to the United States of Indonesia with Sukarno as its first president. This ended 350 years of Dutch administrative and military presence in the Indonesian archipelago. Only New Guinea remained in Dutch hands.[3] The following year, in 1950, the Indonesian government ended the federal structure and proclaimed a unitary state: the Republik Indonesia. New Guinea was ceded to Indonesia on 1 May 1963, after years of diplomatic struggle and a temporary administration under the United Nations.[4]

During the revolutionary years, civilians tried to pick up life again after years of occupation that came with a deteriorating economy. Java and Sumatra were divided: some territory was under Dutch control, while other areas were in the hands of Indonesian freedom fighters. In Java, before the first Police Action, the Dutch controlled the four major cities and the surrounding area; the remaining area was Republican with Yogyakarta as the capital. During the revolutionary years, life in Dutch occupied territory and under Dutch rule looked very different from that in Republican territory. Dutch education was resumed in the Dutch areas and Dutch financial institutions became active again – old times seemed to have returned. Those who were in Japanese internment camps left for the Netherlands. Some Chinese also left for the Netherlands, mainly students. However, uncertainty and violence were not absent from daily life. The unresolved issue about the future of Indonesia meant uncertainty about the future of the Chinese as well.

Neutrality

The Chinese were important to both the Dutch administration and the Indonesian Republic because of their position in the economy. There was often suspicion, racism, and deep-seated prejudice against the Chinese from both sides. Their socioeconomic position made them a distinct and, in Indonesian eyes, privileged minority group that also partly identified with China. This predominant image was based on successful Chinese who mostly lived in the big cities; it ignored the much larger group of Chinese who lived in small towns and villages in the interior. There they lived next to, in the middle of, and among their fellow Indonesian town and village residents.

The Indonesian side was often convinced that the Chinese were pro-Dutch, and therefore anti-Republic. As soon as setbacks or problems occurred, the Chinese were blamed.[5] On the other hand, in the areas that the advancing Dutch military had 'liberated', Chinese leaders and traders were often suspected by the Dutch of collaborating with the Indonesian enemy. At the same time, China still played a role and the Dutch administration had to take that into account from an international political perspective. Through its Chinese consuls, China wanted to promote the interests of the Chinese population in Indonesia, whom it considered its citizens. Such advocacy was often considered as unwanted interference.

From the beginning of the revolutionary period, Dutch officials in Dutch occupied territory sought to cooperate with the Chinese leaders, especially the *peranakan* leaders. The Chinese, on the other hand, wanted to remain politically neutral so that they were not seen as the enemy when they were in either Republican or Dutch occupied territory. Taking a political position that was unwelcome in Indonesian

eyes would, they feared, mean retaliation and violence in Republican territory. The Chinese did not want to take sides in the Dutch–Indonesian conflict. This was already evident when, in March 1946, Van Mook invited Chinese and other leaders of minority groups to talk about it. They wanted to remain neutral and any cooperation with the Dutch administration had to be strictly non-political. They also took this position at the Pangkalpinang Conference in October 1946,[6] when discussions were held with Dutch authorities about the social position of minorities in the future. In September 1946, on the eve of this conference, the importance of neutrality was reiterated in the influential magazine *Star Weekly*. The Chinese minority had to cooperate with both sides. Participation in Pangkalpinang was not to be interpreted as Chinese support for either Dutch policy or that of the Republic of Indonesia.

Another reason why many Chinese did not want to take sides in the Indonesian–Dutch conflict and tried to be as neutral as possible was that, from 1909, they were Chinese citizens under the Chinese Nationality Law. *Totoks* in particular oriented themselves towards China. If protection was needed, their first inclination was to seek it from the Chinese consuls, who were ready to deal with the complaints. Consul General Tsiang Chia-Tung, who arrived at his post in Jakarta in January 1946, tried to get both the Indonesians and the Dutch to recognize the neutrality of the ethnic Chinese, all of whom he considered Chinese citizens. He asked the warring sides to respect the flag of Nationalist China and suggested that, in the event of hostilities, Chinese people should gather in buildings for their safety and raise this flag. His efforts came to nothing. Neither side was willing to acknowledge that the Chinese flag had any authority in Indonesia.[7] In addition to the consulate in Jakarta, consuls were stationed in six other cities. When anti-Chinese violence occurred, the consuls would bombard both Dutch and Indonesian authorities with complaints or protests. To maintain the respect of the Chinese community, it was important to them that the protests led to some result. In the face of references to Chinese nationality, Dutch agencies repeatedly took the position that Chinese victims were not Chinese citizens but Dutch subjects. In other words, the Chinese consul had no business interfering with them.

Dutch military authorities had to consider possible political consequences in the international arena when dealing with complaints connected with the Chinese. Under the Allies, China was one of the 'Big Five' and a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. No, or too little, attention to Chinese complaints could lead to official protests. This, in turn, could prompt internal investigations and punishment of perpetrators. In other words, Chinese victims possessed a certain lobbying power.[8]

However, when complaints arose, the lobby did not always lead to proper investigation. Both General Spoor and Lieutenant Governor-General Van Mook

were well aware of this. Spoor, fearing political damage, was forced several times to stand up for the politically and economically important Chinese minority. In October 1946, he reminded his commanders that the Chinese population in Republican territory was at the mercy of the terror and extortion of the Tentara Republik Indonesia TRI (the Indonesian Army) leadership and other militant groups. To secure their lives, property, and assets, the Chinese were often forced to register as Republican citizens or even take an anti-Dutch stance in a conflict in which they preferred to remain neutral. One had to be very careful, Spoor warned, to regard Chinese leaders and merchants on vague grounds as collaborators and for the Dutch to carry out reprisals on them. In February 1947, Van Mook also felt compelled, in the interest of Sino-Dutch relations, to circulate new directives to key civilian authorities after a series of incidents against the Chinese. Jakarta, the Chinese government had complained, did not pay enough attention to the interests of the Chinese community. Complaints about rightful or wrongful action by Dutch authorities were not adequately investigated. The new guidelines included instructions to avoid discrimination, behave properly, and, if possible, allow Dutch subjects of Chinese descent access to government administrative bodies.

China's vigilance in this regard meant that Chinese victims of Republican violence were accurately tracked on the Dutch side. This happened much less for Indonesian victims. Propaganda played a role in this consideration. By showing gruesome photos of Chinese victims of Republican violence, the Netherlands could cast the Republic in a bad light and thus generate sympathy for the Dutch from China and the Chinese people.[9]

The neutrality of the Chinese came under tension when the Dutch army began recruiting Chinese for war propaganda purposes. Unlike the British, whose mission was temporary, the Dutch were determined to return.[10] Beginning in March 1946, they began recruiting Chinese – sometimes under pressure – for the military police and as reserves, fully aware of the consequences. Displaced Chinese who had experienced looting, suffered themselves, or whose relatives had been killed or raped would be the most suitable soldiers to confront the enemy with.

Indeed, a small number of Chinese from around Jakarta and Banten joined the Dutch NICA (Netherlands Indies Civil Administration) army.[11] They acted out of revenge and frustration, as their families had been victims of murder, looting, and arson by Indonesian armed groups during the massive anti-Chinese violence in Tangerang. The Dutch were not particularly interested in the physical strength of the Chinese. It was the image of the Chinese being part of the Dutch armed forces that would have a powerful propaganda effect. It would reinforce among Indonesians the image of the Chinese who supported the Dutch cause, spied for the NICA, and collaborated with the enemy.

Aware of this effect, in Jakarta, Chinese Consul General Tsiang Chia-tung tried to put a stop to it. In a letter to Van Mook and Spoor, he repeated what he had discussed in an earlier conversation, namely that the presence of Chinese in the Dutch army could lead to unfortunate misunderstandings. The safety of Chinese communities in other parts of the country would be endangered. A strictly neutral stance was crucial, since the actions of a small part of the Chinese community could be considered as actions of that community as a whole. 'I am sure you understand that the presence of these Chinese members in the Dutch armed forces could be misconstrued and twisted in such a way that it would cause danger to all other Chinese citizens. I appeal to you to release the Chinese members of your (military) force'. Tsiang seemed unsuccessful in his efforts; indeed, over the next few months, the presence of Chinese people among the Dutch troops was an additional reason to kill Chinese elsewhere, especially in those areas not occupied by the Dutch. The newspaper *Tien Sheng Jih Pao* advised these Chinese to withdraw from the Dutch army of their own accord.

The Dutch probably still viewed the *peranakan* Chinese as Dutch subjects. They overlooked the fact that the Chinese who had joined the Dutch army did so not only out of vindictiveness, but sometimes also out of necessity, in order to earn a living.[12] In doing so, the Chinese exposed themselves and their families to the risk of retaliation by Indonesian fighters. In contrast, on the Dutch side, there was little awareness of the predicament these Chinese were in. In the army, they were often treated with contempt by their Dutch colleagues, who showed little appreciation for their Chinese counterparts. The number of Chinese serving in the British and Dutch forces was not large: only about 350 people by mid-1946.[13]

Designated for Self-protection: The Pao An Tui

In practice, neutrality meant that the Chinese in Dutch occupied territory were under the protection of Dutch authority. Until the first Police Action, that was the area around the four major cities of Java and part of Sumatra. The area beyond that, which was most of Java, was in Republican hands. Violence against the Chinese occurred not only in major cities, but also outside those places in Republican territory. Establishing security zones in Republican and Dutch territories, as proposed by the Chinese consul general, proved impossible. Guarding such a zone with a police force comprised of Indonesians, Chinese, and Dutch was rejected by the Indonesians and the Dutch. This required weapons and that was a difficult issue.

Thus, the Chinese were on their own and had to seek safety in schools or buildings of Chinese organizations, and then hope that the Chinese flag or the Red Cross flag would provide adequate protection. Earlier, during the *Bersiap* period, a Chinese flag,

either placed in front of a house or worn on the chest, could provide protection.[14] The need for organized protection eventually led to the establishment of the Pao An Tui, an armed vigilante group; first in Medan, in December 1945, and later in Jakarta after the first Police Action in August 1947. The Pao An Tui in Medan differed from that in Java.

The Pao An Tui (PAT) in Medan was established on 13 December 1945, during the British presence. Medan had a large Chinese population and in the 1930 Census, they were recorded as the city's largest population at 35.63 per cent. Within a year of its establishment, the corps developed from a small, poorly armed Chinese self-defence group into a thousand-man, fully functioning military organization. After only four months, the PAT was already cooperating with the Allied forces to defend Medan from infiltration by Indonesian militias. However, British military authorities kept the PAT at arm's length from the official forces.

In late November 1946, the Dutch took over command from the British. The Royal Dutch East Indies Army (KNIL) was aware of the importance of peace and order in the large and densely populated Chinese quarter in Medan, and the value of a well-organized and disciplined Chinese self-defence corps. The PAT became an official auxiliary unit of the KNIL, although it did not mean that the PAT was entirely subject to Dutch military command. As with the British, the PAT was kept at arm's length. It retained a large degree of independence and, more than once, its authoritarian and unlawful actions were censured by the KNIL. At the same time, there was a clear reluctance to take measures that would restrict the PAT's freedom of movement.

By October 1947, the PAT had so many units in the area surrounding Medan, and functioned so effectively that it had basically become a state within a state. The PAT, which started as a self-defence corps and formally subordinate to the KNIL, grew into an autonomous and leading organization that had authority within the Chinese community and acted as an intermediary between the city's Chinese residents and the authorities. PAT members were trained by former military personnel from China. Its organizational structure was modelled after a regular corps of the Chinese National Army. The PAT's organization was mainly supported by a group of wealthy businessmen who sympathized with the Kuomintang, the Chinese Nationalist Party. By funding the corps, these businessmen were able to increase their influence. The PAT provided them and their commercial activities with a safe and stable business environment. By the end of 1947, however, the support of the Chinese in Medan for the PAT had waned. The corps was disbanded in April 1948.[15]

In Java, the PAT was established only after the first Police Action (21 July–5 August 1947). Earlier, the Chinese in Java had requested the Dutch administration to provide them with weapons for the purpose of self-protection. Indeed, Dutch troops had not always been able to protect the Chinese from Indonesian reprisals in areas

conquered by the Netherlands. The rejection of these requests caused resentment among many Chinese. After the start of the first Police Action, the Chinese foreign minister stated on 31 July 1947 that he was deeply concerned about the violence the Chinese had experienced during that action. Then, on 26 August 1947, the Chinese consul general in Jakarta, Tsiang Chia-Tung, announced in a radio address that Chinese in Dutch occupied areas had formed several organizations to defend themselves against groups threatening them. A conference was held by the Chinese federation Chung Hua Tsung Hui CHTH (Federation of Chinese Organizations) from 25–27 August 1947, several weeks after the first Police Action. At the conference, where 31 branches of the CHTH from Java and beyond were represented, it was decided to establish a Pao An Tui for Java. The CHTH was a continuation of the HCCH (Hua Ch'iao Chung Hui, the Association for the Overseas Chinese) founded during the Japanese occupation.

The purpose of the Pao An Tui in Java was to coordinate aid to all Chinese victims in different areas. In this aspect, it differed from the PAT in Medan, which was an actively operating self-defence corps. It was expressly stated that the Pao An Tui in Java was temporary in nature and would be disbanded when conditions improved. A week later, on 6 September 1947, Army Commander Spoor issued a decision from the military high command stating that the purpose of the PAT was to protect the lives and property of the Chinese in Java and Sumatra. Property included city neighbourhoods, factories, businesses, warehouses, and homes. The PAT's tasks were thus broadened from coordinating aid to actively protecting lives and property.

The PAT 's headquarters was in Jakarta. Its departments could be established in other places, and only Chinese were allowed to be members. The PAT was not allowed to interfere in police affairs except when deemed necessary. In several places, such as Sukabumi, the PAT allegedly succeeded in protecting houses and stores belonging to Chinese people from arson. Rumours circulated that the PAT was an army of Chinese youth, armed by the Dutch to strike Indonesian youth.[16] This was not surprising since they wore KNIL uniforms, albeit without badges.[17]

Pao An Tui in Java grew into a volunteer armed vigilante group recruited from among the Chinese population. They were trained by the Dutch army, which provided them with uniforms and some weapons. The costs were borne by Chinese organizations. The PAT also procured weapons for itself, for example through the black market. The PAT had ties to the Dutch military. The organization was active only in territories controlled by the Netherlands and functioned largely as Dutch auxiliary troops, thus relieving pressure on the Dutch troops. Occasionally, the group was also used for military operations. It managed to resist Indonesian attacks on several occasions. In doing so, it committed extreme violence or criminal acts, sometimes also on its own initiative.

The Republic was understandably hostile towards the PAT. Even within its own Chinese community, the organization was not uncontroversial as it was considered anti-Republican and allegedly favoured Dutchmen and wealthy Chinese businessmen. By February 1949, the PAT had its own branches in more than 30 cities. There was little support for the PAT in East Java. Surabaya did not want a PAT. There, its establishment was blocked by Tjoa Sik Ien,[18] a supporter of the Indonesian struggle for independence. He feared that the PAT would be abused by wealthy supporters or by the Dutch. In 1949, the organization was disbanded in Java. Quite a few Chinese served with the PAT, the KNIL, or the Indonesian Army (TNI) and, in that capacity, were co-perpetrators in mass violence on several occasions.[19]

Chinese Organizations

The chaotic period after the capitulation of Japan, like the period after the capitulation of the Netherlands in 1942, again brought much violence and loss for the Chinese. In Jakarta, the need for some form of self-protection soon arose among the Chinese, well before the establishment of a PAT in Java. Young Chinese formed guard groups to protect Chinese neighbourhoods where there had been looting, robberies, extortion, and kidnapping. There was also a strong need to organize themselves and thus provide assistance in cases of violence against the Chinese. In October 1945, the first organization established – with the approval of the British – was the Chinese Committee for Assisting Preservation for Law and Order, or Chi An Hui, also later known as the Committee. The Committee, initially unarmed, employed uniformed Chinese and Indonesian guards. Next came the establishment of the Committee of the Chinese Red Cross, whose mission was to help ex-internees. In order to cooperate with the Indonesian side, this organization worked independently from the Dutch Red Cross. The leading figure was Kwa Tjoan Sioe,[20] a doctor who had founded the Jang Seng Ie Hospital in Jakarta in 1924 and took over again as director after the years of internment. He was a Dutch-educated *peranakan* with pro-Indonesian and anti-Kuomintang views.

For contact with the Dutch authorities and with the Republic, in Jakarta and Yogyakarta, respectively, a strong front that could represent the Chinese community had to be established. Best known was the organization Chung Hua Tsung Hui CHTH (Federation of Chinese Associations) in Jakarta, founded on 15 October 1945.[21] CHTH was the successor to the Kakyo Shokai (Hua Ch'iao Chung Hui HCCH – Association for Overseas Chinese), which the Japanese had established for the Chinese during the Japanese occupation. CHTH wanted to bring together all ethnic Chinese, both *totoks* and *peranakans* with their different interests and political sympathies, under one umbrella and represent their interests. Locally, several sub-organizations

emerged.[22] Although the main organization and sub-organizations – at least in the beginning – were intended to be non-political, in Republican territory they formed the channels for financial support for the revolution.[23] This local support for the Republic was also evident in the 1946–1951 commemorative book of the CHTH in the city of Tegal on its fifth anniversary. In it, the regent and the mayor of Pekalongan expressed their gratitude for the considerable material assistance that Tegal's Chinese community had provided to the Indonesian Republic and its troops during the revolution years.[24] The mayor of Tegal also expressed his appreciation for the work of the CHTH. The expenditure review for the years 1947–1949 showed that, during the revolution years, the CHTH in Tegal spent between 65–71 per cent of its budget on costs for displaced people and refugees, 10–13 per cent on donations and contributions, and 11–13.6% on education (THHK schools).

Internal differences, including in the political orientations of *totok* and *peranakan* members of the CHTH in Jakarta, soon led to dissatisfaction. To strengthen *totok* influence within the CHTH, *peranakans* were allowed to make up only one -third of the board. This strengthened the influence of the nationalist Kuomintang party within the CHTH. Whether the overrepresentation of *totoks* in Jakarta's CHTH also continued in the local representations of the CHTH is not clear. Another point of contention was that Westernized *peranakans* wanted candidates with university degrees for the presidency. The *totok* elite, on the other hand, felt that quality, character, skills, and efficiency could not be judged from a university degree.

So, it was not long before a new social organization, the Sin Ming Hui (New Light), was formed in January 1946 in Jakarta by the Dutch- and Malay-speaking *peranakans* alongside the CHTH. The language barrier within the CHTH had become a problem for internal communication. The *totoks* in charge spoke Mandarin Chinese during meetings. However, language was not the only problem that had separated the groups: their prospects were also completely different. The *totoks* saw their future in China, while the *peranakans* saw theirs in Indonesia. As for China, the influence of the Communist Party, especially in Sumatra, became stronger from 1947 onwards.[25] There was no unity among the *peranakans* either. Contradictions between pro-Republican Surabaya and the more Dutch-oriented Jakarta probably played a role.

In addition to contacts with the Dutch and Indonesian authorities, the CHTH also maintained contacts with the press. The organization recorded anti-Chinese violence and aided refugees. In short, it tried to serve the interests of the Chinese in a broad sense. Contact between the CHTH organizations and the Chinese consuls was good. In some areas they worked together in matters of aid and security.

In addition to the CHTH and the Sin Ming Hui, a Chinese political party, the Persatoean Tionghoa PT (the Chinese Union), was founded on 23 May 1948. Its name reflected its connective goals. Many of its members had been members of

various pre-war organizations oriented toward either Indonesia, China, or the Netherlands. The most prominent member was former CHH leader Thio Thiam Tjong. Because of his role as an advisor to Lieutenant Governor-General H.J. van Mook during the revolutionary years, Indonesian nationalists associated him with Dutch colonialism. The PT received support from the *totok*-dominated CHTH, the *peranakan*-dominated Sin Ming Hui, and the Siang Hwee (Chinese Chamber of Commerce). PT's main goal was to protect the interests of the Chinese minority in the upcoming independent Indonesia. In early 1950, the PT changed its name to Partai Demokrat Tionghoa Indonesia, PDTI.[26]

Faces of Violence

Violence against the Chinese had many forms and faces. It was committed by various perpetrators, or groups of perpetrators, and targeted the Chinese both individually and as a group. Depending on the purpose and character of the struggle, and of the clashing parties, the Chinese were sometimes victims in general, while at other times the violence was directed specifically at them.

There were four distinct periods of considerable violence against the Chinese. The first period began after the landing of the first British troops in late September 1945 in Jakarta, when authority was taken over from the Japanese. This period also included the *Bersiap*. The *Bersiap* (which literally means 'be ready' in Indonesian) was a brief period of extreme violence against (Indo) Dutch, Indonesians, Chinese, Japanese, British, and British-Indians right after the Japanese surrender until early 1946.[27] The second period of violence was after the capture of the major cities of Java. Two major outbreaks of violence occurred: in the fishing village of Bagan Siapi-api on Sumatra's east coast and in Tangerang in West Java. In Bagan Siapi-api, Chinese people fought off attacks by Indonesian army troops beginning in March 1946. In Tangerang, there were many Chinese casualties in June 1946. The third and fourth periods of violence were those of the two Police Actions. The first Police Action (Operation Product) began on 21 July and ended on 5 August 1947. The second one (Operation Crow) lasted from 19 December 1948 to 5 January 1949. There were also many Chinese casualties between and after these periods of brutalities due to extreme violence.

Bersiap and the British Takeover

The first weeks after the Japanese surrender were relatively peaceful, with only incidental looting of Chinese stores, although there were several Chinese deaths.[28] After the British arrived in September 1945, the takeover of Japanese authority

followed. In West Java, fighting between the British and Indonesian combat troops was most intense in Bandung. Before the first British troops entered the city on 17 October 1945, the *Bersiap* actions had already claimed many victims of murder, kidnapping, and other brutal violence among the inhabitants of Java. Only after 1 February 1946, when sufficient troops from the Netherlands arrived in Indonesia, did the Dutch join the British under General Spoor.[29] The presence of Dutch troops increased aggression on the Indonesian side against the Chinese, as they were often seen as Dutch sympathizers.

Bandung could not be captured and was divided by a demarcation line into a northern part controlled by the British and a southern part held by Indonesian fighting groups, including *pemudas,*[30] extremists, and 'insurgents'. After the British ultimatum to leave the city, the Indonesian combat units withdrew. Some of the population was forced to go with them. The burning of entire residential areas and *kampongs* went down in history as '*Bandung Lautan Api*', Bandung engulfed in a sea of fire. The violence targeted different population groups, especially the Chinese. They were accused of profiting from the suffering of the Indonesian people under Dutch and Japanese rule. From Jakarta, the Sin Ming Hui offered aid to the Chinese victims in Bandung.[31]

The five-day battle over Semarang, from 14–19 October, and then through November 1945, had a completely different character. The Japanese, waiting for the arrival of the British, were preparing themselves to fight the Indonesian battle groups. The Japanese wanted to transfer authority and arms only to the British. The fighting that took place starting from 14 October between British and Japanese army units on the one hand, and Indonesian fighting groups on the other, resulted in a bloodbath with many casualties on both sides. Civilian casualties occurred because of the fighting between all sides, not because the violence turned against them. By the end of the fighting in and around Semarang, entire villages around the city had been reduced to ashes.

After Semarang, the British Army continued its advance towards Ambarawa and Magelang. The situation in Semarang had not improved due to the misconduct of the Gurkhas (Nepalese soldiers who were part of the British troops) against the population. The presence of Dutch NICA personnel who had piggybacked with the British also evoked negative reactions. Fighting reignited when the city was again attacked by Indonesian troops on 30 October and 23 November. These were fierce battles and many Semarang residents fled the city.[32] To help the victims, food, money, and other relief supplies were sent from various surrounding towns.[33]

During the same period in Surabaya, between 19–26 November 1945, the British fought against the Indonesian army and other combat groups. There were many civilian casualties. This was partly due to the heavy bombing by the British after the death of General Mallaby,[34] and also because of the scorched-earth tactics used by

the Indonesian side. When the Indonesian troops withdrew, entire residential areas were set on fire. Initially, many Chinese remained in the city in their homes and stores, fearing looting by Indonesians. That changed when bombings by the British caused many casualties. The Chinese from outside Surabaya came to help.[35] However, when the Allies gained the upper hand, Indonesian armed groups proceeded to force thousands of Chinese to evacuate inland. According to several Chinese in that city, the evacuation from Surabaya was a pretext from the Indonesian side to appropriate Chinese property. Indeed, it seems paradoxical that while many Chinese fled to major cities in search of safety, thousands of them were 'evacuated' into Republican territory by armed groups and military personnel.[36]

In August 1946, the Chinese Consul General in Batavia consulted with the Indonesian authorities over the (re-)evacuation of 12,000 Chinese from Malang to Surabaya. Their living situation had become a major problem. What they had taken with them during their evacuation from Surabaya had been almost entirely absorbed in high living costs or lost through extortion and looting. Return to Surabaya was not always possible because the Indonesian authorities did not allow travel through their territory, or halted entrance altogether. On 25 January 1947, the return to Surabaya was still problematic. For this return, the CHTH cooperated with the Dutch and Indonesian authorities with the knowledge of the Consul General of China.[37]

In January and February 1946, after major cities in Java came under British rule, violence against the Chinese increased. Many Chinese were kidnapped by *pemudas* or coerced to perform forced labour. Chinese and Indonesians caught selling food to Europeans often paid for their trading activities with their lives. Many massacres directed against the Chinese took place, for example in March 1946 around Banjaran[38] and other places in Java. Riots also took place in Pekalongan and Tegal. However, Van Mook believed that only a few Chinese were victims of looting, kidnapping, and extortion.[39]

Anti-Chinese Violence in Dutch Territory

Chinese civilians were not only robbed, mistreated, or killed by regular or rogue Indonesian fighters. Between 1945 and 1949, they were also repeatedly victimized by Dutch soldiers. There were regular indignant complaints from Chinese, not only from Java, but also from West Borneo, about Dutch mass violence and looting of which they were victims. On the other hand, there were also expressions of gratitude from the Chinese in successful countermeasures by the Dutch side in Indonesian raids.

Established in October 1945, the Chinese Security Protection Committee recorded violence against Chinese in the capital of Jakarta. That violence was committed by

members of Dutch units such as the KNIL, the military police, the General Police Reserve (APR), guards, and other police personnel. Minor street incidents, such as the failure to ring a bicycle bell, alleged 'insolence' of victims, and suspicions, could lead to a 'brazen tendency' to shoot or arbitrarily enter homes, or assault, sometimes resulting in death. The complaints described by the Committee involved robbery, looting, illegal confiscation, violence during searches and interrogations, and being forced to sell goods at low prices to Dutch soldiers and police officers. The perpetrators were almost always dressed in Dutch uniform and their attitude was characterized by a 'great degree of arbitrariness, of coarseness and abusive treatment', and also by a 'lack of awareness of the difficult and chaotic conditions which people were now living in, especially in the economic sphere'. On several occasions, members of the military and civilian police violated their powers in their actions against Chinese citizens suspected of criminal offences. Innocent suspects were detained for long periods and searches were often used by soldiers or police as a cover to enrich themselves at the expense of civilians who could not defend themselves.

On the Dutch side, the complaints were often belittled and not taken seriously. Spoor and Van Mook, to whom complaints were sometimes addressed directly with the urgent request for protection against arbitrariness, also showed little interest in these matters. This sometimes gave rise to judicial investigations but they were of a superficial nature. Only a few cases were investigated, while the rest were dismissed. The only concrete result was that on 28 May 1946, after another urgent letter from the Committee, the commander in Jakarta proceeded to prohibit house searches at own initiative. From that point, house searches required warrants or accompaniment by civilian police. Only in an emergency did members of the military police or other soldiers have the right to detain people and, even then, the detainees had to be turned over to the local Glodok prison and to a civilian police station. From then on, searches of *kampongs* as part of military actions also had to be accompanied by a police officer.[40]

Conversely, in mid-1946, the Dutch side accused the Committee of employing criminals, serving private interests, and protecting gambling houses. Indeed, to cover the Committee's expenses, the organization collected money from shopkeepers in neighbourhoods where mainly Chinese people lived and worked. Chinese businessmen paid protection money to criminal gangs. Members of the Committee would also engage in the auctioning of contraband, the proceeds of which were distributed to the Committee, the Chinese Civil Police (officially established in January 1946), and the Chinese school.

The difference with the complaints about anti-Chinese violence was that these Dutch complaints about the Chinese did not involve violence committed by Chinese against Dutch people or other persons outside the Chinese community.

Nor had they resulted in robbery, bodily injuries, or fatalities on the Dutch side. The complaints were of an entirely different nature. It had to do with the way the Chinese solved their problems within their own community. Such solutions were not uncommon within the Chinese community, who were used to relying on themselves for safety and protection. This self-reliance was also evident later, when the Committee aided displaced people from Tangerang after the massacre there. The Committee and the Chinese civilian police acted as intermediaries (liaisons) with the authorities.[41]

Tangerang and Bagan Siapi-api

After the British took over control, violent actions by the Indonesian side against the Chinese took place in Tangerang (West Java) and Bagan Siapi-api in Sumatra. The massacre in Tangerang (30 May–4 June 1946), a town west of Jakarta, is known as one of the worst violent episodes against Chinese during this period.

Chinese people had settled in Tangerang for centuries. Most of them were simple farmers and agricultural workers who seemed to live in peace with their neighbours. In May 1946, Indonesian and Dutch troops were fighting each other over the surrounding territory and the city of Tangerang. The outbreak of aggression against the Chinese population came from local, often religiously inspired combat groups. Several causes were cited for the violence, including past abuse and exploitation by Chinese landowners, economic and social distrust, religious antagonism, suspected and possible collaboration and espionage for the Dutch, including the presence of Chinese among the Dutch troops. After the withdrawal of the Indonesian army, which hoped to gain strength further inland, a kind of no man's land emerged where rogue elements had free reign, with the violence directed against the Chinese population.

It would become a regular pattern in the years that followed: a retreating Indonesian army leaving room for violence by combat groups – organized and unorganized – against Chinese civilians. The violence was unprecedented. Chinese people were mistreated, locked in burning houses, deported, or brutally murdered. Men were forcibly circumcised, and women and girls were raped. Several villages west and south of Tangerang suffered true devastation. Some 1,500 houses were burned or reduced to rubble. Looting took place, while, in contrast, the homes and property of indigenous Indonesians were spared.

The perpetrators were sometimes recognized as fellow villagers. In the nearby village of Prau, 600 Chinese were killed, and only a few managed to escape. One thousand Chinese men were forced to walk to Mauk, where they were held captive in a former prison. On 10 June, after a fight with local violent elements, a group of twenty Chinese youth managed to free the men in Mauk. 11 June 1946 was declared

a day of mourning on which the Chinese closed their stores and businesses and stayed home.[42] Prime Minister Sjahrir and President Sukarno apologized to the Republic of China for its failure to protect the Chinese victims.[43]

According to reports by, among others, the CHTH and Jang Seng Ie Hospital in Jakarta, there were 653 casualties in Tangerang, including 136 women and 36 children. Other sources cited higher numbers: 1,085 dead, 213 missing, and 15,000–25,000 people fleeing to Jakarta. Some of the refugees were sheltered in the Sin Ming Hui association building in Jakarta.[44] However, Chinese relief organizations could not cope alone. The Dutch Red Cross, together with Sin Ming Hui and Chiu Chi Ku (Chinese poor relief), established the Comité Penoeloeng Korban2 Tiong Hoa dari Tangerang (Aid Committee for the Chinese Victims of Tangerang). Aid was provided in the form of food and money and, from August 1946, building materials were provided for the repair or construction of homes. Agricultural tools were purchased so that people could be self-reliant again. Return was sometimes not possible even after months. In the Jakarta region, 26,104 people stayed in camps. Until February 1947, about 35,000 Chinese there received financial aid, food, and clothing from the Dutch Red Cross.[45]

The battle for Bagan Siapa-api began in March 1946 as a conflict between the Indonesian army and the Chinese residents of Bagan. Bagan Siapi-api was a fishing town south of Medan, across Malacca. The population was predominantly Chinese: there were 14,000 Chinese, mostly *totoks*, compared to 3,000 Indonesians. There had been some tensions between the population groups in the past. On 12 March 1946, the Chinese of Bagan, who were strongly oriented towards China, wanted to commemorate the 21st anniversary of the death of Sun Yat Sen, president and founder of the Republic of China. They had obtained permission from the village chief for the planned festivities, including the raising of the Chinese flag. However, during the commemoration, they allegedly refused to hang the red-and-white flag of the Republic next to the Chinese flag, upon which the TRI (Tentara Republik Indonesia, Indonesian Army) decided to take down the Chinese flag. A violent clash ensued with casualties on both sides.

Many Chinese fled to Kuala Lumpur, Malacca, and Singapore. In Bagan, the Chinese established a military-trained corps. They wore uniforms like the national army in China and had equipped themselves with pistols, rifles, and even machine guns, probably smuggled from the Malay Peninsula. Starting in September 1946, a battle occurred between a thousand Indonesian Navy men and the town's residents, who were left to fend for themselves. Despite repeated requests by the Chinese inhabitants to the Consul General in Singapore, to the British – who were still present at the time – and also for a dispatch of Dutch troops for whom they offered to provide shelter and food, no help came. There were many Chinese casualties, possibly some 200 in Bagan alone, but also in the surrounding villages.

Following a ceasefire in October 1946, an agreement was reached between the warring parties. A 'security council' was established consisting of five Chinese and five Indonesians, headed by an Indonesian military officer. The root cause of the tense relations between the Indonesian military and the Bagan Chinese was said to be the anti-Republican mood of the latter. They did not want to give up their city to the Republican army. The battle for Bagan Siapi-api was a rather exceptional event in the years of the revolution, as the Chinese independently engaged in direct and repeated combat with the Indonesian army and proved able to resist.[46]

The Police Actions

During the Police Actions in Java and Sumatra, the Dutch army fought the Indonesian army for the conquest or recapture of territory and the restoration of authority. There were many casualties, both on the Dutch side and among the Indonesian and Chinese population. Most Chinese casualties in the revolutionary period occurred during these military actions.

As early as November 1946, when there was no talk of a Police Action, Dutch military intelligence warned army leaders that a war would have dire consequences for the (Chinese) population of Java and Sumatra. The Dutch realized that once they moved inland, the safety of the inhabitants would be endangered. In the interior, the Chinese lived with and among the Indonesian population. As non-Muslims, and often relatively affluent citizens, they were a highly visible target during outbreaks of aggression. Republican 'extremists', or generally those who held power outside the major cities, could unleash a wave of terror and uncontrolled violence that would also affect the Chinese. The scorched earth or *bumi hangus* tactic would be used against individuals suspected of sympathizing with the Dutch or who would be targeted for other reasons.[47] According to historian Rémy Limpach, in the implementation of these tactics during the first Police Action, the structural and systematic violence probably did not befall Chinese civilians by chance. Violence against the Chinese population was not the 'flip side' of war actions, but rather a 'systematic policy of looting and revenge'.[48] Both on the Indonesian and Dutch sides, aggression against the Chinese was consciously anticipated. Indeed, the violence of the Indonesian forces was not only aimed at destroying Chinese-owned businesses, factories, and supplies, but also directed against the local Chinese civilian population: men, women, and children.

The Indonesian troops and groups were often aware of the arrival of the Dutch, in part through pamphlets strewn about, allowing them to adjust their tactics accordingly. The Dutch troops seemed to want to give the enemy an opportunity for violence against the Chinese: these soldiers would sometimes wait at some distance until the Republican troops had begun their violent actions before taking

a village or town. In a sense, both sides appeared to have 'coordinated' their plans based on the data and information obtained. In a few cases, Dutch troops arrived in time to help civilians.[49]

The First Police Action (21 July–5 August 1947): Operation Product

'Securing economic interests' played a very important role for the Dutch in the first Police Action. The action was aptly codenamed 'Operation Product'. Sugar and other companies, rice mills, food supplies, public utilities, machine factories, and others were to be seized as quickly as possible, and then secured and guarded in connection with threats of destruction. The primary focus of the march routes would be the recovery of the economic apparatus through occupation of: 1) West Java, important for plantation products (tea, coffee, rubber, rice); 2) the western part of Central Java up to the Tegal-Purwokerto-Cilacap line; 3) East Java, with its important plantations (sugar, rice). Sometimes, the seized supplies were of such quantity that the battalion in question spoke of 'enormous' booty. These gains on the Dutch side meant losses for the Republic. The latter, without these enterprises and supplies, immediately lost its ability to participate in foreign trade. Food supplies also deteriorated.

The pattern was as follows: when Indonesian troops were informed of the arrival of Dutch troops, they began destroying vital businesses such as rice mills, tea and textile factories, and rubber warehouses, followed by setting fire to the stores and homes of Chinese residents, as well as looting and pillaging. The Indonesian army was joined by irregular troops who finished the job. There was rape, humiliation, people burned alive, beatings, torture, and murder. Not only individuals, but sometimes large groups of Chinese were taken away to unknown destinations. Not everyone returned.

Chinese citizens often tried to flee the violence that awaited them. Fear and panic were sometimes so great that when one Chinese family left a village, others followed suit. They did not rely on the protection of Dutch soldiers. Often, upon their return, they would find their house and store completely demolished.[50] Soon after the first Police Action, the Federation of Chinese Organizations, the CHTH, produced a *Memorandum* summarizing the violence the Chinese had experienced during the Dutch army's march routes in West, Central, and East Java. In addition to places, numbers, and names of the victims, the overview provided a detailed inventory of the violence committed.

The Chinese organization CHTH had set up several camps for refugees, including in Cirebon (West Java). In August 1947, it admitted 14,431 displaced Chinese there. Prior to the camp's set up, the CHTH had urged the Dutch military authorities to establish an armed civilian police force, provide six trucks for aid operations, and occupy strategically important sites. The flight to Cirebon, according to the CHTH chairman, was the result of the uncertainty created in villages due to the impending

6.1. Woman and child from a group of 1,400 Chinese who fled to an area under Dutch military control. Tumpang in Malang, East Java, date unknown.

6.2. Chinese people fleeing to safer areas. Cirebon, West Java, 22 July 1947.

6.3. Three thousand Chinese civilians who had been taken by the Indonesian Armed Forces TNI were rescued by the Dutch military. Relief can clearly be read on their faces. Around Pekalongan, Central Java, August 1947.

6.4. Remains of a destroyed Chinese store in Sukabumi, West Java, 26 July 1947.

6.5. A ransacked Chinese villa in Linggajati, West Java, July 1947.

6.6. A damaged Chinese home and office in Karawang, West Java, July 1947.

6.7. "Yesterday my rice mill still stood here". A Chinese owner at his destroyed rice mill in Karawang, West Java, July 1947.

6.8. A mass grave of murdered Chinese is being covered. Malang, East Java, July 1947.



6.9. Areas in Indonesia under Dutch control between 1945 and 1949.

6.10. Areas in Java under Dutch control between 1945 and 1949.

Dutch offensive and the expected Indonesian backlash, which had forced them to leave everything behind.[51]

Even after the first Police Action, mass violence against the Chinese occurred in several places in West and East Java. In addition to militias and criminal gangs, the regular Indonesian army was also involved. In August 1947, 500 homes and the local oil installations were set on fire in Pangkalan Brandan in North Sumatra. Some 4,000 Chinese residents were taken away and held without food and shelter. Liberation by the Dutch army was not considered possible, even after a request from the Chinese consul.[52]

During the first Police Action, the Republican government repeatedly tried to protect the Chinese minority from raids by Indonesian militias and armed groups, although Indonesian troops were sometimes also among the perpetrators of violence. The Republic also had to take international opinion into consideration when dealing with violence against the Chinese, as was evident after the large number of casualties in the Tangerang killings. Prime Minister Sjahrir and President Sukarno apologized to China for the Republic's failure to adequately protect the Chinese. In April 1946, Amir Syarifuddin, Minister of Defence in the Indonesian cabinet, had pointed out on his visit to Sumatra that it should not be forgotten that many Chinese had helped Republican organizations and individual Indonesians in many ways. It was also an attempt by Syarifuddin to improve relations between the Chinese and Indonesians, and to secure Chinese support for the Indonesian struggle for independence. In addition to compassion, interests also played a role.[53]

The Second Police Action (19 December–5 January 1949): Operation Crow

The goal of the second Police Action was to capture the remaining territories of Java and Sumatra from the Republicans and take positions there. Much to General

Spoor's anger, the United Nations Security Council had halted the first Police Action. Thus, the Dutch were unable to march on into Republican capital Yogyakarta. The Netherlands agreed to a ceasefire, although it was not happy with the international intervention.[54] The most important thing in this second action was the capture of Yogyakarta, along with its government and army leadership.

During the second Police Action, destruction of Chinese property by looting and arson again took place, as well as violence – rape and murder – in several areas of Java and Sumatra. This continued even after the Police Actions concluded, until the end of 1949.[55] In Java, the worst violence took place in East Java, especially after all prisoners were freed from Surabaya's Kalisosok prison and were then either supplied with weapons or recruited for troop units. These men were allowed to do whatever was necessary to apply scorched-earth tactics. Most Chinese victims of looting and murder fell in East Java, including in the regions of Kertosono, Nganjuk, Caruban, Madiun, Blitar, Tulungagung, Kediri, Wlingi, and Malang.

The Nganjuk massacre was the most notorious act of violence in the history of the second Police Action. When Dutch troops attacked Nganjuk during the action in December 1948, the Republican military authorities, led by the army commander on the spot, went into action and rounded up all Chinese men over the age of twelve into a warehouse. Men over 70 were left alone. After several hundred men were herded together, the warehouse was set on fire. Those who tried to get to safety were shot. The town was left as 'a city of widows'. Out of the 1,500 Chinese residents of Nganjuk, between 750 and 790 men died.[56] A memorial to this massacre was erected in 1951–1952.[57]

The Chinese were also directly affected by actions from the Dutch side after the second Police Action. On 16 January 1949, the village Penanggungan in Central Java was bombed. Following the shooting down of one of its planes in the areas, the Dutch suspected the presence of a strong section of the Republican troops there. However, the Dutch were unaware that about 340 Chinese were being held captive by Indonesian guards in the village. The bombing took the lives of 41 Chinese and wounded 59 others. A subsequent investigation was launched.[58] In March 1949, 500 Chinese were missing in Surakarta. As late as October 1949, the Chinese in Java were still fleeing violence, seeking refuge in major cities.

Deaths, Disappearances, and Evacuations

Much violence was committed against the Chinese during the revolutionary period. Some of this involved extreme violence, including mass slaughter by irregular troops or criminal gangs, as well as by regular soldiers under the responsibility of their officers. Most Chinese deaths did not occur during the chaotic period of the

Bersiap, the British takeover of control, or the periods of violence in Tangerang and Bagan Siapi-api, but during the first and second Police Actions. As described above, Indonesian mass violence against the Chinese was mainly committed on the margins of combat operations, when Dutch troops attacked and Republican forces withdrew. The violence was not just politically or racially motivated. Prejudices and assumptions could play a role, as could hopes for the reduction or disappearance of the great economic influence of the Chinese. Alternatively, violence could simply be the result of criminal behaviour.[59]

It is not possible to give reliable figures on the number of Chinese victims during this period, since the estimated numbers cited by various authors vary too widely. It is also not always clear if those quoted numbers refer only to fatalities, or if they include missing persons, and whether the numbers cover the entire revolutionary period. At times it is also unclear if the numbers mentioned refer only to Chinese people. After all, the group of victims could also include Ambonese and other Indonesians. Nor was it always possible to determine whether they were victims of violence from the Indonesian side or from the Dutch army.

Only rough estimates are possible, and even these can vary widely. Remco Raben estimates that thousands of Chinese were killed during the revolutionary years. Rémy Limpach puts the number at 10,000 Chinese dead at the end of the Indonesian War of Independence – a number even higher than the fatalities among the Dutch military. Twang Peck Yang speaks of 1,000 deaths for all of Indonesia during the first Police Action, and 3,500 deaths throughout the revolutionary period, with 1,631 missing and nearly 100,000 displaced people. After the second Police Action, 34,392 evacuees were counted, although many later returned to their hometowns.[60]

Material Damage

Chinese, both the business elite and common civilians, suffered great material losses during the revolutionary years in addition to the many casualties in their population. Many homes of the Chinese civilian population were burned and looted. The *peranakan* business elite had already suffered great losses during the Japanese occupation, and this continued unabated thereafter.

Prior to 1942, the Chinese business elite controlled much of the rice mills, factories, plantations, and other forms of real estate, including private estates. At the beginning of the Japanese occupation, 444 rice mills were reportedly operational in Java. Of these, 95 per cent were Chinese-owned. After the Japanese occupation, it was determined in April 1946 that these rice mills were in deplorable condition. At the end of the first Police Action, more than half had been destroyed or burned down, while the situation of 89 was unknown. Only 119 were still operational. Along

with the rice mills, warehouses were also lost, and rice stocks were taken away or destroyed. Other Chinese enterprises, mostly tea and rubber, were destroyed or burned down, as were textile and other businesses.[61] Immediately after the first Police Action, on 23 August 1947, a preliminary report from the Department of Economic Affairs estimated that 77 Chinese enterprises and factories suffered serious damage or had been completely destroyed by Indonesian groups in the previous month. They included rubber, tea, and coffee enterprises, factories (sawmill, oil, soap, cigarettes) and many rice husking and weaving mills. Buildings had been set on fire, equipment and supplies looted; machinery had already been partially removed by the Japanese.[62] In Semarang alone, the damage suffered by Chinese between August 1945 and March 1947 was estimated at f5,379,251. A similar situation occurred in Sumatra's main cities and in the interior. The damage and loss of Chinese property was substantial. However, the overview was incomplete: few exact figures could be given, and only estimates were possible.[63]

Of the damage suffered in the second Police Action by Chinese enterprises – insofar as they survived the first Police Action – little information is available. However, it is known that during the second action in East Java, rice mills in the Kediri, Madiun, and Bojonegoro regencies were severely damaged or completely destroyed. Again, rice stocks in warehouses were largely lost. What was left was either confiscated by the Indonesian Armed Forces TNI or by Dutch troops. In East Java, out of the 32 sugar mills, seventeen were severely damaged or completely looted. Only seven remained intact or suffered only minor damage. Chinese managers were kidnapped or killed. As Dutch troops entered the town of Madiun, the director of the Oei Tiong Ham sugar factory was kidnapped by retreating TNI soldiers. Three other Chinese were killed. The sugar factory, destroyed by TNI soldiers, could not be saved. The Pakis sugar factory of the same concern in the Pati regency became a refugee camp for women and children. The sugar and tapioca factories in Krebet, also of the same concern, were destroyed in the Republican scorched-earth tactics. Factories making other products were also targeted for destruction. In West Java, about 72 tea factories were destroyed in the Sukabumi area. It is not known how many of them were Chinese-owned.

Private estates had already been confiscated by the Japanese during its occupation. They were declared property of the Japanese military by an ordinance on 1 June 1942. Landlords, mostly Chinese, remained in charge of managing their own estates. By November 1946, the British had allowed the original owners to return to their lands without being able to exercise their special rights.[64] Since many of these plots were in Republican territory, few dared to return. As the area controlled by the Netherlands expanded, the pre-war government policy of buying back these private plots was resumed in April 1948. By early 1949, 94 per cent had been repurchased by the government.[65]

The Chinese Economic Position

The decline in the economic position of the Chinese, which had begun during the Japanese occupation, continued during the revolutionary years. This had several causes. First, the Chinese suffered great financial losses due to the overall destruction of their property as a result of war violence. The loss of Chinese property during the entire period of the revolution is estimated at more than f530 million.[66]

Property rights in a broad sense were deliberately compromised or set aside during this period by the authorities looking the other way, or giving consent, when Chinese property was being confiscated or appropriated. For example, what was called 'acquisition' was in reality the confiscation of rice mills, factories, stores, and houses. In August 1946, the Chinese General Association of Purwakarta sent a delegation to Indonesian Defence Minister Amir Syarifuddin, requesting that the local Indonesian administration order its armed units to clear and return confiscated Chinese property.[67] Not having these resources at their disposal meant loss or destruction of their livelihood. After the revolutionary period, many Chinese were left to their own devices to try to recover their confiscated property, restore it, or – if that was not possible – start from scratch.

Forced donations and contributions to the military and other Indonesian organizations further impoverished the Chinese. From the beginning of the revolution, the Chinese were considered a major source of financing by the Republican authorities. It was a continuation of the Japanese policy of financing the war economy. Soon after Japan's surrender, Chinese individuals and organizations were solicited for financial contributions and donations. These contributions came in the form of cash, goods, or furniture. There was also additional pressure to support government organizations such as the Merdekafonds (Freedom Fund) and the 'National Loan', and compulsory subscriptions to 'National Salvation Bonds'.[68]

Chinese organizations such as the CHTH and the Chinese Red Cross,[69] as well as individual Chinese, were sometimes held responsible for raising these funds. By November 1945, the Chinese in Malang, Pasuruan, Probolinggo, and Lumajang had contributed f50,000 to the Merdeka Fund. In May 1946, a 'savings campaign' was launched in which the people of Cirebon were expected to contribute 10 million JAN (Japanese Army Notes). Some 60 per cent was to be raised by the Chinese, 20 per cent by the Indonesians, and 15 per cent by the Arabs. The Chinese delegates to the campaign felt this was too heavy a burden on the Chinese population 'whose resources were virtually exhausted'. The Arab delegation in Cirebon suggested that the contributions of the various ethnic groups be based on the city's population composition.

In several places in Java and Sumatra, the local administration asked Chinese residents to buy Indonesian bonds.[70] In Banyumas, according to the Republican

Army Division V, f400,000 was allegedly donated by the CHTH and four Chinese businessmen in May 1946. This amount was earmarked for the Fonds Perjuangan (Revolutionary Fund), the social section of the Fonds Masyumi (Islamic Party Fund), the Fonds Pemondokan Kaum Buruh (Fund for Workers' Housing), and the Partai Buruh Indonesia (Indonesian Workers' Party).

After the first Police Action, the CHTH in Yogyakarta started a fundraising effort for the republic. In July 1946, the *Tien Sheng Jih Pao* newspaper noted that the Indonesian authorities' campaign for bond subscriptions was too heavy a burden for the Chinese in small towns in the interior. A month later, a Dutch official also noted that 'the incessant requests for support from the Merdeka Fund, the forced participation in the National Loan, and the continuous attacks on the finances of the Chinese Red Cross will lead to serious impoverishment of the Chinese people'. Local branches of the CHTH, such as in Tegal and Pekalongan, contributed financially to the Indonesian Revolution during these years, as was later recognized.[71]

The Chinese also had to pay contributions for protection and security. In addition to the Republican authorities, irregular armed groups and military personnel often proved even more demanding. Several branches of the military were quite powerful in the interior, and the Chinese were overwhelmingly at the mercy of these groups for their security. For example, when the Chinese established a Committee for the Preservation of Order and Peace in East Java, that was only possible with the support of Indonesian troops and the police. In several places in Java, protection came at a cost, sometimes on a monthly basis. In Palembang in Sumatra, Chinese businessmen received requests from Indonesian armed groups for large donations within a few months of independence. As a result, some of these businessmen moved to Singapore.

The Chinese, however, could not count on any protection, even if they contributed through donations and fundraising, as Chinese newspaper *Tien Sheng Jih Pao* wrote. In areas where Republican and other armed groups retreated, thousands of Chinese were forced to 'evacuate' inland, where they were held in various places. It seemed that they were being held hostage, which was probably financially motivated so that the Republicans would have a free hand in appropriating the property of the evacuees.[72]

Economic Policy

The economic policy pursued by the Republic can also be seen as one of the causes of the decline of Chinese business. Finance Minister Hatta's policy was to optimally promote the development of the Indonesian people's economic position. His speech in September 1946 made this clear. Chinese capital had no place in the Republican

economy. He would rather deal with Dutch capital than Chinese entrepreneurs, even if they had become Indonesian citizens.[73] This policy meant a limitation of economic opportunities for the Chinese. The Republican elite sought to control and dominate domestic trade, while the Dutch focused on foreign trade. In both areas, the climate was unfavourable for the Chinese, both in policy and practice. This affected the *peranakan* business elite more than the *totok* businessmen, who were much more flexible.[74]

The influx of new Chinese immigrants after the Japanese occupation into the Dutch occupied territories was partly responsible for the decline in the economic position of the *peranakans*, according to the magazine *Star Weekly*. These *totoks* took over more and more stores and businesses from the *peranakans*. In general, they were willing to take more risks, and the new situation demanded boldness in addition to great adaptability. *Totoks* dared to wager their entire property with the prospect of rapid fortune, while at the same time reckoning with the possibility that they could be completely ruined. *Peranakans* were much more cautious. They were used to spreading their risks and wealth, and investing in the long term, for example in industry rather than trading.

Even after the occupation years, the differences between *totoks* and *peranakans* continued to play a role. Early on, it had proved impossible to work together in one organization. The strong bond that *totoks* had with China was much less so with the *peranakans*. It was a fundamental disadvantage for the *peranakans* that they did not speak Chinese. Dutch education had previously already been proven useless, when *totoks* insisted on using Chinese as the working language in Chinese organizations. *Peranakans* lacked good connections to the *totok* community, and also with the Dutch and Indonesian communities. Access to power and political support from government authorities were also crucial to trade at that time. The Chinese Consul General was ready to support nationalist China-oriented *totok* elites, but there was nothing to suggest that Dutch authorities were willing to do the same for *peranakans*. Added to this was the fact that the Republican government's economic policy was to promote and strengthen the trade position of the Indonesians.[75]

Another cause for the changing economic position of the Chinese was monetary policy. Between 1942 and 1949, there were three types of currency in circulation. After the Republik Indonesia declared independence, it issued its own money in rupiah, the *Oeang Republik Indonesia* (ORI). The pre-war Dutch money and the Japanese money (Japan Army Notes, JAN, known as *uang Jepang* or *uang pisang*)[76] were recognized by the Republic and remained in circulation. Then the Dutch came up with a new currency: the *gouvernementsguldens* (government guilders) or NICA money (*uang NICA* or *uang merah*).[77] NICA money[78] would only work in Dutch occupied territory, effectively in the major cities in Java. Monetary policies of the Republican and Dutch governments could cause one of the currencies to

fall sharply in value and the other to rise, sometimes overnight. The first money restructuring occurred in 1946 with a huge drop in the value of the JAN. In the second money restructuring in 1950, all the guilder notes were cut in half: the left half could be exchanged for new paper money, and the right half for bonds. These money restructurings could result in large financial losses.[79]

The deterioration and weakening of the economic position of *peranakans* in particular had several causes. *Totoks*, in contrast, with their more aggressive trade culture, proved to be better and more decisive in dealing with changing circumstances. They seized the new opportunities which arose in the revolutionary years. They cooperated with the Republic and the army in a new market: the arms market. *Totok* Chinese imported weapons, medicine, and other goods from Palembang for the Republic, and they exported rubber from Sumatra and sugar from Java. For transportation, they used motorboats and landing crafts that came from Japanese and British army supplies they had bought for a pittance. Huge arsenals of weapons left behind by the Japanese and Allied armies became commodities. A lively barter and smuggling trade had developed, starting in late 1945 between Palembang in Sumatra and Singapore and Malaysia. While the Republic was aware of this, it actually profited from these transactions, and even encouraged them. In the first year of the revolution, between September 1945 and November 1946, *totok* Chinese made a killing in this new market. The Republic also earned handsomely from exports and was able to use the money to pay the salaries of its own administrative apparatus and purchase arms and ammunition.[80]

These Chinese transports were very risky because of the trade blockades imposed by the Dutch authorities, but the danger was amply rewarded by the large profits that were possible. John Lie Tjeng Tjoan, a Chinese from Manado – not a businessman – was one of the highest commanders in the Indonesian Navy. His duties for the Republic included escorting boats smuggling products to Singapore, and then transporting weapons back. With his commitment to the Indonesian cause during the revolution years and beyond, he was of great significance to the Republic. He is considered a hero in Indonesia.[81]

At the end of the revolution, new trade relations emerged between the Chinese and autonomous Indonesian military commanders. They offered protection to the Chinese when the latter traded outside the Republic. Trading houses emerged under the leadership of military commanders. These trading houses imported weapons – e.g. from the Philippines – in exchange for sugar, rubber, or tea. The role of the Chinese trading elite was crucial for the Republicans in the final phase of their struggle.[82] Cooperation between Chinese entrepreneurs and the military administration, and between Chinese and Indonesian businessmen in the *kumiai,* which began during the Japanese occupation, took a different form in the revolution years. Chinese entrepreneurs now cooperated not only with the Republican military, but also with autonomous senior military officers as trading partners.

Towards Transfer of Sovereignty

In the political field, we see several Chinese who actively supported the Indonesian cause even before, and during, the Japanese occupation, and who chose the side of the Indonesian nationalists. The best known among them included the previously mentioned Liem Koen Hian and Ko Kwat Tiong, who had founded the Persatoean Tionghoa Indonesia PTI (Chinese Indonesian Association) in 1932, as well as Tjoa Sik Ien. For them and their kindred spirits, Indonesia was not only their country of birth, but also the country where they belonged and identified with. Others, such as Tan Po Gwan, Siauw Giok Tjhan, and Ong Eng Die participated in the Sjahrir III and Syarifuddin cabinets.[83] Ong was also an advisor in the Renville negotiations. Liem Koen Hian participated in the Round Table Conference along with Teng Tjin Leng[84] for Indonesia. Tjoa Sik Ien was a delegate to the United Nations for the Republik Indonesia in 1949. After the transfer of sovereignty, they entered the political arena as parliamentarians or ministers. In addition to these politicians, the aforementioned John Lie held a special place. After the revolution, he remained committed to the Indonesian cause in various other ways.[85]

With the transfer of sovereignty in 1949, a new period began in the history of the Chinese. During the years of occupation and revolution, they had had to deal with different rulers, and enter into new relationships with the Indonesian population, which hitherto had inflicted much violence and loss on them. During these violent years, many Chinese had to leave their home or lost everything. Many had to start over from scratch. On the economic front, the Chinese had been introduced to other power structures and had learned to cooperate in other ways with those in power. In the nineteenth century, it was leaseholds that linked them with the Indies government interests. Starting in 1942, their counterparts or partners were, first, the Japanese military administration and, later, in the revolutionary years, they were the returning Dutch trading in Dutch occupied territory and the Republican rulers in Republican territory. Once again, their ability to adapt and meet new challenges was called upon.

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VII Equal is Unequal (1949–1967)[1]

A Minority in the Republic

A new chapter in Indonesia's history began with the transfer of sovereignty on 27 December 1949. After a period of more than three hundred years of Dutch rule, followed by years of occupation and revolution, Indonesia's independence was universally accepted. The Republic began as part of the federation 'United States of Indonesia'. A year later, on 17 August 1950, Indonesia unilaterally replaced it with the independent Republik Indonesia. With the transfer of sovereignty, a new period began with new power relations for the people of the Indonesian archipelago. Within those power relations, the Chinese minority had to find its way and its position.

This was by no means a beginning with a clean slate. The young state had gone through violent years of war, occupation, and revolution: years that ended with complex negotiations with the former colonizer. The freedom and independence gained came at a price. The Republic began with a colonial legacy that had different meanings for the Chinese and the Indonesians, but which had to be dealt with together. The new Indonesian society had to balance the tension of the past with the reality of the present. In the 1950–1967 period, for Chinese and Indonesians alike, the question was how and in what way the Chinese, as a minority group, could occupy an accepted position in the Republic of Indonesia. Nationality and ethnicity were linked to identity and roots in Indonesia. The economic position of the Chinese was deeply entrenched in Indonesian society due to its long history and many developments. The 'Chinese problem' of 1897 had returned in a different sense and in the context of the Republic.

The transfer of sovereignty in 1949 marked the beginning of the Republik Indonesia period led by President Sukarno. This chapter ends in 1966–1967, when the Sukarno period transitioned into the Suharto era. The failed coup of 30 September 1965, known in Indonesia as G30S, marked the end of Sukarno's power. On 11 March 1966, Sukarno signed a document authorizing Army Chief Lieutenant General Suharto to do whatever he deemed necessary to restore order in the country after the G30S coup and the subsequent mass killings in 1965–1966. Although Sukarno would remain as president for another year, the transition to *Orde Baru*, President Suharto's so-called New Order regime, began in 1966.

For the Chinese in Indonesia, an important and tumultuous period ended in 1967. The years 1950–1967 were marked by various political and economic

developments in which, for the Chinese, the question of nationality versus ethnicity was always in the background. The question was what Indonesian citizenship of the Chinese meant for the policies of the Indonesian government, for various groups in society, and for the Chinese themselves. Within Chinese society, there was also the question of the extent to which they, as a group, were willing or able to give up their 'exclusivity' – meaning their cultural traditions and characteristics – for an accepted place as Indonesian citizens in Indonesian society. Other elements in the nationality issue were the creation of the Indonesian Nationality Law in 1958 and the end of dual nationality for the Chinese. The year 1967 also saw the dissolution of the Lembaga Pembinaan Kesatuan Bangsa LPKB (Institute for the Promotion of National Unity). The LPKB had worked for assimilation in the 1960s, including by encouraging the Chinese to change their names. Name change was seen as the initial step towards solving what was seen primarily by the Indonesians, and gradually by some Chinese, as the problem of the Chinese minority, i.e. holding on to, and propagating, one's own culture and position in Indonesian society. That image of 'exclusivity' had to disappear.

Another important factor in these years, not directly related to the Chinese, was the New Guinea issue, which caused much friction between Indonesia and the Netherlands.[2] This conflict began soon after the transfer of sovereignty and dragged on for years. It was one of the triggers for the nationalization, also called *naasten* in Dutch,[3] of Dutch companies in 1957–1958. Diplomatic relations between the Netherlands and Indonesia were severed as a result,[4] and were not restored until 1963 when New Guinea was ceded to Indonesia.

The difficult period the Chinese went through in the new Republic of Indonesia was followed closely in the Netherlands. The Chinese there maintained intensive personal and business contacts between those two worlds. Chinese students in the Netherlands wanted to keep abreast of developments in their native country. After completing their studies, it was a given that most of these students wanted to return to Indonesia. However, the New Guinea issue made this more complicated. For these students, the years between 1958 and 1963 represented a very complex period, to which we will return in the concluding chapter.

Indonesian Nationality:[5] *Warga Negara Indonesia*

The transfer of sovereignty on 27 December 1949 meant that the people of Indonesia had to choose for Dutch or Indonesian nationality within two years.

The 'Agreement regarding the Assignment of Citizenship' served to establish whether people who were subjects of the Netherlands, and at the same time Indonesian citizens according to the Republik Indonesia laws, would have Dutch or Indonesian nationality. They were given two years to choose their nationality: from 27 December 1949 to 27 December 1951.

Until then, according to the 1910 Dutch Subject Law, the Chinese born in the Dutch East Indies were Dutch subjects without Dutch nationality (*Nederlands onderdaan, niet-Nederlander*). According to the law of Republik Indonesia in 1946, Chinese people – as non-native Indonesians and not descendants of native Indonesians – were considered Indonesian citizens if they were born within the territory of the Indonesian state and had settled there for five consecutive years, and were at least 21 years old or married. Indonesian nationality was based on the *ius soli*: rights based on the country of birth.

Next to the chosen Dutch or Indonesian nationality, the Chinese also had Chinese citizenship, and thus had dual nationality. This Chinese nationality, set in the Chinese Nationality Law since 1909, could not be rejected because it was based on *ius sanguinis*: rights based on bloodline. In this case, the *ius sanguinis* referred to descent from a Chinese father, regardless of a person's country of birth. This right is inalienable.

The choice for Indonesian nationality was a passive one, while that for Dutch nationality was an active one. Dutch nationality was obtainable by rejecting Indonesian nationality, and at the same time choosing for Dutch citizenship before the Commissioner of the Netherlands or before a court of law.

It seems that, between 1949 and 1951, most of the Indonesian-born Chinese opted for Indonesian citizenship. They became *Warga Negara Indonesia*, WNI (Indonesian citizens). There are no reliable estimates on how many Chinese chose to become WNI, nor are there reliable official figures on how many Chinese rejected Indonesian citizenship.[6] For most Chinese, born and settled in Indonesia, the choice for their birth country was obvious. Indonesia was their home, their daily reality. They had been born and raised there, and some had families who had already settled there for many generations. Despite the many uncertainties about the future in the Indonesian Republic, choosing Indonesian citizenship was, for better or worse, the most logical option.

Regardless of their choice of Indonesian or Dutch citizenship, the Chinese also held Chinese nationality. Dual citizenship would become a problem in subsequent years. Many Chinese who had settled in Indonesia for generations still felt Chinese. They had an emotional connection with China, the land of their ancestors, even though they no longer spoke the Chinese language, life in China was unfamiliar to them, and they now lived in a mixed, *peranakan* culture. The Indonesian government would soon want to end the dual citizenship of the Chinese.



VRIJ VAN ZEGEL

OPTIE/VERWERPINGSVERKLARING

ingevolge de Overeenkomst betreffende de Toescheiding van Staatsburgers.

Ondergetekende

Naam YAP

Voornamen TJOK KING

Geboren 1 December 1916, te Semarang (Indonesië)

Wonende te Malang, Djalan Raya Idjen No. 17.

Behorende tot groep D No 1.
(zie tabel)

Gehuwd met [1]) VAN DE HULSBEEK, Wijnanda Antonia Henriëtte, geboren 14 December 1924 te Rosmalen.

Vader / ~~Moeder/Voogd~~ [2]) van het hieronder genoemde ongehuwde ~~xxxx~~ kinderen beneden 18 jaar.

1 Yap, Kioe Sheng, geboren 6 Juni 1947 te Amsterdam.
2 ,, ,,
3 ,, ,,
4 ,, ,,
5 ,, ,,
6 ,, ,,
7 ,, ,,
8 ,, ,,

Opteert voor de ------ nationaliteit [2])
Verwerpt de Indonesische nationaliteit [2])
en
Opteert voor de Nederlandse nationaliteit [2])
Verwerpt de ------ nationaliteit [2-3])

mede / ~~alleen~~ [2]) [4]) ten behoeve van ~~het~~ der hierboven sub 1 xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx genoemde ~~xxx~~ kinderen behoren tot groep D No 1. (zie tabel)

Gedaan te Surabaia, 7 November 1950.

Handtekening / Vingertopafdruk

w.g. Yap Tjok King.-

Handtekening en dienststempel van de functionaris bij wie de verklaring wordt afgelegd. [2])
~~die de verklaring ontvangt~~

w.g. J.H. Delgorge.-

Voor eensluidend afschrift:
De 2e Secretaris van het
Commissariaat van het Koninkrijk
der Nederlanden te Surabaia,

(Mr. L.G. Galpke).

Z.O.Z.

1) De gehuwde vrouw volgt de staat van haar man.
2) Doorhalen wat niet van toepassing is.
3) In de gevallen C 1 en 5 hieraan toevoegen: „en herkrijgt mitsdien de Nederlandse nationaliteit".
4) Wettige of gewettigde kinderen beneden de leeftijd van 18 jaar, die niet gehuwd zijn, volgen de staat van hun vader of, indien deze overleden is, die van hun moeder. Natuurlijke kinderen beneden de leeftijd van 18 jaar, die niet gehuwd zijn, volgen de staat van hun moeder; indien zij door de vader erkend zijn, de staat van de vader. Personen van 18 jaar en ouder en gehuwden jonger dan 18 jaar moeten zelf een verklaring afleggen.

7.1. Statement before the Commissioner of the Netherlands to reject Indonesian nationality and opt for Dutch nationality. Surabaya, 7 November 1950.

WNI Chinese, Non-WNI Chinese, and Indigenous WNI

It soon became apparent that the Indonesian nationality of the Chinese within Indonesia was a complex concept. For clarity, in this chapter, Chinese with Indonesian nationality will be referred to as WNI Chinese or WNI *non-pribumi* (non-indigenous). Meanwhile, Chinese people with foreign nationality – meaning Chinese nationality – are non-WNI-Chinese. Native Indonesians will be referred to as *pribumi* or WNI *pribumi*.

The WNI citizenship of the Chinese was not always considered equivalent to the citizenship of native Indonesians, the *pribumi*.[7] Chinese descent and ethnicity made the difference. This difference was evident in the designation of native Indonesians as (WNI) *pribumi*: pure and original Indonesian citizens. The issue of ethnicity as a distinguishing factor was extended to other areas of society, such as the economy. In the economy, the word national in 'national importers' and 'national capital' meant WNI *pribumi* importers and the capital of WNI *pribumi*. WNI Chinese as non-*pribumi* WNI fell outside this category.

Thus, Indonesian nationality in itself was not a guarantee of equality for WNI Chinese. Distinction based on ethnicity was one of the legacies of the colonial past, when society had been legally divided into separate populations. People had long lived, and were then still living, with that distinction. In the new hierarchy of the Republic –a total reversal of the old hierarchy – the carried and internalized, historically grown, unequal relationships could not simply be erased.

Parliamentary Democracy (1949–1957)

Sukarno's rule can be divided into two periods. The first (1949–1957) is known not only as the period of parliamentary democracy, but also as a time of economic nationalism and economic decolonization. The second Sukarno period is that of guided democracy (1957–1966). The latter represented an erosion of the parliamentary system by transferring power from parliament, without abolishing it, to the president and the military.

Beginning in 1949, the Indonesian government faced formidable political and economic challenges. At the Round Table Conference in The Hague prior to the transfer of sovereignty on 27 December 1949, several agreements were reached to regulate the relationship between the Netherlands and Indonesia. The new republic began with a federal legal form, the United States of Indonesia (*Republik Indonesia Serikat* RIS), which was part of a union with the Dutch queen as head of state. The merger of the Netherlands and RIS into one union was a sham in Indonesia's eyes and proved unviable. A year later, on 17 August 1950, the independent Republik

Indonesia replaced RIS. In the South Moluccas, the independent – not recognized by Indonesia – Republic of the South Moluccas (Republik Maluku Selatan) was proclaimed in April 1950. Western New Guinea, called Irian Barat in Indonesia, had remained in Dutch hands at the transfer of sovereignty. The dispute over this would lead to the New Guinea issue.

The unstable political situation during these years was reflected in a large number of cabinets that succeeded each other in rapid succession. In terms of domestic politics, it was a period of growing nationalism. Several elections between 1955 and 1957 showed growing support for the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia PKI). The armed forces, led by General Nasution, chief of staff from 1955, was organized into a strong unit. The army's role changed after a series of mini coups perpetrated by local military commanders in various regions outside Java. It began in December 1956, when army officers in Sumatra sought to seize power. The government in Jakarta was in danger of losing control over Sumatra and restored its authority there. More unrest followed in early 1957 when, in eastern Indonesia (Kalimantan, North and South Sulawesi, and Maluku), the local army rebelled (the Permesta Rebellion[8]). To prevent the country from falling apart, Sukarno declared martial law for the entire country on 14 February 1957.[9] The military under Nasution was given more powers, and enabled Nasution to establish order within it.[10] It was the end of parliamentary democracy, and the armed forces became a major power factor in the political and economic arena. In that year, ties between Sukarno and the PKI strengthened.[11]

Economic Nationalism

The years of the Japanese occupation and the Indonesian Revolution had caused great economic damage in Indonesia, and the Financial-Economic Agreement (Finec), reached with the Netherlands at the Round Table Conference, placed a heavy burden on the young republic. Indonesia had to pay a high price for its sovereignty. The new state was saddled with the former Dutch East Indies' debt of f4.5 billion. Economically, the early years were characterized by major financial problems and rising inflation. In addition to heavy financial obligations to the Netherlands, there was a desire on the Indonesian side to reduce the Dutch grip on large parts of the economy. The role and participation of the Indonesian population in the more complex sectors of the economy, some of which had been closed to Indonesians, had to be increased.

The goal of giving its own, indigenous population a greater place in the economy was cast in the concept of *Indonesianisasi*.[12] Dutch companies were to 'as quickly and as much as possible include suitable Indonesians in management (including boards of directors) and employees of companies for this purpose'. Within a reasonable

time, the majority of the managerial staff of Dutch companies should consist of Indonesian nationals.[13] At the same time, foreign companies were to eventually become Indonesian through a process of gradual nationalization. Examples of the latter process included De Javasche Bank becoming Bank Indonesia (1949–1953) and Garuda Indonesian Airways taking over from KLM (1950–1957).[14] Although the Finec agreement did not mention the Chinese share in the economy, it is obvious that the intended greater space for *pribumi* Indonesians in the Indonesian economy would have implications for the Chinese. The latter had their own, strong position in the economy, but they too would have to make room for their fellow Indonesian competitors.[15]

In 1950, Trade and Industry Minister Sumitro introduced the Benteng Programme, which was based on positive discrimination in favour of the *pribumi*. They would enjoy government protection as 'national importers', allowing them to compete with 'foreign' importers, i.e. *non-pribumi,* which refers to the ethnic Chinese. National importers were to be given access to government credit and priority in the allocation of identified import goods, the 'Benteng goods'. Some 70 per cent of the entrepreneurial capital was to come from *pribumis*, with the rest supplemented by the government. Although the scope of the word 'national' was not made explicit, it became apparent that WNI Chinese were not included in this category despite their Indonesian citizenship. Their Indonesian citizenship did not appear to be equivalent to that of *pribumi* Indonesians: ethnicity was the determining factor.

In 1953, this preferential policy led to protests by Siauw Giok Tjhan, WNI Chinese and member of parliament for the Indonesian Socialist Party PSI (Partai Sosialis Indonesia). The policy violated Indonesia's 1945 Political Manifesto, which prohibited discrimination based on race. In December, Siauw filed a formal complaint with the Minister of Economy about discrimination against ethnic Chinese in the acceptance of national importers and at manufacturing plants.[16] In response, the government assured Siauw that the only criterion for being designated as a national importer was Indonesian nationality, not ethnicity. Yet, in practice it was different. Indonesian citizenship for Chinese as non-*pribumi* turned out to be very complex and anything but unambiguous. In August 1954, the Chinese Federation of Commerce throughout Indonesia, in consultation with Minister of Economic Affairs Iskaq, had to settle for the agreement that in any future investments, 75 per cent would be reserved for *pribumi*, 15 per cent for non-*pribumi* (WNI Chinese), and 10 per cent for foreign investors. It was clear that WNI Chinese capital did not fall under the concept of national capital.

In the same year, conditions for ethnic Chinese deteriorated further when two government regulations revealed the ambiguity of citizenship. These regulations, PP 42/1954 and PP 61/1954, stipulated that rice mills, which were 90 per cent Chinese owned, and warehouses in the main port towns (both Dutch and Chinese owned)

should be transferred to *pribumis*. However, the government in late 1955 denied that institutionalized distinction existed between *pribumi* and non-*pribumi* WNI in procedures for the allocation of Benteng Programme foreign exchange certificates. The question of whether positive discrimination towards Indonesians implied discrimination against ethnic Chinese was answered in the negative by the Minister of Economy in the Djuanda Cabinet. Moderate nationalists felt uneasy about racial discrimination as it did emerge in the implementation of the Benteng Programme.

When it became apparent that the number of participants in the Benteng Programme did not meet expectations, more and more goods were designated as 'Benteng goods'. This list initially included 10 per cent of imported goods, which then rose to more than 50 per cent in 1953. This increase carried on for some time. Similarly, the foreign exchange quota[17] – the share of import financing set by the government – rose to 42 per cent for *pribumi* in 1952, compared to 31 per cent for European companies and 26 per cent for ethnic Chinese. Economy Minister Iskaq aimed for a *pribumi* share of between 80–90 per cent. This policy excluded more and more Chinese as non-*pribumi* Indonesian nationals from import trade, with their capital classified as 'foreign'.

The number of 'national importers' increased significantly, but this increase proved deceptive. National importers largely turned out to be collaborations between *pribumi* Indonesians and non-*pribumi* business partners. In the process, *pribumis* acted as front men for both European trading houses such as the 'Big Five'[18] and the Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij (Dutch Trading Company NHM) as well as for the ethnic Chinese. Cooperation was mutually beneficial. This phenomenon, a joint venture between *pribumi* ('Ali', often a senior military officer) and ethnic Chinese ('Baba'), also known as the Ali-Baba collaboration, became commonplace.[19] Import licence trade flourished, and corruption was rampant. Government attempts to stem the tide and restore the reputation of the Benteng Programme came to nothing. The regulation that a national importer had to be born in Indonesia also failed. Starting in 1956, this was expanded to include the requirement that the person's father also had to be born in Indonesia – another measure to exclude the Chinese. For them, it was difficult to provide proof of their fathers' place of birth. In fact, registration of birth in Indonesia had only been possible for them since the introduction of the civil registry for the Chinese in Java in 1919, and outside Java from 1926. Moreover, much administrative material had been destroyed or lost during the revolutionary years.[20]

By the end of 1956, it was clear that the Benteng Programme had failed completely. Under the guise of national economic development, the policy had provided *pribumi* businessmen with privileges that had cost the country hundreds of millions of rupiahs, while their share of the economy had not increased as significantly as had been intended. Economic interests of individual *pribumis* had won out over the national goal. Nine out of ten national importers were in fact functioning because

of the very people whose economic power the government had wanted to reduce. The power of 'foreign' capital was unbroken, while the policies had encouraged corruption among officials. It is probably an overstatement to argue that the Benteng Programme caused the widespread corruption that would permeate in Indonesian society. However, it was an undeniable fact that corruption practices were reinforced and encouraged by a policy that was politically inspired from the beginning and not based on economic considerations. The failed Benteng Programme and increased corruption created a climate in which anti-Chinese sentiment flourished.[21]

When the Benteng Programme came to an end in 1956, these sentiments were openly expressed by the group around Assaat, a prominent politician and former businessman.[22] A group of Indonesian businessmen, supported by the Islamist party Masyumi, among others, wanted the government to institute an official policy of discrimination in their favour against the Chinese, including WNI Chinese. They believed that the Dutch colonial administration had made the Chinese economically strong and left the Indonesians weak. This last bastion of colonialism now had to be torn down. National businesses should be fully controlled by *pribumi*, even when jointly owned by *pribumi* and non-*pribumi* WNI. *Pribumi* businesses and enterprises were to be protected from competition from foreign trade activities in general, and from those of the Chinese in particular. The Assaat movement's ultimate goal was the transfer of all economic property into *pribumi* hands. In the absence of support from the leading political parties, the Assaat movement disappeared as quickly as it emerged, especially when Assaat became involved in the rebellion in Sumatra.[23]

While the Benteng Programme involved positive discrimination in favour of *pribumi* entrepreneurs, which should have been detrimental to Chinese, by 1956 in the Assaat movement discrimination was openly directed against Chinese. The government definition of 'national' in 'national enterprise' made it clear that ethnicity was a more determining factor than nationality. Official regulations could be freely interpreted: discrimination was formally opposed, but practice was different. Long-standing anti-Chinese sentiments prevalent among Indonesians, which were initially publicly expressed only hesitantly or in veiled terms, surfaced in the Assaat movement.[24]

Economic Decolonization

Starting in December 1955, the New Guinea issue demanded all attention, including in the international arena. The issue had dragged on for years. During the negotiations at the Round Table Conference in 1949, the transfer of New Guinea had been a hard demand for Indonesia, but Indonesia had given in considerably because it wanted to achieve a transfer of sovereignty as quickly as possible. The Netherlands had put forward all sorts of arguments for preserving this area, in which it had

previously shown little interest. In the end, it served mainly as a balm to soften the painful loss of the Dutch East Indies. Because the conference was not to fail on this last point about New Guinea, the parties agreed to a compromise in order to get out of the stalemate. The status of New Guinea would remain undecided, but a final solution had to be found within a year after the sovereignty transfer. However, negotiations for a transfer by 1 January 1951, failed. The attitude of the Dutch government was inflexible. In Indonesia, there was a unanimous opinion that the Netherlands had broken its word by withholding this area that belonged to Indonesia. Since a solution proved impossible, Indonesia wanted to put the issue on the international agenda at the United Nations. This required a two-thirds majority.

In February 1956, all agreements made at the Round Table Conference, including the Finec, were unilaterally terminated by Indonesia. From August 1956, the New Guinea issue was in the Indonesian media almost daily. Hatta's resignation as vice president on 1 December 1956, brought a further hardening in Indonesian relations with Dutch business. The great tensions within Indonesia from December 1956 onward, due in part to rebel sections of the military first in Sumatra and then in eastern Indonesia, led to the declaration of martial law in February 1957.

The deep, continuing unrest led to the unexpected takeover of major Dutch financial companies and institutions by Indonesian labour unions in the first week of December 1957. Their 'wild' actions were unexpected to the Indonesian government. There were no instructions for this from the cabinet. After the state took over the dispossessed companies from the unions, the military, which had taken on an increasingly important role after the declaration of martial law earlier that year, took over. As of 13 December 1957, all dispossessed businesses were under military control, which prevented unions from gaining control of vital economic sectors. The military authority saw the unions as strongly aligned with the communist PKI, the party that had gained power after the 1955 elections. The immediate consequence of the dispossessions was that Dutch citizens had to leave Indonesia within months. Between December 1957 and August 1958, 33,600 Dutch citizens left the country. A total of 700 Dutch companies were expropriated.

Several causes are cited for the dispossessions in December 1957. Indonesia's political prestige surrounding the New Guinea issue was said to have played a role. That reputation was said to have received a blow when a month earlier Indonesia had again failed to get the New Guinea issue on the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly. The two-thirds majority needed to do so was not achieved. Also, fingers pointed to the failed *Indonesianisasi* in reference to the dispossessions. This had not produced the hoped for result. Dutch businesses had made too little effort to allow Indonesians into the economic sector. Also cited as a third cause was Indonesia's highly volatile and tense political and economic situation. Both communist and nationalist groups knew that they could count on support in the

event of actions against the Netherlands.[25] The exodus of about 50,000 Dutch ultimately marked the completion of economic decolonization for Indonesia.

On the Dutch side, the business community realised that, regardless of whether there would be any restoration of trade relations, the good old days were definitely over. Those historic relations between colony and coloniser had come to an end.[26] It became a final rupture in more ways than one. The subsequent closure of Dutch schools marked, in effect, cultural decolonization: an end to Dutch-language education, and thus ending transmission of Dutch culture.

The deeply problematic relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands led to the severance of diplomatic relations. These would only be restored in May 1963, after the New Guinea issue was resolved, and the missing part of the Republic was handed over to Indonesia. After the restoration of diplomatic relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands, the two countries continued on a different footing.

For the Chinese in Indonesia who still had a connection to the Netherlands, the latter disappeared from their lives from the late 1950s. The Netherlands would play a role in the background, however, when the question arose for many as to whether they saw their future in Indonesia. Some of them experienced daily life in Indonesia during these years as increasingly threatening and hopeless. Even for Chinese from Indonesia who were in the Netherlands during these years – most of them to study – the severance of diplomatic relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands had consequences (see last chapter 'Outflow and Inflow').

Guided Democracy (1957–1966)

Overall, 1957 was a particularly tumultuous year that marked the transition from the period of parliamentary democracy to that of Sukarno's *Demokrasi Terpimpin* (Guided Democracy).[27] An important development during this period was the changed role of the military with the declaration of martial law. The Indonesian military was given powers under martial law in February 1957, giving it administrative, and thus political, power. Hence, the army entered the centre of national and political life and assumed that its political role was justified even when martial law was repealed. In November 1958, Chief of Staff General Nasution declared that the army was entitled to an administrative share in the highest levels of government. The military also claimed the status of a 'functional group' with the right of representation in the consultative bodies appointed under the 1945 Indonesian Constitution.

In addition to expanding its political role, the military gained an important foothold in the economy in 1957. After the expropriations in December 1957, the military had taken over the extensive network of Dutch business enterprises in

Indonesia. The presence of army officers on the boards of companies in many of the modern sectors of Indonesia's economy was not affected by the formal nationalization of Dutch companies a year later.

In the period up to 1958, the failed Benteng Programme, with its positive discrimination, and the anti-Chinese Assaat movement, led to economic decline and dislocation. The departure of Dutch businesses after December 1957 did not make things better. Also waiting to be resolved was the conflict with the Netherlands over New Guinea.

In domestic politics, the system of parliamentary democracy as it had functioned after 1949 received increased public criticism. The political apparatus of the Republic had not been able to solve the country's diverse national problems. The regime was authoritarian and Sukarno's position in those years took on something divine – he could not be criticized and allowed himself to be flattered with various titles. Constitutional norms were uncertain and the government had often been unable to implement policies – and was sometimes even unable to formulate them. After the 1955 elections, the PKI grew. The relationship between Sukarno and China also grew stronger. Other parties, disillusioned with the democratic process, viewed the military as a counterforce to the PKI's growing influence. A triangular relationship between the army, the PKI, and the president had emerged after martial law was declared in 1957, with the president sometimes supporting one side and sometimes the other. The military's growing administrative power stood in contrast with the severe curtailment of the independence of the judiciary and the press. Government control and intervention in the economy increased. Anti-Chinese sentiment was undiminished.[28]

The Trade Ban PP 10/1959

These were difficult years for the Chinese, and not just because of economic discrimination. It became increasingly clear to the Chinese that their status as Indonesian citizens was fragile and ambiguous. The Indonesian citizenship of the Chinese did not stop anti-Chinese sentiment from growing in the country's economy, politics and society.

On 14 May 1959, Trade Minister Rachmat Muljomiseno announced a measure that would prohibit retail sales by and from 'foreigners'[29] outside the major cities. Although the measure did not mention the Chinese population group by name, it affected them directly: they were the ones who were overwhelmingly active as intermediaries outside the big cities. In interior regions, they were the middlemen for the sale and transportation of agricultural products to cities, and the distribution of imported goods. The circumstances surrounding the announcement were telling: the minister in question was from the Nahdatul Ulama, a conservative Muslim party

whose membership included mostly small rural Indonesian traders, particularly from East Java. The ban was announced at a meeting of *pribumi* businessmen, a group for whom the arrangement would be beneficial, and took place a month after Chinese businessmen were barred from import trade. President Sukarno was abroad at the time.

Because martial law was in force, implementation of the measure came into the hands of the military or local military commanders. On 28 August 1959, a military regulation was issued in West Java, ordering that the foreigners referred to in the measure must leave the rural areas by 31 December of that year. Before that could be achieved, however, the ban was weakened in November by President Sukarno (by then he had returned to Indonesia) with Presidential Regulation PP 10/1959.[30] The trade ban remained in effect, but the foreigners in question were allowed to remain in the countryside as long as the local army commander allowed it from a security point of view. These foreigners' positions in trade could be taken over by cooperatives, which in turn could employ the displaced Chinese. Chinese were only allowed to continue working in very specific professions, such as in transportation, food and, for example, as barbers and dentists.

Although the trade ban was aimed at alien Chinese – non-WNI Chinese – it affected both those with only Chinese nationality and those with dual nationality. The treaty eliminating dual nationality was not yet in force in November 1959. If WNI Chinese as non-foreigners wanted to circumvent the new restrictions, they had to provide proof of their Indonesian citizenship, which was not easy. That citizenship had to be established by a judge.[31] In various ways, the Chinese tried to maintain their livelihood and avoid their subsequent forced departure. Alas, 25,000 Chinese-owned stores were closed across Indonesia.

As a result of the measure, 136,000[32] Chinese people chose to leave Indonesia and go to China. Their departure was sometimes encouraged by Chinese consular officials. Normally, about 12,000 Chinese left annually. Most of the Chinese who left after the measure were *totoks*, including first-generation Chinese who had been born in China and were now returning there. Among them were many shopkeepers driven away from the interior with their families, as well as city dwellers affected by poverty. Several WNI Chinese also left. After all, because of their dual citizenship, they were also Chinese nationals. Out of the first 40,000 repatriates to China, 10,000 came from West Java, where the new measures were most severely enforced. Overall, 60 per cent of the departing Chinese came from Java, and the rest from Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Bali, and Lombok.

Although the measure was not applied as harshly as first feared, its effect was profound, both on the Chinese population and the Indonesian economy. Economically, cooperatives and Indonesian businessmen proved unable to completely replace the Chinese. The capital needed to take over the Chinese stores or businesses could not be raised, or the required trade experience was lacking. For urban Chinese

shopkeepers, for whom the trade ban did not apply, the situation became precarious when it was proposed to extend the ban to cities. The measure ultimately led to such a disruption in the economy that further restrictions on Chinese trade could not be contemplated. It also did not lead to the desired emergence of a strong class of *pribumi* entrepreneurs. Tacitly, therefore, the Chinese were allowed to return to their places of residence.

Internationally, the measure affected the good relationship built up in previous years with China. China and the Chinese press reacted violently to the trade ban, although the Chinese government limited itself to diplomatic pressure. Escalation and anti-Chinese outbursts were to be avoided. China also did not want to antagonize the Indonesian military. However, it did call on its subjects to return to the 'warm bosom of the motherland', and sent ships to pick them up. The Indonesian army also hired ships for that purpose.[33]

In the chaotic economic situation and uncertainty of these years, which included sharply rising inflation, private entrepreneurs had proven to be better at adapting than state-owned enterprises. The Chinese who figured prominently among these entrepreneurs were not only able to survive, but they also saw the opportunity to penetrate other sectors of the economy, such as those dominated by the Dutch before 1958. They did so preferably together with Indonesian civilian or military partners, who controlled the levers of power.

Such success stories were probably more the exception rather than the rule. The general situation was one of economic decline. In the public domain, the external scapegoats for this were continued imperialism and neo-colonialism. Internal scapegoats were the bureaucratic capitalists and the new rich, including the Chinese. Moreover, when there were frustrations over increased prices and scarcity of goods, the finger was usually pointed at the Chinese. Although overt anti-Chinese expressions and violence were suppressed quite effectively until 1963, the anti-Chinese element in Indonesian society persisted.[34]

Indonesia's Nationality Law and the End of Dual Citizenship

The nationality issue of the Chinese continued to be dealt with between 1954 and 1960. The Indonesian Nationality Law came into effect in 1958. The treaty with China abolishing dual nationality came into force in 1960.

The preparation of the 1958 Indonesian Nationality Law also showed the anti-Chinese sentiment of those years. A draft law was submitted in 1954. The two requirements that the law would impose on the Chinese raised great opposition. The first requirement concerned the active choice of Indonesian citizenship. It meant that all Chinese aged eighteen and older who were already Indonesian citizens had to choose again, and now actively, for Indonesian citizenship. Opponents strongly



Formulir III.

Untuk orang jang tidak mempunjai anak jang belum dewasa, dan untuk perempuan jang anak-anaknja semuanja mempunjai bapak sah jang masih hidup, atau jang sudah meninggal dunia setelah menjatakan keterangan melepaskan kewarganegaraan Republik Indonesia atau kewarganegaraan Republik Rakjat Tiongkok.

Nomor urut : 286/PRNT/61

SURAT PERNJATAAN KETERANGAN
MELEPASKAN KEWARGANEGARAAN REPUBLIK RAKJAT TIONGKOK
UNTUK
TETAP MENDJADI WARGANEGARA REPUBLIK INDONESIA

Jang bertanda tangan
Jang tjap (empu) djarinja tertera dibawah ini, saja :

LIEM GIOK KIAUW NIO ..... alias 林玉喬女民 ;

laki-laki/perempuan lahir di Tjirebon ;

pada tanggal 24-3-1939 ;

sekarang bertempat tinggal di Amsterdam ;

anak dari Liem Kim Seng ..... jang lahir di Batang ;

kawin sah di Amsterdam ..... pada tanggal 9-7-1959 ;

dengan seorang warganegara Indonesia ;

bernama Tjiook Tiauw Han ..... lahir di Djokjakarta ;

pertalian kawin putus pada tanggal ..... ;

menerangkan dengan sungguh belum pernah melepaskan atau menolak kewarganegaraan Indonesia atau belum pernah turut dalam penolakan ataupun untuknja ditolakkan kewarganegaraan Indonesia :

sekarang menjatakan keterangan

MELEPASKAN KEWARGANEGARAAN REPUBLIK RAKJAT TIONGKOK.

Amsterdam ....., tanggal 6-12-1961
Jang menjatakan keterangan,

(Liem Giok Kiauw Nio)

Tanda tanggan (tjap) djari dinjatakan sah oleh

Irawan Darsa
Sekretaris III

DITERIMA di Kedutaan Republik Indonesia di Brussel, pada tanggal 8 Desember 1961

DUTA REPUBLIK INDONESIA UNTUK
BELGIA DAN LUXEMBURG
u. b.

(Irawan Darsa)
Sekretaris III

7.2. Document of nationality choice: a statement dropping the nationality of the People's Republic of China to definitely become a citizen of Republik Indonesia. Brussels, 8 December 1961.

objected to having to choose for the second time – having already done so in the 1949–1951 period – and thus having to confirm their loyalty to Indonesia. They had already proven that loyalty, prominent Chinese argued, by actively working for the Indonesian cause, for example as members of parliament or as ministers in successive cabinets. That year, Ong Eng Die and Lie Kiat Teng held the ministerial posts of finance and health, respectively. The second requirement was proof of birth in Indonesia, not only of themselves, but also of their fathers. Moreover, the latter must have already lived and settled in Indonesia – without gaps – for ten years. These proof-of-birth requirements were, as reported earlier, also imposed on Chinese people who wished to gain access to the Benteng Programme as 'national importers'.[35] Although these requirements disappeared and were not to be found in the 1958 Nationality Law, it marked the anti-Chinese climate of those years.

Treaty for the Elimination of Dual Nationality

Starting in November 1954, Indonesia negotiated with China to abolish the dual nationality of their citizens. In that year, Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-Lai had stated in his speech at the National People's Congress that China was willing to do so because it was aware of the difficult situation in which the overseas Chinese found themselves. China encouraged the overseas Chinese to respect the laws and customs of the countries where they lived. China's decision to abandon its formal claims to the nationality and loyalty of all ethnic Chinese outside China was a striking departure from its traditional policy, which rested on the *ius sanguinis*, the law of blood and lineage. Negotiations went well, and as early as 1955 an agreement was reached at the Asian–African Conference in Bandung, where Zhou led the Chinese delegation and conducted the negotiations.[36]

Despite a positive start, it would take until 1960 for the treaty to come into effect.[37] Reasons included Indonesia's political instability, the lingering conflict with the Netherlands over the New Guinea issue, the economic decolonization in late 1957, and the preparations for the new Indonesian Nationality Law. The treaty abolishing dual nationality was not to conflict with that new Indonesian Nationality Law, which came into being in 1958.

On 20 January 1960, the treaty eliminating dual citizenship came into force. Starting from that date, a two-year period of choice took effect. Until 20 January 1962, either Indonesian or Chinese nationality had to be personally and actively chosen including by women. That choice also included rejecting the other nationality.

Integration

The Chinese who had chosen Indonesian nationality between 1960 and 1962, and simultaneously rejected Chinese nationality, had just one nationality from that

time onwards: the Indonesian nationality. Without Chinese nationality, they could no longer rely on help or support from China, as was previously given by Chinese consuls, its representatives in Indonesia.

For the government, the nationality choice made by the Chinese brought clarity. Among the ethnic Chinese population in Indonesia, there was now a group with Indonesian and a group with non-Indonesian, i.e. Chinese nationality. The government could take this into account or adjust its policies accordingly. In ordinary life, nationality did not matter much in the relationship between the Chinese and other population groups. In daily life, recognizability was the distinction. Most of the Chinese in Indonesia were born on Indonesian soil, to parents who had lived there for a long time, many already for generations. They spoke the Indonesian language and had Indonesian nationality. Yet, despite all of the above, it was that recognizability – also because of their names – that could land the Chinese into trouble in conflict situations.

Their image in Indonesian society was that of a minority group with a strong economic position and racial and cultural exclusivity[38] because of their traditions, culture, and way of life. This image did not always tally with the many Chinese who were economically weak and struggled to make ends meet, and lived with and among the Indonesian population. This stereotype could cause problems and was called the Chinese problem or *masalah Cina* by many in Indonesia.

During these years of discrimination, the Chinese became increasingly aware that, as a minority, they had to do something in order to become an equal, accepted, and inclusive part of Indonesian society. Two avenues were open for this: integration or assimilation. The organization Badan Permusyawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia Baperki (the Consultative Body for Indonesian Citizenship) made the case for integration. It was founded in 1954 by several prominent WNI Chinese. Impetus for its establishment was most likely the prevailing climate of increasing discrimination against the Chinese, and the realization that Indonesian citizenship did not guarantee equal treatment with *pribumis*. Other matters were preparations for the elimination of dual citizenship in conjunction with the Indonesian Nationality Law. The goal of Baperki's establishment included achieving an understanding of Indonesian citizenship and what it meant, and the elimination of discrimination based on origin, culture, traditions, and religion. Baperki would grow into the largest organization in the history of the Chinese in Indonesia.

Although the organization participated in the 1955 national elections and the 1957 regional elections, provided candidates for them, and was represented in parliament and the legislative assembly, Baperki did not advertise itself as a political party. Rather, it called itself a mass organization that was not ideologically bound, allowing persons of different political currents to become members. The organization was not intended only for Chinese: membership was open to all Indonesian

citizens. In practice, however, both leaders and members were of Chinese descent. In October 1955, 98 per cent of the 48,000 members were of Chinese descent. By August 1965 – the year before its dissolution – membership had grown to 280,000, and the number of non-Chinese may have gone up but remained small.[39]

From its founding until its dissolution in 1966, Baperki was associated with its leader Siauw Giok Tjhan. He had developed from a left-leaning journalist into a left-leaning politician, and had held a ministerial post in two Republican cabinets during the revolutionary years. The Chinese in Indonesia, he taught his children, were part of Indonesian society and were obliged to integrate into Indonesia. That was their homeland.[40] Siauw was the face of, and the driving force behind, Baperki. He set its course, and served in parliament from 1950 until 1966, the year the organization was disbanded. There, he represented the Chinese minority. In the early years, Siauw took a stand against racism and discrimination in trade and economics on several occasions, such as with the Benteng Programme. He believed that the Indonesian government should make no distinction between capital originating from *pribumi* or non-*pribumi*, as long as that capital remained in Indonesia.[41] Because of Siauw's stance, many WNI Chinese saw Baperki as an organization that gave a voice to the *peranakan* community, dared to take a strong and clear stand on discrimination, and defended their rights. Later, however, his increasingly left-wing course prompted a number of Chinese to leave Baperki.

Siauw also paid attention to the impending nationality law and the elimination of dual citizenship, and developed initiatives with Baperki in education. After access to certain forms of education was restricted for Chinese youth, Baperki set up its own schools.[42] The number of Baperki schools grew to 100 in 1963. A Baperki university was established in Jakarta, later called Universitas Res Publica, with a branch in Surabaya. Baperki thus met the need for a good education for both *totok* and *peranakan* students.

Within Baperki, opinions differed on how to resolve racism and discrimination. Chairman Siauw believed that this could be achieved through Indonesian socialism. Vice Chairman and lawyer Yap Thiam Hien saw the solution in applying the values of the constitution and human rights. This difference of opinion led to a conflict between the two that ended in 1960 with Yap's resignation.[43] As for the minority problem, Baperki stood for integration of the WNI Chinese. The Chinese should be accepted as a minority group in Indonesian society and within the Indonesian nation while maintaining their cultural characteristics and traditions. In short, they should be treated equally as other ethnic groups in Indonesia, as a *suku* (ethnic group, tribe).

Beginning in 1959, Baperki and Siauw left their unaligned positions. Baperki increasingly went along with the leftist course of President Sukarno and his Nasakom national ideology. In that ideology, Sukarno wanted to bring together

nationalism, religion (*agama*), and communism. He wanted to achieve this by uniting the nationalists (PNI), religious (Masyumi) and communists (PKI), and then incorporating them into the government. The military, however, did not want PKI representation in the government.[44] Among a group of WNI Chinese there was resistance to Baperki and its leftist views. They believed that the problem of the Chinese minority could not be solved with the integration that Baperki advocated. They believed that *asimilasi* was the right way to go. Chinese had to give up the very cultural characteristics that Baperki wanted to preserve. Specifically, *asimilasi* meant the change of Chinese names into Indonesian names and intermingling through marriages between Chinese and *pribumi* Indonesians. Switching to Islam was another possibility. According to Baperki, these symbols offered no protection whatsoever against discrimination and racism; the requirement to give up cultural characteristics was inherently discriminatory and unacceptable. Suggestions that Chinese people should blend with the native inhabitants by marrying and adopt Indonesian names also aroused great suspicion.[45]

The Assimilationists

Although ideas about assimilation had been around and expressed for some time, the assimilation movement only got off to a good start in 1960. Possibly, Baperki's more leftist direction played a role in this. The assimilationists believed that the only solution to the Chinese minority problem lay in making WNI Chinese 'disappear' as a socially and culturally visible group. In other words, they should dissolve into the Indonesian population.

The assimilation process could be accelerated by what has already been mentioned above: changing Chinese names to Indonesian names, marrying *pribumi* Indonesians, and letting culturally distinctive Chinese features disappear. This would break the ethnic exclusivity. Of all these proposals, name change received the most attention. This would promote a sense of belonging to Indonesia for the Chinese. It would make individuals feel that they were an accepted part of Indonesia and contributed to bringing down the barriers of racial exclusivity. At the same time, it was recognized that name change was a personal matter. No one should be forced to do so.

Although name change was not presented as an imperative requirement – at least not in public – this appeal did create a feeling of moral pressure among the Chinese. The bottom line was that if they wanted to be seen as good and patriotic citizens, they had to put aside their perceived 'pride and sense of superiority'. Many WNI Chinese opposed name change because they doubted its value. At the same time, many Indonesians thought that the Chinese would change their names only to benefit economically, or to use the change for subversive actions against

Indonesia. They were stuck between a rock and a hard place: whatever the Chinese decided could be used against them.[46]

One important element which got the assimilationist movement off the ground was a March 1960 statement by ten *peranakan* Chinese[47] in the magazine *Star Weekly*. Among them were members of Baperki who had left the party. Baperki's course would identify the Chinese minority with the left, these departing members feared. Gradually, *pribumis* who were anti-communist in orientation also joined. The pros and cons of assimilation then appeared in newspaper columns. In the following years, the movement took a more institutional form in a committee for information on assimilation.

In June 1962, a proposal of the committee, addressed to Armed Forces Chief General Nasution – who was also defence minister – was realized: the creation of a special agency under the wing of the Army to promote national unity. With this bureau, the Badan Pembina Potensi Karya BPPK (Labour Potential Development Agency) – regarded as a precursor to the LPKB – a link was established between the assimilationists and the military high command. This bond would have great significance for government policy towards the WNI Chinese. However, the bond with the army also fed the belief that assimilation would be imposed or enforced on them, as was also suggested by some Baperki members. The split among the WNI Chinese over integration or assimilation largely coincided with the general polarization in Indonesian politics between the left (PKI) and the right (the military). *Pribumi* people within the assimilation movement were politically right-wing and anti-communist in orientation, while at Baperki there were many people who had ties to left-wing groups such as the PKI, the Partindo, or the PNI.[48]

The LPKB versus Baperki

1963 marked a political watershed, not only in terms of the *peranakan* Chinese's position, but also for Indonesian politics as a whole. In May of that year, martial law, which had been in effect since 1957, ended. This eliminated the basis of cooperation between the assimilationists and the military.

In early 1963, the assimilationists asked President Sukarno to openly support them, which he did. Sukarno additionally declared that 'a nation with minorities was not a nation'. Before the upcoming Baperki Congress was to take place a few months later, the assimilationists held a conference in Jakarta in which they condemned organizations and schools that, in practice, were racially exclusive. It was clear that they meant Baperki and the Baperki schools. At that conference it was also decided that there would be an institute to promote national unity: the Lembaga Pembina Kesatuan Bangsa LPKB (National Unity Development Institute). That national unity was to be achieved in cooperation with the government through assimilation

in every field. The LPKB, like Baperki, was to become a mass organization with members and subdivisions. Within the LPKB, like its military-sponsored predecessor BPPK, several right-wing *pribumi* Indonesians were active members. The LPKB was located at the same address as its predecessor in Jakarta: on army premises.

However, at the Baperki Congress, held after the conference, Sukarno praised Baperki in his speech and explained that there were no minorities in Indonesia, only *suku* (tribes). He explicitly mentioned the Chinese as a *suku* and not a minority. Personally, he believed that, like religion, a name was a personal matter. Name change was not necessary to be a good citizen. According to Coppel, who has done extensive research on this period and subject, Sukarno's words must have been a slap in the face to the assimilationists.[49]

The year 1963 was marred with plenty of anti-Chinese violence. After the Baperki Congress, where Sukarno advocated the idea of integration, anti-Chinese riots erupted in Java between March and May. It began on 27 March in Cirebon. Fighting broke out between Indonesian and Chinese students after a court ruling on a traffic accident that had killed a Chinese man. This fighting was followed by destruction of Chinese houses in the Chinese neighbourhood. The violence spread to other cities in Java. There was a tense atmosphere in the country during those months, with the public waiting to see what political steps would be taken.

Meanwhile, on 1 May 1963, martial law was lifted. Violence flared up again a few days later, beginning in Tegal (5 May) and then in Bandung (10 May). In the violent riots in Bandung, students from the Technical University ITB had a key role. The police made no significant attempt to stop the violence and destruction. The lifting of martial law had created a power vacuum. This time, the violence was not only against the Chinese, but also against the government and the nouveau riche. Eventually, the military intervened. Although the 18 May riots in Sukabumi were also significant, in 1963 this series of riots was popularly referred to as the 10 May affair. Notable was the student participation in the various clashes, although it was unclear to what extent the riots were orchestrated.[50] These were fearful times for the Chinese.

On the left, the explosions of violence were seen as racial outbursts. On the right, it was said in veiled terms, including by the LPKB, that the Chinese victims had brought this misery upon themselves by their attitude of exclusivity and maintaining their distinctive lifestyle.

President Sukarno was late to respond. In his analysis of the violence, he chose the aforementioned interpretation of Baperki and other leftists, i.e. that they were racial outbursts. The goal of the perpetrators of the violence was to discredit Indonesia and himself as president. During Sukarno's absence thereafter – he was travelling – Acting President Djuanda released an instruction stating a different position. Djuanda recognized the need for assimilation and felt that this required

intensive indoctrination. Organizations that stood in the way of assimilation had to be restricted. The assimilationists of the LPKB, until then a private organization with ties to the army and housed in Jakarta on army property, aimed for a formal strengthening of their position. On 15 July, they urged Sukarno to approve and formalize their plans to eliminate exclusivism by promoting assimilation. Sukarno now took a different position and a few days later he signed two presidential decrees. The first established a government body that, in effect, was a new LPKB. The second decree appointed former LPKB Chairman Kristoforus Sindhunata[51] as acting head of the new government organization. Sindhunata was a WNI Chinese with a Catholic background. He started out as a lawyer and had made a career in the navy and army. He immediately set about converting the LPKB from a private organization into a government body.[52]

After the G30S Coup

The years leading up to 1965 were marked by increasing social tension in many areas of society, and economic downturns due to continued inflation.[53] Meanwhile, until 1965, the left and the right remained opposed in their views on assimilation.

The events in Jakarta on 30 September 1965 – also known as the G30S – marked a turning point in Indonesia's history. The assassination of six generals was considered a failed coup for which the communists were held responsible. In the purges that followed, there were an estimated 500,000 to 1,000,000 casualties. The PKI was banned. It marked the end of the Sukarno era and the transition, in 1966–1967, to the Suharto period and the New Order (*Orde Baru*).

The end of the Sukarno era also marked the end of Baperki. The organization was suspected of having financed the PKI in cooperation with the People's Republic of China. For the LPKB, the circumstances presented an excellent opportunity to eliminate Baperki. It urged President Sukarno to disband Baperki.[54] The president did not accede to this request. Baperki's branch in Karawang, just outside of Jakarta, decided to shut down on its own accord. It also proposed to dissolve Baperki in its entirety. Following this initiative, military authorities and sections of LPKB worked together to halt Baperki's activities and thus brought members to the dissolution of their own sections. So, that was what happened. In October, Baperki divisions in other places proceeded to shut down. Little more was needed when ordinary members found themselves facing the gigantic waves of anti-left purges occurring throughout Java in the months following the G30S. Baperki met its end. Prominent members, including Siauw, were imprisoned. Many lost their jobs because of the anti-communist purges.

The LPKB, in cooperation with local army and education departments, implemented the military's official policy regarding Baperki schools and universities.

Schools were closed and school buildings had to be prepared for reopening on a non-exclusive basis. Staff and students had to be purged. Some students were expelled on suspicion of being PKI members. The Res Publica University of Baperki went up in flames. Almost immediately, on 29 November 1965, the Indonesian government established Trisakti University, on the ruins of the destroyed Res Publica.[55]

With Baperki out of the way, the LPKB wanted to take further steps in solving the 'Chinese problem'. In cooperation with government agencies, the organization wanted to broaden its objectives. It remained committed to the assimilation of WNI Chinese, but now also drew a clear line between Chinese with and Chinese without Indonesian citizenship. The influence of the People's Republic of China on those with non-Indonesian (read: Chinese) citizenship was to be countered as much as possible. Too much interference with this group would eventually expose the LPKB to the accusation that it was a neo-Baperki organization seeking to represent the interests of all ethnic Chinese.[56]

Collective Name Change in Sukabumi

Over just two days in June 1966, 6,662 Chinese in Sukabumi – virtually the entire local community – proceeded to change their Chinese names into Indonesian names. Local LPKB leaders, in cooperation with the local administration, staged a massive name-change ceremony for this purpose. It took place on the symbolic date of 1 June, the day that marked the birth of Pancasila. Pancasila stands for the five basic principles of the Indonesian state as contained in the 1945 constitution.

Following this massive name change, a new procedure was adopted on 27 December 1966[57], to make name changing cheaper and faster. The new instruction was well received in the media and the LPKB views were reiterated, i.e. name change was not mandatory, but rather a step in WNI Chinese assimilation, publicly identifying them with Indonesia. It would help them be accepted by *pribumi* Indonesians and, at the same time, it would allow them to distinguish between Chinese who were Indonesian citizens and those who were not. Yap Thiam Hien, *peranakan* lawyer and former deputy chair of Baperki, who had left the organization after a conflict with Siauw in 1960, believed that the willingness to change names stemmed from opportunism and, above all, from fear and concern for one's own safety.[58] In August 1969, the Department of Justice announced that 232,882 WNI Chinese had taken advantage of the new procedure to change their names.

The fault line drawn between WNI Chinese and Chinese with Chinese nationality had major consequences for the latter. Their organizations were banned, they had to register for possible repatriation, their assets were blocked, and, in several smaller towns, their nationality had to be clearly visible. Measures taken by local military

commanders, such as those in East Java, resulted in a head tax equivalent to $320, a ban on trade both as intermediaries and in wholesale, and a ban on speaking the Chinese language. Some non-WNI Chinese proceeded to transfer their capital to WNI Chinese, making deals with military officers or withdrawing from trade altogether.

WNI Chinese were not formally covered by these measures. However, having to prove again and again that they were Indonesian citizens made them vulnerable to intimidation and blackmail. The Chinese faced constant threats, vandalism, and extortion. The military was underpaid at this time and soldiers depended on unconventional sources, which they tried to obtain from, among others, the Chinese. The government itself was also in limbo: first, authority had to be restored after the failed coup of September 1965. The situation was extremely unstable.

Thus, for the Chinese, there was little or no protection; people were on their own, whether they were WNI or not. There was a constant sense of vulnerability and being unprotected. However, this did not lead to an exodus of the type seen in 1959. Demonstrations, however, did occur. They began in Malang and Kudus and spread wider. In September 1966, Acting President Suharto declared that he deplored the racial excesses against the Chinese, and that the Indonesian government would always try to protect them. However, subordinate officials and military commanders continued to set their own rules. Only in late 1967, when the Suharto government was more firmly in place, was the government better able to maintain order and act against its own regional commanders.[59]

The Dissolution of the LPKB

The LPKB's ambitions in 1966 to broaden its objectives were unsuccessful. The organization wanted to occupy a key position in the process of achieving national unity. It wanted to participate in the formulation of policy, oversee its application and implementation, and gain an established role in society. With varying degrees of success, it approached different departments, imploring for an end to the habit of discriminating against WNI Chinese. In practice, however, it was extremely difficult to make a clear distinction between WNI and non-WNI Chinese. Members of Chinese families – by choice or necessity – did not always hold the same nationality.

In February 1967, it became clear that the LPKB's activities would come to an end. It remained part of the Department of the Interior as a separate organization until its dissolution later that year. In July 1967, it transferred its functions to that department, after which the LPKB was dissolved by presidential decree in November 1967. A supporting foundation did remain in place to oversee various educational projects. At the time of its dissolution, the LPKB announced that it had reached its limit. After all, the government had completely adopted its policies. There

was certainly some truth in that. The assimilation process had been set in motion, and thus an important step had been taken towards the sought-after national unity. But equality and equal treatment had not been achieved. Discriminatory practices in the government and its departments – especially against non-WNI Chinese – persisted. WNI Chinese, despite their name change, had not yet achieved an accepted place in Indonesian society.[60] More time was needed for assimilation.

For the Chinese, 1950–1967 was a turbulent time with great uncertainties about their position. They had to choose their nationality twice. Indonesian nationality, however, did not bring them an equal position with *pribumi* Indonesians. Integration while maintaining their own culture, and thus being accepted as a *suku*, a tribe within Indonesian society, proved impossible. The exclusivity of 'being Chinese' and being part of a group with its own cultural features and characteristics had to be abandoned, starting with name change.

Many Chinese heeded the call for name change. It was understood by most not as a free choice, but as something imposed on them. They changed their names because they felt it necessary to avoid problems in daily life in Indonesia, the country where they lived and wanted to continue to live. This necessity was also felt in matters of business and commerce, in which there were regular dealings with the government. A small number of Chinese retained their own names. Usually, these were individuals who were well informed, knew that name change was a voluntary choice, and were professionals with a high degree of independence.

During these turbulent years, a minority of Chinese chose to leave Indonesia. The unstable situation, living with discrimination, fear for their own safety, uncertain and bleak prospects for their families, and their own experiences of violence in various forms, made them decide to seek a future outside Indonesia. The history described in the previous chapters undoubtedly influenced or shaped their lives in one way or another. They took that history with them in what, for some, became an adventure to sometimes unknown countries in the hope of finding a new future there. For others, especially those Chinese who were familiar with the Dutch language and culture, who had studied in the Netherlands or had contacts there through family and friends, the choice fell on the Netherlands. The concluding chapter is about the Chinese in the Netherlands. In that chapter, we go back in time and get to know, among other things, the first Chinese students who came to the Netherlands in the late nineteenth century.

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VIII Students in the Netherlands and Other Newcomers

The first encounter between the Dutch in the Netherlands and the Chinese from Indonesia was in 1882. That was when the first Chinese student from the Dutch East Indies came to study at an institution of higher education. There were no facilities for this in the Dutch East Indies at that time. The first institute of higher education came only some forty years later.

Oei Jan Lee was the first Chinese student to come to the Netherlands, arriving in 1882. A year later, after having finished gymnasium secondary school in Leiden, he started to study law at Leiden University. The following two students were Tan Tjoen Liang (1892, Delft Polytechnic School)[1] and O-Siandhay (1895, gymnasium Rotterdam, then law at University of Amsterdam). After the turn of the century, Jie Koei Tiang arrived, studying in Amsterdam in 1904.[2] These students must have come from wealthy Chinese, *peranakan* families and received Dutch education in Indonesia. Indeed, a preliminary European education in the Indies followed by higher education in Europe was costly. These children received their preliminary education through private education at home, boarding at the families of European teachers, or through European schools. The latter was an exception, as admission to those schools was only done after advocacy based on connections and social position. These parents must have been in contact or familiar in some way, either professionally or personally, with Dutch people and the Dutch language and culture, and thus recognized the importance of a European education. A study in Europe was held in high regard in the colony.[3]

The Chung Hwa Hui Student Association

After the first Chinese students arrived in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, more and more students found their way to the Netherlands. It led to the founding of the Chung Hwa Hui student association (Chinese Students Association, CHH) in 1911; not to be confused with the Chinese Union of the same name founded in Semarang in 1928 to represent the interests of the Chinese in the East Indies. Some members of CHH Indonesia, a Dutch-oriented party, had been members of the CHH student union in the Netherlands during their university years. The CHH Indonesia was disbanded during the Japanese occupation. The student association in the Netherlands, while it ceased activities after 1962, was not disbanded until 2013.[4]

The CHH student organization was formed in 1911, during the turbulent years of the Chinese movement in the Dutch East Indies. The Chinese movement was striving for greater equality under the law by removing various discriminatory laws and regulations. These developments were closely followed and supported by the Chinese students in the Netherlands. There was intensive contact between the student body and P.H. Fromberg, author of *De Chineesche beweging op Java* (The Chinese Movement in Java). Fromberg was known as an advocate for better legal status for the Chinese in Indonesia. In the colonial administration, he had risen from judicial officer to member of the Supreme Court. His outspoken views on the slighted position of the Chinese in colonial society were exceptional for the time. Fromberg was held in high regard by the student organization until his death in 1924.[5]

The CHH not only had great concern regarding social and political conditions in the Dutch East Indies, but it also closely monitored developments in China. There was great interest in the active and concrete support that China gave to various emancipatory initiatives of the Chinese in the Dutch East Indies in those first decades of the twentieth century. There was a strong sense of connection with China and Chinese culture among CHH members, coupled with an equally strong awareness of their Chinese identity.

For Chinese students, the choice of their field of study was often related to the situation of their ethnic group in the East Indies. An independent profession was considered important. Around 40 per cent of the students pursued studies in the medical field (doctor, dentist, and pharmacist), 20 per cent in technical and natural science professions (engineer, chemist, physicist), 20 per cent in economic professions (economist, accountant, and bookkeeper) and 17 per cent studied law. Only 3 per cent chose another field of study.[6]

In all, the CHH had 1,279 members between 1911 and 1962. The association began with about 60 members. This number remained fairly stable until around 1920. In the early years, probably almost all Chinese students in the Netherlands were members of CHH, while later this was less obvious. Starting in 1920, the number of Chinese coming to the Netherlands from Indonesia grew steadily to 90 in 1925 and 155 in 1929. Not all of them were students. Out of the 150 Chinese in 1930, 115 were following university or college courses. The others were taking non-academic courses, were high school students, or were women the students were married to.[7] After more opportunities to study at institutes of higher education became available in the Dutch East Indies in the 1920s, the number of CHH members fluctuated between 140 and 155 in the years before World War II. Until 1946, members were exclusively persons of Chinese descent. From that year, members' non-Chinese spouses were accepted in the organization because they were considered Chinese. Of CHH's 1,279 members between 1911 and 1962, 19 per cent were women (247), and,

of those, they were mostly married women with no academic training. Almost all members (98 per cent) were *peranakans* with a Hokkien background. A few had Hakka or Cantonese backgrounds, or came to the Netherlands directly from China or from Suriname.

In its fifty years of active existence, CHH was not only a social meeting point for its members, but also a place where fierce discussions could be held about the association's political direction. The socio-cultural club life focused on what the students themselves needed: mutual contact that, in addition to conviviality, was also meant to provide guidance and support while living away from home. Moreover, intellectual development was promoted. To help underprivileged Chinese students with their education in Europe, the CHH established the Hioh Pan Study Fund in 1913.

Within CHH there were different, and often opposing, views regarding political developments in China and the Dutch East Indies. Especially in the 1920s, members were strongly oriented towards China. For CHH, Chinese culture was the basis and starting point from which the course was set. After 1924, the Chinese-nationalist direction was strong, even to the point that there was serious talk of emigration to China. Chairman Liem Bwan Tjie put his money where his mouth was some years later, albeit briefly. His final destination became Indonesia. The focus, however, was not only on China and Indonesia. Members were also interested in international developments and attended congresses such as the Paris Peace Conference in 1919.

Although the association's main focus was on China and Chinese interests, it could not promote a clear or outspoken position externally. This could meet with resistance – both inside and outside the association – and such a thing could also affect its relationship with the Dutch or Indies administration. By always navigating cautiously, the CHH gave the impression of being passive and apolitical. Between 1919 and 1939, however, it could not be accused of passivity. There was contact with 25 organizations during that period, including international organizations in ten different countries, and eight congresses were attended.

From the mid-1920s, because of the rise of Indonesian nationalism and the pursuit of an independent Indonesia, contact was made with the Indonesian student association in the Netherlands, the Perhimpunan Indonesia PI (Indonesian Association). They even produced a joint manifesto. However, cooperation proved fragile. Cooperation was broken off in 1931 after the PI criticized Chinese Nationalist Party Leader Chiang Kai-shek.

The period up to World War II saw many internal contradictions and discussions about political direction. One group within the CHH, under Tan Ling Djie,[8] identified with Indonesian nationalism. This led to a secession in 1932, with Tan establishing the Sarekat Peranakan Tionghoa Indonesia SPTI (Alliance of Chinese from Indonesia). The other founders were Teng Tjin Leng and Tjoa Sik Ien. Without denying their Chinese ancestry, the SPTI assumed the inescapable and desirable

8.1. The Chung Hwa Hui Board, 1932–1933. Sitting from left to right: Que Keng Lead; Tan Kiang Hong; Koo Liong Bing; Tan Siang Swie; Liem Tjiauw Joe. Standing left to right: Diao Ing Koen and Lie Kok Tjing.

8.2. Chinese Indonesian students in Leiden during the German occupation of the Netherlands, 1941. Standing from left to right: Tan Tek Seng; Go Lam San; Kwee Hong Kiem; Go Lam Djoen; Oey Tjeng Sit. Sitting left to right: Pauline The; Tan Tek Oen; Lena The; Lie Oen An.

8.3. Chung Hwa Hui gathering, 26 April 1947.

independence of Indonesia. However, most CHH members limited themselves to an orientation towards Chinese culture and Chinese nationalism. They were willing to engage in politics only when the general interest was harmed. Nevertheless, it did organize collections for China and the victims of the Sino–Japanese war. In 1941, a tentative, renewed contact with the PI was again broken after an article in Perhimpunan's magazine called Chiang Kai-shek a traitor because of his actions against the Chinese communists. The association took that as an insult to Chinese people in general, and certainly to CHH members.[9]

Chinese Students during the German Occupation

World War II and the German occupation put organizational life and discussions about the association's direction on hold. As far as is known, 170 Chinese from the Dutch East Indies were in the Netherlands when Germany invaded its neighbour on 10 May 1940. In addition to the students, there were also non-students: parents of students, graduates who had remained in the Netherlands, and spouses of students. There were also Chinese women who were temporarily in the Netherlands in the service of Dutch families. Due to the threat of war, some Chinese had already returned to the Dutch East Indies before May 1940. The last boat to the Dutch East Indies with

some Chinese on board left while there was already fighting in the Netherlands.[10] After that, return to the Dutch East Indies was no longer possible, as the German Reich Commissioner did not give permission for it. Moreover, communication between the Netherlands and the Dutch East Indies ceased immediately after the Dutch surrender. Sending mail and telegrams was no longer possible. Between 1940 and 1945, it was only sporadically possible to send mail to and from the Dutch East Indies through the Red Cross. Most students depended on money sent from the Dutch East Indies for their finances. There was support from the ministry and universities,[11] and there were individual arrangements with companies operating in the Dutch East Indies and the Netherlands. Their offices in the Netherlands gave a monthly advance. Universities during this period paid special attention to the situation of foreign students, including Chinese and Indonesian students.

Because of the war conditions, association activities were virtually halted in late 1941. Germany had decided to recognize the pro-Japanese regime of Wang Ching-Wei as the government of China. However, the CHH board remained loyal to the nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek throughout the war. When the possibility arose that the CHH might be required to cooperate with a supporter of the Wang Ching-wei government, consideration was given to dissolving the association.[12]

In autumn 1940, when the German occupiers began anti-Jewish measures, there were large protests. Leiden University was closed – first temporarily and then permanently in 1941. Students, including Chinese students, had to move to other universities. Many medical students went to Amsterdam, and pharmacy students to Groningen. In early 1943, the occupying forces demanded a declaration of loyalty from all students, by which they would declare that they would do nothing against the occupying forces. If they did not sign the declaration, they would be put to work in Germany. Between 80–90 per cent of the students refused to sign. No percentages are known of the number of Chinese students who did not sign, but it is unlikely that the figure differed significantly from that of other students. During raids in early 1943, many students were rounded up in student towns as reprisals. They were taken to Vught, a German concentration camp in the Netherlands. Among them were Chinese students, such as Go Lam Djoen. Although in the Nazi racial doctrine Asians were considered inferior, there were no targeted actions against the Chinese or Indonesians. The Germans did not want the Chinese to be put to work in Germany, but there was always the fear and uncertainty that the occupiers would round them up anyway.

As far as is known, there was no organized resistance during the war from the Chinese students or other Chinese from the Dutch East Indies. This was in contrast with the ideologically organized Indonesian resistance. Indonesian students in the Netherlands were already strongly anti-national socialist, anti-colonial, and often

communist before the war. There were, however, Chinese students and graduate students who were closely involved in Indonesian-organized resistance, such as Sie Soe Giang.[13]

In May 1943, all universities were closed. Many Dutch students had to go into hiding to avoid being put to work in Germany. Student resistance also continued at that time. Some of the Chinese students and graduates went to work in hospitals and pharmacies. More so than during their student years, this period created more space for contact with Dutch society. From these contacts, relationships between Chinese male students with Dutch women occurred more often than before. Through work and relationships, these Chinese also came into contact with the Dutch resistance. Consequently, resistance, or support for the resistance, from the Chinese side was on an individual basis rather than organized via a Chinese network.

Not all Chinese students became members of CHH. Harry Lim Tjing Lok (Surabaya, 1920) went to high school in the Netherlands and then studied medicine in Amsterdam. He was not a member of the CHH. However, he was a member of the Amsterdam student fraternity Pallas. This fraternity was active in the resistance. The entire group was arrested in December 1944, and some were executed by firing squad. Harry was transported to Neuengamme concentration camp. He died in April 1945, somewhere near Hamburg. His two younger sisters were also active in the resistance. There are several stories about Chinese students and graduates who aided the resistance and engaged in printing and distributing illegal newspapers.

Most Chinese from the Dutch East Indies survived the war in the Netherlands. As far as is known, eight Chinese died. Harry Lim's demise was directly related to his activities in the resistance. The deaths of four other Chinese people during this period were almost certainly not related to the occupation, while in the case of the other three, this could not be entirely ruled out. After the war, students tried to graduate as quickly as possible. Some students who had graduated during the war were already working and specializing as doctors and/or were married to Dutch women. Some of them did not return to Indonesia.[14]

Conflicting Post-War Directions

After World War II, the Netherlands was dominated by liberation and reconstruction. In Indonesia, after the declaration of the Republik Indonesia, the years of revolution began with uncertainty and violence. In the Netherlands, student life resumed. A new wave of students arrived. The Chung Hwa Hui student association was faced with the task of charting a course in these new circumstances.

At first, it seemed that the CHH would make a political shift and support an independent Indonesia. A future was envisioned in which the Chinese would have

their own place within the Indonesian nation. Chinese culture would complement Indonesian culture, so the cultural identity of the association would then no longer have to be seen as purely Chinese. Cooperation with the Perhimpunan Indonesia was re-established.

This change of course, however, did not endure. As the Chinese in Indonesia became victims of violence in the revolution years, the sense of their own cultural identity became stronger again, and holding on to that cultural identity became an insurmountable obstacle. No clear political choice could be made, and the association did not have a political direction. Consequently, the internal cohesion the CHH had sought to promote after 1945 waned. In 1946, in Amsterdam, Chung San Hui (CSH) was founded, a student association with a more leftist signature that sought to move members towards more progressive politics, including support for Indonesian nationalism. The CSH was bolder in profiling itself and collaborated with the Perhimpunan Indonesia and other organizations. At the same time, Chung San Hui identified with China, where the nationalists were increasingly losing ground against the communists.[15]

Until 1949, the CHH was unable to make a clear political choice. After the transfer of sovereignty, however, a choice of nationality had to be made: Indonesian or Dutch. Most CHH members – some 90 per cent – chose Indonesian citizenship, thereby choosing for their birth country and a future there. The choice to focus on Indonesia and a shared identity with that country meant an erosion of CHH's foundation – the Chinese identity – and was thus an implicit threat to its survival.

The years 1950 to 1954 are illustrative of this struggle. An attempt to bring together Chung Hwa Hui, Chung San Hui, Roepi – an apolitical Indonesian student association[16] – and several Indonesian students who were not affiliated with any organization into a planned united association, Konsentrasi Pelajar Indonesia Konpi (Concentration of Indonesian Students), foundered. Negotiations broke down over CSH's demand that the new association establish ties with China. Following this, the Indonesian student association Roepi disbanded, and the Persatuan Pelajar Indonesia PPI (Indonesian Student Association) was formed. A proposal to dissolve the CHH and encourage members to join the PPI failed as some members continued to prioritize Chinese cultural identity. A last resort was the proposal to transform the CHH into an apolitical association based on Chinese culture, which, at the same time, was loyal to Indonesia.

As a result of this ongoing battle of directions, a majority of CHH members left the organization. Another reason for the exodus may have been because of members completing their studies and returning to Indonesia. The association continued to exist with a membership that, as of 1952, included only a limited portion of the Chinese in the Netherlands, predominantly those who had chosen Dutch citizenship. In 1954, the board proposed turning the CHH into a general

association, with open membership for all 'who are interested in the work of the association', but it failed to revive the CHH. The organization slowly bled to death. By 1955, there were no more activities.[17]

After World War II: A New Flow of Students

After the end of the German occupation, many Chinese students and graduates wanted to return to Indonesia, but with the outbreak of fighting in Indonesia during the revolutionary period, enthusiasm for returning decreased. From Indonesia, in the opposite direction, the number of Chinese going to the Netherlands increased to about 500, most of them new students. Following the resumption of Dutch education in the Dutch occupied areas of Indonesia, many had taken the opportunity to obtain their secondary school diplomas through accelerated schooling. Many of these 'newcomers' had a different socioeconomic background compared to the pre-war students. Indeed, with a Malino scholarship, children of less wealthy Chinese could study in the Netherlands starting in the second half of 1946. The scholarships were a result of the July 1946 conference in the town of Malino in Sulawesi. Any resident of Indonesia who was willing and able to pursue an academic education in the Netherlands could qualify for the scholarship. The first Malino students arrived in the Netherlands in autumn 1946.[18] There were also students who had to support themselves and paid for their studies as working students.[19] For these new students, studying in the Netherlands meant a better chance for a good future.

Although not all students became members of the association, this new influx of Chinese from Indonesia resulted in CHH's membership increasing to nearly 400 in 1947 and around 460 in 1948–1949. Other Chinese student associations, some affiliated with the CHH, also emerged during this period and then went their separate ways. There was also an outflow as students joined Indonesian or Dutch student organizations. At the CHH, a decline in student numbers set in from 1950, and in 1952 the association had less than 300 members, with membership decreasing further to around 160 in 1954. Subsequently, there were formally still 90 members, but in fact the association had ceased to function.

In 1961, an attempt was made to revive the CHH as a socio-cultural association for *peranakans*. The basis was again Chinese culture and political aloofness. Briefly, membership rose to between 150 and 190 people, partly due to a new influx from Indonesia. A growing number of Dutch-educated academics had left Indonesia because of the unfavourable situation there and settled permanently in the Netherlands. The CHH also wanted to provide social cohesion to this group. In that year, the association's fiftieth anniversary was festively celebrated and well attended. However, the association did not prove viable. Meetings were poorly attended and

members' interest in board positions was low. Mutual social interaction increasingly took place on more informal occasions. In 1962, activities came to a definite end.[20] The CHH led a dormant existence until its dissolution in 2013.

After completing their studies in the 1950s, many Chinese graduates went back to Indonesia. For many, this was as a matter of course. They had come to the Netherlands to study, but their future thereafter was in Indonesia. For some, there was an idealistic component: they wanted to contribute to building the Republik Indonesia. They did so not only in various areas of Indonesian society, but also in politics.[21] There were also Chinese who remained in the Netherlands, especially when they had Dutch spouses. Not everyone who returned to Indonesia saw their expectations fulfilled there. Many developments unfavourable to the Chinese took place in Indonesia in the 1950s, and their living conditions deteriorated. As a result, many Chinese decided to leave Indonesia.

The Tail End of Dutch Education in Indonesia (1950–1961)

As late as the 1950s, Chinese students continued to come to the Netherlands. However, the numbers were much smaller and not comparable to those of the years 1947–1949. These students had received Dutch education in Indonesia, which was no longer a matter of course in the Republic. From 1950, the Indonesian government funded only state schools with Indonesian as the language of instruction and with an Indonesian-based curriculum. Starting in that same year, Dutch education in Indonesia was provided by the Stichting Nederlands Onderwijs in Indonesië SNO (Foundation for Dutch Education in Indonesia). This initiative was taken by the Dutch Entrepreneurs Union, an umbrella interest group of Dutch companies operating in Indonesia. The union urged the Dutch government to secure Dutch education in Indonesia. For the union, this was a necessary condition for the survival and continuity of Dutch business in Indonesia. The transfer of sovereignty had already led to the departure of many executives for whom the lack of Dutch education had been an important motive for returning to the Netherlands. If Dutch education (compatible with education in the Netherlands) remained an option for their children, they would stay and continue working for the Dutch businesses in Indonesia.

The SNO's initiative was well received by the Dutch government not just because preserving the Dutch school system would serve its economic interests. Cultural contacts would also preserve Dutch influence in the former colony. More importantly, the minister at the time hoped that securing education in Indonesia would stem the rising tide of newcomers to the Netherlands. The Dutch government was troubled by the large flow of repatriates, some of whom appealed for government aid after arrival, as they could not support themselves.

Swift action was taken. On 1 July 1950, six months after the transfer of sovereignty, the SNO took over all educational duties from the Dutch government. The A-schools (called the *concordant* schools) provided education equal to that in the Netherlands with Dutch as the language of instruction. This education was primarily intended for Dutch children. B-education (B stood for *blijvers* or 'those who stay') was a form of assimilated or adapted education that was not necessarily aligned with the curriculum in the Netherlands. The admission criterion was not Dutch nationality but the need for Dutch education. Any child who qualified for Dutch education in terms of language and environment could be admitted. The Dutch government bore part of the costs of this education, but the lion's share was borne by the business community. School fees were four times higher than in colonial times. There was a subsidy scheme for Dutch parents who could not afford the school fees and who were connected to the business world.[22] A start was made with the concordant schools, which provided only secondary education. Once those were functioning, B-education would follow at the elementary school level.

In the period between 1950 and 1961, there were 88 SNO schools, with the concordant schools being Protestant, Catholic, or non-denominational, with 15,000 pupils. Roughly 80 per cent of the school population was Dutch. Of the remaining 20 per cent, more than half were Chinese, one third were Indonesian or children whose parents had chosen Indonesian citizenship. Following the expropriation of Dutch companies in December 1957 and the departure of many Dutch nationals from Indonesia – resulting in a sharply declining number of pupils – the SNO schools were closed at the end of 1961. Their rationale to exist had ceased.[23]

Chinese children in Indonesia followed Dutch concordant education when there were still prospects for further study in the Netherlands. Studying in the Netherlands was still held in high regard. When Dutch education in Indonesia came to an end, studying in the Netherlands also became a thing of the past for the Chinese in Indonesia. The Dutch language was only used by older people who were former students at Dutch schools. English as a foreign language took the place of Dutch alongside *Bahasa Indonesia*. For higher education outside Indonesia, focus started shifting more towards English-speaking countries outside Europe, such as the United States, Canada, and Australia. Although the 1957 diplomatic rift between Indonesia and the Netherlands was repaired in 1963, the cultural rift was permanent. Dutch language and education did not return to Indonesian society.

Outflow and Inflow

The 1957–1963 conflict between the Netherlands and Indonesia also had major consequences for WNI Chinese students in the Netherlands. Due to the severing of

diplomatic relations with the Netherlands, Indonesian passport holders had to leave the Netherlands, and vice versa. It became very difficult to enter the Netherlands. Chinese students in the Netherlands were forced to abort their studies there and move to universities in neighbouring countries, such as Germany and Belgium. As much as possible, they would continue and complete their studies in those countries. Many Chinese students preferred this to returning to Indonesia. It was an unfavourable time to go back. Back in their home country, many Chinese were actually considering leaving Indonesia at this time. After the trade ban in 1959, many had chosen to leave for, or return to, China. Even after that, China remained a destination, albeit to a lesser extent.

As the living conditions deteriorated for the Chinese in Indonesia, an increasing number of them considered seeking a future elsewhere. Personal experiences of anti-Chinese violence, threats, fear of Islamization, and uncertainty about the future contributed to the decision to leave Indonesia. The departure was often not announced. Sometimes, it took place in the deepest secrecy for fear of being stopped from leaving the country. Even family members or staff were not informed. People would pretend as if they were just leaving for a few days. In fact, it was not a departure: it was an escape.

Between 1957 and 1963, the Netherlands was a natural destination for many Chinese because of their familiarity with the language and culture. The borders, however, were closed. At best they were porous, if people had contacts who could be helpful in obtaining them a visa. Until 1963, and even beyond that – when diplomatic relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands had been restored – it remained difficult to enter the Netherlands. Sometimes, they succeeded only after years of waiting in places such as Germany, Belgium, Suriname, or even Brazil.[24]

There were exceptions. In the 1960s, a group of Chinese dentists from Indonesia were easily admitted, because the Netherlands had a shortage of dentists for school dental care.[25] When new life in the first chosen country after Indonesia did not go as expected, attempts were still made to be admitted to the Netherlands. Chances for success were highest for those with a high level of education and familiarity with the Dutch language and culture. This meant that the first steps in integration had already been taken. There was generally no need for these Chinese to apply for government support.

The Chinese who did manage to reach the Netherlands had to build a whole new life. If that life was in one of the big cities, a social network was quickly established, consisting of family and old and new acquaintances. But even outside the urban centres, they generally managed to be accepted into the new living environment. For these migrants, it was important that their move to the Netherlands would mean a better future for their children. Access to all levels of education was a matter of course in the Netherlands.

8.4. A group of Chinese people from Surabaya and Bandung in Jakarta, just before their departure to China with the ship Mei Shang Mei, January 1961. Sitting, tenth from left is Tan Tjing Wie. Back row, seventh from left is Tan An Nie (Anny Tan).

As the Chinese migrants in the Netherlands grew older and approached retirement, the need arose among the first generation – those who had come or stayed in the Netherlands after World War II – to meet each other more regularly in a familiar environment. It led to the establishment of several socio-cultural associations in the 1980s.

Not many of those first-generation Chinese from Indonesia are left in 2024. Many of their stories can no longer be told. Then, there is the question of whether some people were even willing to speak about a life that was considered a closed chapter. Through the Chinese Indonesian Heritage Center's oral history project, efforts are being made to keep this personal history from being lost.

In order to better understand these personal histories, the bigger and overall historical picture must be sketched. Hopefully, this book can contribute towards that endeavour.

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Biographical Sketches

Kan Hok Hoei, better known as H.H. Kan (Batavia 1881–Jakarta 1951), was a major landowner and politician. Kan received a Dutch education and was Dutch-oriented. His wealth and knowledge of the Dutch language made him the best-known Chinese in Dutch circles. When the People's Council was installed in 1918 and the Chinese decided not to appoint a representative to sit on it, Kan did so in a personal capacity. He believed that Chinese interests were best safeguarded under the colonial policy. Another Chinese had a seat on the People's Council. People's Council members only had advisory rights. In 1928, he became the first president of CHH-Java (Chung Hwa Hui organization) and remained so until the Japanese occupation in 1942. He was interned by the Japanese. For his special services to the Netherlands, he was decorated as an Officer in the Order of Oranje-Nassau in 1921 and Knight in the Order of the Dutch Lion in 1930. Kan died in 1951.

Khouw Kim An (Batavia 1875–Jakarta 1945) was the fifth and last major of the Chinese of Batavia. He received his education at a Hokkien school, was raised traditionally Chinese and spoke Dutch in addition to Chinese and Malay. He came from a family of Chinese officers and was appointed lieutenant in 1905, captain in 1908, and major of the Chinese in 1910. His marriage to Phoa Keng Hek's daughter strengthened his position within Batavia's Chinese elite. He was one of the founders of the Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan in 1900. As a major, he was president of the Chinese Council of Batavia, a position he held until 1930. From 1921 to 1931, he was a member of the People's Council. He was involved in the establishment of the CHH-Java in 1928 and was a member of its Central Board until 1942. For his merits he was decorated by the Dutch government. He was interned by the Japanese in 1942 and died in captivity in 1945.

Ko Kwat Tiong (Parakan 1896–Semarang 1970) was a lawyer. The son of a lieutenant, Ko went to the ELS in Magelang and attended the HBS in Semarang. He first worked for a Dutch company and then for a newspaper in Yogyakarta, where he was active in Chinese associations. Between 1920 and 1926, he studied law in the Netherlands and was a member of the student association CHH there. He returned to Semarang and worked with Jauw Keng Hong, a Chinese lawyer. Afterwards, he started mingling with other Indonesian lawyers. Through them, he began to better understand the sentiments of educated Indonesians. He considered the Indies as the homeland for the *peranakans*. He was briefly a member of the CHH-Java in 1928 but left disillusioned and turned away from the organization. With Liem Koen Hian he founded the political party Persatoean Tionghoa Indonesia PTI (Indonesian Chinese

Association), followed by a PTI Semarang branch and other branches in Central Java. In 1934, he became chairman of the PTI Central Board, and from 1935 to 1939 he served on the People's Council for the PTI. In that year, he left the PTI after a conflict with Liem Koen Hian. Soon after Indonesia's independence, he changed his name to Mohammad Saleh. He lectured at several universities, notably at Diponegoro University in Semarang. He died in Semarang in 1970.

Kwa Tjoan Sioe (Salatiga 1893–1948) first attended a Malay private school, went to the ELS in Salatiga at age eleven, and then to the HBS in Semarang. In 1913, he left for the Netherlands and graduated as a doctor there in 1920. He was a member of the student association CHH in 1917–1918. After specializing in tropical diseases at the Colonial Institute in Amsterdam, he worked in Jakarta: first at the General Hospital and then at the Pasteur Institute. After two years of private medical practice, he founded the Jang Seng Ie Hospital in Jakarta in 1924, where he became its first director. Kwa was politically active. He was a socialist and pro-China. In 1926, the colonial administration suspected him of being a member of the Comintern (the International Communist). Kwa was strongly critical of Chiang Kai-shek's decision to break with the Chinese Communist Party in 1927. He was also critical of CHH-Java and its president H.H. Kan. In 1932, Kwa organized a meeting of publishers and directors of various *peranakan* newspapers to support Indonesian nationalism. In 1934, he visited China. During the Japanese occupation, he was interned. After World War II, he worked again for the Jang Seng Ie Hospital and was active for the Chinese Red Cross. He died in 1948.

Lie Kim Hok (Buitenzorg 1853–Batavia 1912) was the son of a house painter. Lie was a writer and publicist. He attended a Dutch Catholic school. His schoolmate was Phoa Keng Hek who would later become the president of the THHK-Batavia. Lie was a connoisseur of Chinese traditions and spoke fluent Sundanese. In late 1870, he founded his own school for poor *peranakan* children. His interest, however, was more in writing and publishing. Between 1884 and 1886, he edited several Chinese-Malay books, including the first Malay grammar book published by a *peranakan* Chinese (*Melajoe Betawi*, 1886). After moving to Batavia in 1886, he first worked at the *Pemberita Betawi* newspaper, and then became a freelance writer. Money problems forced him to work for a landowner as a rice inspector. He continued to write and translated several Dutch and English works, which were also published as serials in *peranakan* newspapers. By the time of his death, he had published about 25 books, including a biography of Confucius. In 1900, together with his schoolmate Phoa Keng Hek and other *peranakans*, he founded the THHK, of which he became an executive member. This made him responsible for all matters related to Chinese customs and traditions, and Confucianism. In 1909, he received the *Kung-Pai* (7th-degree medal) award from the Chinese emperor. He died in 1912.

John Lie Tjeng Tjoan (Manado 1911–Jakarta 1988) rose to become one of the top naval commanders during the Indonesian Revolution. He still enjoys hero status in Indonesia. During the Indonesian Revolution, he was tasked with escorting/smuggling small ships carrying rubber to Singapore, and buying weapons for the independence struggle in exchange. Starting from 1950, he was active in and for the Indonesian Navy. In 1960, he was appointed admiral and briefly served as a member of parliament. In 1967, he changed his name to Jahja Daniel Dharma. He is buried in the Kalibata Cemetery for National Heroes in Jakarta. He was posthumously honoured by both President Suharto and President Yudhoyono for his services to the country before and after Indonesia's independence.

Liem Koen Hian (Banjarmasin 1896–Medan 1952) was a journalist and received his basic Dutch education through self-study. He passed the entrance exam for the School of Law in Batavia. Like many *peranakan* journalists, he was first a Chinese nationalist. He was successively chief editor of several China-oriented newspapers: *Tjhoen Tjhioe* (1915–1916), *Soo Lim Po* (1917), *Sinar Sumatra* (1918–1921) and *Pewarta Surabaya* (1921–1925). In the mid-1920s, he abandoned his Chinese-nationalist ideas and declared himself an Indonesian nationalist. He developed his ideas of Indonesian nationalism for the *peranakan* Chinese in the following newspapers of which he also became chief editor: *Sin Tit Po* (Surabaya 1929–1932; 1939) and *Kong Hoa Po* (Jakarta 1937–1938). In September 1932, he founded the Partai Tionghoa Indonesia (PTI), a political party that sided with Indonesian nationalists seeking independence from the Netherlands. Liem was the party's first chairman (1932–1933) but left it in 1937 for the leftist Indonesian party Gerindo. At that time, Gerindo was the only Indonesian political party that accepted *peranakans* as members.

Liem was opposed to Japanese imperialism. In 1938, he wrote a book rejecting it. He was arrested when Japan occupied Java but was soon released. In 1945, he was appointed by the Japanese to the BPUPKI, the Investigative Committee to Prepare for Independence, established by the Japanese with Sukarno and Hatta at its head. Liem believed that the Chinese in Indonesia were more Indonesian than Chinese, and felt that they should be granted Indonesian citizenship in the future Republik Indonesia. After the republic was declared, Liem was appointed a member of the Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat KNIP (Central Indonesian National Committee). He was also a member of the Indonesian delegation for the Renville negotiations (1947–1948). Gradually, he became more interested in the communist movement in China. In 1950, he founded a multiracial party, the Persatuan Tenaga Indonesia (Indonesian Power Association, the new PTI), in which he again showed himself a supporter of Indonesian nationalism. In 1951, he was arrested by the Sukiman government on suspicion of communism. After his release, he rejected

Indonesian citizenship for which he had fought for in the past two decades. A year later, in 1952, he died in Medan as a businessman of Chinese nationality.

Loa Sek Hie (Batavia 1898–The Hague 1965), son of a landowner, enjoyed his schooling at the ELS and the HBS in Batavia. He attended trade school at the Prins Hendrikschool in Batavia, and then studied economics in Rotterdam. He was a member of the student association CHH. Back in Indonesia, he took part in the People's Council from 1927 to 1931, and participated in the Jakarta City Council before World War II. From 1928 to 1942, he was an executive member of the CHH-Java. In 1964, he left Indonesia. He died a year later in The Hague.

Oei Tjong Hauw (Semarang 1905–Jakarta 1951), son of Oei Tiong Ham, was a businessman and director of the Oei Tiong Ham concern. He attended the HBS in Semarang. After his father's death, he ran the family business (1931–1950), first with his older half-brother Oei Tjong Swan. He had great influence in the economic and political spheres. In 1927, he helped establish the CHH-Java and was part of its executive committee. During his stay in Shanghai (1937–1938), he was an executive member of the CHH Central Board. In 1934, he founded the Semarang daily newspaper *Mata Hari*. During the Japanese occupation, he managed to keep the company, including the sugar mills, operational. In this period, he was appointed as a member of the Chuo Sangiin (Central Advisory Council) and represented the Chinese of Central Java. He was also chairman of several Chinese associations in Central Java. He was appointed as a member of the BPUPKI in 1945. He died in Jakarta on 21 January 1951.

Oei Tiang Tjoei (Batavia 1893–1977) was director of the pro-Japanese daily *Hong Po* from 1939 to 1941. In 1941, he was arrested by the Dutch for his pro-Japanese activities. During the Japanese occupation, he was appointed a member of the Chuo Sangiin (Central Advisory Council) and represented the Chinese of West Java there. He was also chairman of the Japanese-established Chinese organization CHTH in Jakarta, and a member of BPUPKI at the end of the Japanese occupation. Oei felt that, although *peranakan* Chinese were a mixture of Indonesian and Chinese, this did not make them Indonesians. He suggested that the constitution of Republik Indonesia should give full scope to the nationality of the Chinese. In doing so, he did not explicitly say that the Chinese should be declared Chinese citizens, but it pointed to that. He saw no contradiction between being a member of the Chinese nation and the Indonesian community at the same time.

Ong Eng Die (Gorontalo 1910–Rijswijk 1999) was the son of a lieutenant. He graduated in 1940 in Amsterdam as an economist. Obtained his doctorate in 1943 with

the thesis 'The Chinese in the Dutch East Indies: Sociography of an Indonesian Population Group'. In the Netherlands, he was first refused membership by the CHH student organization because of his ties to the left-wing SPTI (Alliance of Chinese from Indonesia), founded in 1932. Nevertheless, he became a CHH member in 1938, and then president from 1942–1943 and in 1945. After returning to Indonesia in 1946, he first worked for a bank. He then became deputy finance minister in the Syarifuddin cabinet in 1947–1948. He was an advisor for Indonesia during the Renville negotiations. From 1953 to 1955, he was finance minister of the Republik Indonesia.

Phoa Keng Hek (Buitenzorg 1857–Batavia 1937) was the son of a Chinese captain. After a Hokkien school, he went to a Dutch Catholic school in Cianjur, where he met Lie Kim Hok. He then went to the ELS in Buitenzorg (now Bogor). He settled in Batavia, where his marriage brought him into the circles of the Chinese elite. Because he had a good command of Dutch, he was able to move easily in Dutch circles. He was vocal and became the spokesman for the Chinese community in Batavia. In 1900, together with Lie Kim Hok and other *peranakans*, he founded the THHK, of which he was president until 1923. He expressed criticism of the Dutch discriminatory policy toward the Chinese and published articles on the subject in the newspaper *Perniagaan* under the pseudonym Hoa Djin (a Chinese). Shortly before his death, he received a Dutch award.

Phoa Liong Gie (Bandung 1905–Switzerland 1983), received his schooling at the ELS in Garut and the HBS in Batavia. He attended the School of Law in Batavia and Leiden University, where he graduated as a lawyer in 1925. In 1926–1927, he was editor of the *CHHTC* (*Chung Hwa Hui Tsa Chih*), the magazine of Chung Hwa Hui in the Netherlands. In 1927, he returned to Bandung to work for a Dutch lawyer. A year later, he opened his own practice in Batavia. In 1930, he became director and owner of the daily *Siang Po*, which continued as *Perniagaan*. Until 1934, the paper was the mouthpiece for the CHH, of which Phoa became one of the leaders. After a conflict with H.H. Kan, he left the CHH. He became a member of the People's Council in 1939.

Siauw Giok Tjhan (Surabaya 1914–Leiden 1981) received his schooling at the HBS. In 1932, he joined the Chinese Indonesian Party PTI. From 1934 to 1942, he worked as a journalist for *Mata Hari*, a *peranakan* daily newspaper. His leftist orientation is said to date from this time. During the Japanese occupation, he went into hiding. During the Indonesian Revolution, he sided with the Indonesian nationalists. He became minister without portfolio for *peranakan* affairs in the Sjahrir III Cabinet in 1947. After being briefly imprisoned by the Indonesian authorities on suspicion of involvement in the 1948 PKI uprising, he became active in Indonesian politics

again. From 1950–1966, he was a member of the Indonesian parliament, representing the Chinese minority. Until 1954, he also worked as a journalist. In 1954, he and other *peranakans* founded Baperki. He chaired it until its dissolution in 1965. Siauw championed the idea of integration. During his presidency, he established Chinese schools. After the G30S in 1965 and the dissolution of Baperki, he spent thirteen years in jail. He died in the Netherlands on 20 November 1981.

Kristoforus Sindhunata (Ong Tjong Hay, Batavia 1933–Jakarta 2005) was the son of a physician. In his student years, he was active in the Indonesian Catholic Student Association PMKRI. After law school, he joined the Indonesian Navy. There he served first in the legal department (1961–1963), then in the KOTI (Supreme Operation Command, 1963–1967). He was president of the LPKB from its inception in 1963 until its dissolution in 1967. He was an advocate of assimilation. Between 1967 and 1969, he was acting secretary general of the Navy National Defence Command at the Department of Defence. He left the navy in 1970 and went into private business. During the Suharto period, he was appointed vice chairman of the Municipal Committee for the Development of National Unity in Jakarta (BPKB-DKI) in 1974. From December 1977, he was chairman of the newly established Bakom, an organization under the Interior Ministry with similarities to the LPKB. In addition to promoting assimilation, Bakom was tasked with bridging the communication gap between the central government and the Chinese Indonesian community. Sindhunata is buried in Kalibata, Indonesia's cemetery for national heroes.

Tan Eng Hoa (Semarang, 1907–1949) completed his HBS in Semarang and went to law school in Batavia, where he became president of the Batavia Student Corps. He had a successful law practice in Batavia, with mostly Chinese businessmen as clients. In 1934, he was granted equal status with Europeans. In the late 1930s, he became friends with Japanese journalist Taniguchi Goro, which was likely the reason for him entering Japanese circles. During the Japanese occupation, he held several positions, including head of the film censorship department under the Barisan Propaganda, the Japanese propaganda institution in occupied Indonesia. He was also secretary of the CHTH, where he worked under Oei Tiang Tjoei and Oei Tjong Hauw. He was head of the Jakarta Warung Kumiai, which arranged the distribution of staples such as rice, sugar, and salt. From December 1943, he was head of the Bicycle Kumiai. He was also legal adviser to the *Min Pao*, the successor to the Japanese-sponsored newspaper *Kung Yung Pao* for the Chinese people. Tan was elected as one of the four Chinese representatives of the BPUPKI. His many positions during the Japanese regime gave him the opportunity to help needy Chinese, Eurasians, and Dutch. After the Japanese occupation, he was accused of collaboration by the returning British and Dutch power, and temporarily

imprisoned. Through the mediation of his brothers, who were KNIL officers, the charges were dropped. He died in 1949.

Tan Ling Djie (Surabaya 1904–1970), studied first at the School of Law in Batavia, and in 1925 continued his law studies in Leiden. From 1925 to 1932, he was a member of the student organization CHH. In 1932, together with Teng Tjin Leng and Tjoa Sik Ien, he founded the leftist Chinese Indonesian Association SPTI, of which he later became secretary. After returning to Indonesia, he was chief editor of the *Sin Tit Po* from 1939 to 1942. In 1940, on behalf of the PTI, he was a member of the provincial council in East Java and a member of the 'illegal' PKI. In 1946, he headed the PSI, and in 1948 he was a member of the Politburo, and from 1949 to 1953 secretary general of the PKI. After a conflict with the Aidit group, he was expelled from the Politburo in 1953. After the 1965 coup, he was detained by the authorities. He died in captivity in 1970.

Tan Po Goan (Cianjur 1911–1985) was a lawyer and politician. After finishing the AMS in Bandung, he studied at the School of Law in Batavia. Between 1937 and 1939, he had a law practice, first in Makassar and then in Surabaya. After the internment years, he began a political career. During the revolutionary years, he was a member of the Central Indonesian National Committee KNIP (Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat) and held a ministerial post in the Sjahrir III Cabinet. He was a member of parliament from 1950 to 1956. He was first a member of the Chinese Indonesian Democratic Party PDTI, and from 1953 of the Indonesian Socialist Party PSI. He was to participate in the 1955 general election for Baperki, but withdrew. He left Indonesia in 1959 and returned after the fall of Sukarno.

Teng Tjin Leng (Manado 1906–unknown), first studied at the School of Law in Batavia, then in Leiden. He was a member of the student organization CHH from 1929 to 1932. In 1932, he founded the SPTI with Tan Ling Djie and Tjoa Sik Ien. In 1934, he returned to Indonesia, where he first worked as a lawyer in Palembang and Makassar. From 1946 to 1949, he was vice chairman of the Dutch-formed Progressive Group for the East Indonesian State (Negara Indonesia Timur, NIT). In 1949, he participated in the Round Table Conference in The Hague. From 1950, he participated in a range of political activities: member of parliament (1950–1956), member and adviser of the Indonesian delegation to the Conference on New Guinea (1951–1952), and adviser to the Indonesian–Dutch Conference in Geneva (1955–1956). He was briefly a member of Baperki. From 1958 to 1969, a career in science followed as a professor and administrator. Teng was an adviser to the Indonesian Catholic Student Association from 1960, and president of the Atma Jaya Catholic University in Jakarta from 1965. His Indonesian name was T. Nangoi.

Thio Thiam Tjong (Semarang 1896–the Netherlands 1969) was a wealthy businessman. He received a Dutch education in Semarang, and later studied at the Delft Technical University. He was a member of the student organization CHH from 1923 to 1928. He was very active in the Chinese community, first in the CHH-Java, of which he became president of the Semarang branch in 1930. He was known for his role in business and his activities in social and educational affairs. In Semarang, he became president of the Chinese–English school and the Chung Hoa Hsueh-Hsiao school in, respectively, 1928 and 1936. He was pro-China and anti-Japan. During the Japanese occupation he was interned. During those years, he studied Mandarin Chinese and came in contact with many Chinese leaders. This became the basis for his leadership after his release. Thio became the personal adviser to Lieutenant Governor-General H.J. van Mook. In 1948, Thio founded the Persatoean Tionghoa PT (Chinese Association) with the goal of preparing the Chinese for an independent Indonesia. After the transfer of sovereignty his influence diminished. After the 1965 coup, he was no longer politically active. He died in the Netherlands on 22 September 1969.

Tjoe Bou San (Batavia 1891–1925) was able to read and write Malay, English, and probably Chinese mainly through self-education. In 1909, he became chief editor of *Hoa Tok Po*, a Malay weekly in Jakarta that had close ties to Soe Po Sia, a Chinese revolutionary association and reading club. After a brief stint as *Sin Po* correspondent in China, Tjoe was chief editor of this newspaper from 1918, and director from 1919. Under his leadership, *Sin Po* became one of the most influential political forces in the Chinese community before World War II. Tjoe soon came into conflict with peranakan leaders who disagreed with him that the problem of the Chinese in the Dutch East Indies should be countered with Chinese nationalism. His main opponent was Gouw Peng Liang, chief editor of the newspaper *Perniagaan*, Sin Po's conservative rival, who advocated cooperation with Dutch authorities and Dutch education for the peranakan Chinese. Tjoe died of tuberculosis aged 34.

Tjoa Sik Ien (Surabaya 1906–1987) studied medicine in Leiden. He was a member of the student association CHH from 1928–1933. In 1932, he and two other *peranakan* students (Tan Ling Djie and Teng Tjin Leng) founded the SPTI, opposing the student union CHH. After returning to Indonesia, he became active in local politics. In 1939, he was PTI central board chairman and director of the Surabaya newspaper *Sin Tit Po*. During the Indonesian struggle for independence, Tjoa sided with the Indonesian Republic. In 1949, he was a delegate for the Republik Indonesia to the United Nations. In 1959, he was a member of the Dewan Perancang Nasional (National Planning Council) representing Indonesian nationals of foreign origin.

Yap Thiam Hien (Aceh 1913–Belgium 1998) taught at several high schools between 1934 and 1942 before studying law. He studied first at the School of Law in Batavia and then in Leiden, where he graduated in 1947. As a Christian, he was active in several Christian organizations. He was vice president of Baperki since the organization's establishment in 1954 until he left it in 1960 following a conflict with Siauw Giok Tjhan. As a lawyer, he was known as someone who did not hesitate to take on some very controversial cases and defend them brilliantly. He had very strong ideas about the law and the problems of the Chinese in Indonesia. A champion of human rights and a Christian, he served on several international organizations.

Yap Tjwan Bing (Surakarta 1910–United States 1988) was the son of a businessman. He studied pharmacy at the University of Amsterdam (1932–1939). Back in Indonesia, he began as a businessman before becoming active in politics. He supported Indonesia's struggle for independence. During the Japanese occupation, he was a member of the Chuo Sangiin (Central Advisory Council). In 1945, he was the only Chinese member of the PPKI in preparation for Indonesian independence. In Yogyakarta in 1945, he founded the Chinese organization CHTH, which supported the Indonesian independence struggle. Yap was politically active as a member of the PNI, the party founded by Sukarno, and as a member of parliament until 1955. During the May 1963 anti-Chinese riots in Bandung, his house and car were set on fire. Soon after that, he left for the United States and never returned to Indonesia.

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Timeline

VOC Period (1619–1800)

1619	May 30: J.P. Coen established VOC's trading and administrative centre in Batavia Chinese people were encouraged or forced to come to Batavia 11 October: appointment of merchant So Beng Kong as the first Chinese leader. This was the beginning of the institution of the Chinese officers
1620	24 June: establishment of the Bench of Aldermen with two Chinese advisers Leases and other levies were assigned to the Chinese chief and others Issuing of private estates
1666	Governor-General Maetsuycker did not appoint a new Chinese officer or new Chinese members/advisers to the Bench of Aldermen for twelve years after the death of Captain Siqua. The officer position during that period was held by his Balinese concubine
1740	Chinese massacre in Batavia, followed by the Chinese War (1741–1743)
1761	Chinese family and inheritance law was recorded as *Chinaas recht* (Chinese law) and served as a guideline for the Aldermen's Court
1798–1800	End of VOC period

Nineteenth Century (1800–1900)

1804	Ban on Chinese from direct trade; they concentrated on being trade intermediaries
1824	Founding of Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij NHM (Dutch Trading Company)
1828	Founding of Javasche Bank
1830	Beginning of the *Cultuurstelsel* (Cultivation System)
1854	Government Regulation article 109: division of the population into two main groups, Europeans and *Inlanders* (indigenous people), each with a subgroup. Each main group had its own legal system. The Chinese, as Foreign Orientals, were a subgroup of the main group 'Inlanders'.

1855	At the request of European traders, a trade regulation was issued, making Chinese and other Foreign Orientals subject to a part of European civil and commercial law. Purpose of the regulation: control over Chinese bankruptcies
1860	Free emigration out of China of Chinese people
1867	Additional trade regulation for the Chinese: mandatory accounting and annual balance sheet in their own language. Goal: more control
1870	Opening the Dutch East Indies to private initiatives
1880–1889	Highlight of leaseholds. Public opinion turned against the lease system Period of economic depression; the Chinese were considered a danger to indigenous people
1890	First request from China for admission of its consuls to the Indies
1892	Law on Dutch nationality: Indonesian people and those deemed equal to them were excluded from Dutch nationality
1893	Trial period of the *Opiumregie* (state control of opium)
1894	Individual equation (*individuele gelijkstelling*) became possible for non-Christian Chinese
1896	Replacement of *opiumpacht* (opium lease) by the Opiumregie; change of colonial policy for the Chinese, stricter implementation of the pass and district system
1897	The term 'Chinese problem' was coined for the first time
1899	The Japanese Act: Japanese people were made legally equal to Europeans
1901	Official start of the ethical policy, with the goal of promoting the welfare of the indigenous people

Twentieth Century (1900–1942)

1900	Establishment of *Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan*
1901	Establishment of the first Tiong Hoa Hwee Koan school: Chinese-language education Chinese movement: strive for abolishment of discriminatory provisions
1908	First Dutch-Chinese School HCS: Dutch-language education Establishment of the Indonesian association Boedi Oetomo, goal: advancement of the Javanese people
1909	Nationality Law of China

1910	Dutch Subject Law: Chinese became Dutch subjects without Dutch citizenship. The creation of the law was related to the upcoming consular treaty with China
1911	Netherlands–China consular treaty
1912	End of the Qing Dynasty. Beginning of the Republic of China with Chiang Kai-shek as leader Establishment of *Sarekat Islam*, goal: to promote emancipation and support indigenous trade
1914	Lower criminal justice (*politierechtspraak*) was replaced by the institution of the magistrate's court (*landrechter*) for all population groups Termination of pass system
1917	All European family and inheritance law (with some exceptions) was made applicable to the Chinese; establishment of civil registry for the Chinese (effective 1919)
1918	Individual equality with Europeans is expanded Establishment of advisory body Volksraad (People's Council) Daily Sin Po takes pro-China stance
1919	Termination of district system
1927	Establishment of Indonesian Nationalist Party PNI
1928	Establishment of pro-Dutch Chinese Union Chung Hwa Hui
1932	Establishment of pro-Indonesian Chinese political party Partai Tionghoa Indonesia PTI (Chinese Indonesian Party)

Japanese Occupation (1942–1945)

1941	7 December: attack on Pearl Harbor 27 December: first Japanese troops landed on Borneo
1942	8 March: capitulation of the Netherlands; beginning of the Japanese occupation 26 April: first internment of the Chinese 27 May: second internment of Chinese people in Cimahi Camp June–July–September: Chinese schools were reopened
1943	October 1943–January 1945: mass Killings in Borneo: Haga conspiracy – Pontianak affair – Chinese conspiracy
1945	Preparations for Indonesian independence: establishment of BPUPKI (April), which included four Chinese members, and establishment of PPKI (August), which included one Chinese member 15 August: Japanese capitulation

Indonesian Revolution (1945–1949)

1945	17 August: Sukarno declared Indonesia's independence
1945–1946	September 1945–April 1946 the British took over power in Java
1946	Violence against Chinese: Tangerang (May–June 1946) and Bagan Siapi-api (March–October 1946) 15 November: Linggajati agreement
1947	20 July–5 August: first Police Action August: establishment of self-protection corps Pao An Tui-Java
1948	17 January: Renville agreement
1948–1949	19 December 1948–5 January 1949: second Police Action
1949	23 August–2 November: Round Table Conference in The Hague
1946–1949	A number of Chinese were actively engaged in the Indonesian cause, filling positions in Indonesian cabinets and consultative bodies

Republik Indonesia (1949–1967)

1949	27 December: transfer of sovereignty; Sukarno became first president
1949–1951	27 December 1949–27 December 1951: period in which people could choose for Indonesian or Dutch nationality
1950–1956	Measures to promote *pribumi* Indonesians' access to the economy.
1950–1963	The New Guinea issue
1954	Establishment of the Chinese organization Baperki, advocate of integration
1957	14 February: declaration of martial law; military is given greater power December: expropriation of Dutch companies, followed by severing of Indonesia–Netherlands diplomatic ties
1958	Indonesian Nationality law
1959	16 November: Presidential Regulation PP 10/1959 on the trade ban for the Chinese
1960	Departure to China of some 100,000 Chinese because of PP 10/1959; China sent ships to transport the departing Chinese. Indonesia–China treaty abolishing dual nationality: choice for Indonesian or Chinese nationality between 20 January 1960 and 20 January 1962 Emergence of assimilation movement

1962–1963	Assimilation movement LPKB, which started as a small committee, became an agency, and then an official government organization
1963	1 May: lifting of martial law 10 May affair: anti-Chinese riots in several cities Transfer of New Guinea to Indonesia – restoration of Indonesia–Netherlands diplomatic relations
1965	30 September: G30S coup, followed by a period of witch hunt and mass killings against communists Dissolution Baperki
1966	Name change of Chinese got off the ground 11 March: Sukarno signed a document authorising Lieutenant General Suharto to restore order, effectively transferring power to the latter
1967	12 March: Suharto was appointed acting president by the Temporary People's Consultative Congress (MPRS) November: dissolution of the LPKB
1968	27 March: Suharto was appointed president by the MPRS

Netherlands

1882	First Chinese student arrived in the Netherlands
1911	Establishment of student union Chung Hwa Hui (CHH)
1932	Establishment of leftist party SPTI by three leftist students; dissolved in 1937
1940–1945	German occupation of the Netherlands
1945–1950	Increase in number of Chinese students
1950–1962	Decline of the CHH, decrease in Chinese Indonesian students in the Netherlands
1958–1961	End of Dutch education in Indonesia.
1962	End of CHH activities; the CHH was officially dissolved in 2013
1957–1963	New Guinea issue: due to the breakdown of diplomatic relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands, students/holders of Indonesian passports had to leave the Netherlands
1963	Transfer of New Guinea to Indonesia; restoration of diplomatic relations
1959–1967	Chinese (numbers unknown) left Indonesia for the Netherlands and elsewhere

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Notes

I From Migrant to Major (1619–1800)

1. In the fifteenth century, the famous eunuch-admiral Zheng He also visited Java on one of his discovery voyages to Southeast Asia. His aim was to persuade the local princes to pay tribute to the Chinese imperial court.
2. Nanyang means 'Southern Ocean.'
3. The current name Jakarta/Djakarta dates from 1942. Before that, it was called Sunda Kelapa (397–1527), Jayakarta or Jacatra (1527–1619), and Batavia (1619–1942/1945).
4. Other Chinese settlements on that northern coast included Cirebon, Pekalongan, Semarang, Jepara, Gresik, Tuban, and Surabaya.
5. Liem Twan Djie, 1947: 16; Vermeulen, 1938: 6–11; Blussé, 1975: 48.
6. The VOC later became a major buyer of sugar. In 1710, when the sugar industry reached its peak, the Ommelanden (surrounding countryside) of Batavia counted 130 sugar mills employing some 7,000 Chinese. In 1712, there were twelve arrack distilleries in the Batavia area. The number rose to 20 in 1793, but subsequently this industry was pushed back by competition from Ceylon. By 1827, only two distilleries remained.
7. Liem Twan Djie, 1947: 19–20, 26–27; Erkelens, 2013: 53; Vermeulen, 1938: 6–10.
8. Also known as Souw Beng Kong.
9. The head tax for the Chinese, a tax per 'head,' was collected among Chinese residents living in Batavia, Semarang, and on the island of Madura. In the city of Batavia and its suburbs, the monthly head tax for Chinese men was 25 cents. For workmen and coolies (hired workers) it was 1 guilder and 33.5 cents annually. Chinese men in the Ommelanden of Batavia paid 1 guilder for the whole year; Chen, 2011: 19.
10. Here, *pacht* (lease) refers to the sale of the right to collect taxes. In everyday language, *pacht* means rent for real estate used for agriculture or the lease of agricultural land.
11. Thomas, Th., 1893: 13–37.
12. The archives of the Chinese Council/Kong Koan of Batavia are housed in the library of Leiden University. The archives of the Chinese Council in Semarang and Surabaya have been lost.
13. Chen, 2011: 6–9.
14. The *boom* meant the crossbar used to close the waterway at the mouth of rivers. Customs were levied at that place before the *boom* was raised.
15. Spirits distilled from rice, also called 'Chinese arrack.'
16. For a description of the leases, see Thomas, 1893: leases.
17. From 1633, Chinese dice games were leased out. It brought in 20 per cent of the gamblers' profits, in addition to a share of the fines for violations. So Beng Kong also got the lease on the weighing house, determining the price of bread, and on making lead cassies or pitches, Hoetink, 1917: 19–21.

18. Cator, 1936: 19; Ong Eng Die, 1943: 54–63. The salt monopoly was abolished in 1813, and the market lease in 1851.
19. Amount that had to be paid to engage in certain activities.
20. Tjiook-Liem, *Het Chinees Bestuur,* May 1998.
21. Residents: those who live and work on the land.
22. Personal services that farmers and labourers had to perform for their landlords, such as road maintenance or forced cultivation.
23. Tjiook-Liem, 2009: 175, 187–189.
24. Tjiook-Liem, 2009: 72.
25. These were referred to as their 'own religious laws, traditional institutions and customs'.
26. Maetsuycker (governor-general from 1953–1768), who was not sympathetic towards the Chinese, had failed to fill the vacant seat due to the death of the then Chinese officer.
27. Fujian (Mandarin) is the coastal province also referred to as Fukien. The residents of Fujian are called Fujianese or Hokkien Chinese.
28. In the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, famines occurred 228, 158, and 101 times, respectively; Pan, L. 1998: 30–31.
29. Blussé, 1986: 36, 104.
30. Blussé, 1986: 149–152, 157.
31. Wang Gungwu, 2003: 3; Ng Chin-Keong, 1983: 219–220; Purcell, 1951: 33.
32. Blussé, 1986: 115–121.
33. The VOC became a major buyer of sugar. In 1710, when the sugar industry reached its peak. See note 6. The Ommelanden (surrounding area) of Batavia counted 130 sugar mills employing some 7,000 Chinese.
34. Blussé, 1986: 90, 121–127.
35. Blussé, 1986: 90, 115–128, 148–163.
36. Reid, 1996: 15.
37. Hoetink, 1922: 3, Liem Thian Yoe: 37.
38. Kwee Hui Kian, 2006: 14–15, 160–171, 219; Cribb, 2000: 92–93, 95.
39. The section on the Chinese massacre was drawn from J.Th. Vermeulen: 1938.
40. Blussé, 1986: 147–155.

II From Migrant to Major (1800–1900)

1. Loderichs, 2009.
2. Liem Twan Djie, 1947: 33; Tjiook-Liem, 2009: 297–382.
3. Some of these leases were abolished over the course of the nineteenth century for various reasons, mostly due to abuse. However, the complete abolition of all leases did not occur until the first two decades of the twentieth century. The opium lease was of great significance in the nineteenth century both to the government and to the Chinese.
4. Erkelens, 2013: 27, 156–158.
5. A region governed by a resident.
6. Tjiook-Liem, 2009: 31.

7. Rush, 1990: 43–45, 48–49.
8. Rush, 1990: 98–100.
9. Onghokham, 1980: 281–284.
10. Rush, 1990: 88. Van Hoevell estimated that, in 1850, 14,000 Chinese lived in the interior because of the *pasarpacht* (market lease), which amounted to four Chinese in each of the 3,500 leased markets. In the same year, there were 2,664 legal opium outlets in Java and Madura.
11. Onghokham, 1980: 282.
12. Rush, 1990: 88.
13. Claver, 2006: 170.
14. Claver, 2006: 172–175.
15. Ricklefs, 1993: 151–152.
16. W.P. Groeneveldt (1864–1915) was an interpreter for the Chinese language in Pontianak, Padang, Beijing, and Batavia between 1864 and 1877. He first became a member of the Council of the Indies in 1889 after a civil service career in Batavia, and then vice president of that advisory body from 1893 to 1895.
17. *NRC,* 13 March 1897.
18. Claver, 2006: 168–169, 176–177.
19. Chen, 2011: 72; Rush, 1990: 9–29, 124 note 45; Claver, 2006: 168–169; Lohanda, 2002: 210; Tjiook-Liem, 1998: 31.
20. Claver, 2006: 168–170; Chen, 2011: 72–73.
21. The Siauw Giap, 1984: 12.
22. Claver, 2006: 169–170, 178.
23. Liem Twan Djie, 1947: 35, 36.
24. Liem Twan Djie, 1947: 32, refers to the *Plakkaat* (Proclamations) of 7 February 1804, with the approval of the Council of the Indies, J.A. van der Ghijs, N.I. *Plakkaatboek*, vol. XIV, p. 7.
25. Liem Twan Djie, 1947: 32–33.
26. Ong Eng Die, 1943: 63–68.
27. A subsistence economy is an economy in which most goods are consumed by the producers themselves. In such an economy most people work in agriculture.
28. Liem Twan Djie, 1947: 1–11.
29. There were ten Dutch and British trading houses and three Armenian ones.
30. Claver, 2006: 94–105.
31. In 1848, the legislation for the Dutch East Indies was codified and a separate legal system was introduced. For this purpose art. 109 of the Government Regulations of 1854 divided the population of the Dutch East Indies into two groups. Europeans and those equal (*gelijkgesteld*) to them were subject to European law. Natives and those equal to them, including Chinese and other Foreign Orientals, fell under the law and legal system intended for them.
32. In Staatsblad (Statute Book) 1855 no. 79, Chinese and other Foreign Orientals were brought under part of the European civil and commercial law.
33. Kuiper, 2016, I: 621–624. The first steps to train Chinese language interpreters were taken in 1854.

34. Claver, 2006: 192–195; Erkelens, 2013: 153–154; Tjiook-Liem, 2009: 148–149.
35. The balance surplus was the profit resulting from the *Cultuurstelsel* (Cultivation System) in the Dutch East Indies and benefited the Dutch treasury. Until 1877, it was a substantial part of state revenues.
36. Tjiook-Liem, 2009: 232.
37. Claver, 2006: 91–92, 109.
38. Claver, 2006: 172–173.
39. Erkelens, 2013: 149–153.
40. *Masalah Cina* is the Indonesian word for the Chinese problem.
41. *Indische Gids I*: 1897: 622–624; *NRC,* 13 March 1897.
42. Tjiook-Liem, 2009: 334.
43. Van Sandick, 1908: 213.
44. Tjiook-Liem, 2009: 336–337.
45. Claver, 2006: 67.

III Education, Equality, and Political Awareness (1900–1942)

1. Tjiook-Liem, 2009: 457.
2. Dutch nationality gave access to all political positions in the Dutch East Indies. Tjiook-Liem, 2009: 434–435; Ned. St. 1892 no. 269.
3. Article 109 RR is the article in the Government Regulations (considered as the Constitution) of the Dutch East Indies in which the population in the East Indies colonies was divided into two groups: the group of Europeans and those equal to them, and the group of indigenous people and those equal to them. Each group had its own legal system.
4. Tjiook-Liem, 2005.
5. Ned. St. 1899 no. 121, Ind. St. 1899 no. 202.
6. Tjiook-Liem, 2005.
7. Kwee Tek Hoay, 1969; Williams, 1961.
8. Fromberg, 1911.
9. Kwee Tek Hoay, 1969: 1–12.
10. The THHK was founded by twenty Chinese people. The first board members were Phoa Keng Hek (president), Khoe A Fan and Ang Sioe Tjiang (vice presidents), Tan Kim San (secretary), Khouw Lam Tjiang (treasurer), and Lie Kim Hok (commissioner); Setiono, 2003: 240.
11. In Singapore, Dr Liem Boen Keng was engaged in Confucianism, also as a religion. He had translated two of Confucius's books and founded the religious organization Kong Kauw Hwee.
12. Govaars-Tjia, 1999: 64–88.
13. Govaars-Tjia, 1999: 64–65; Suryadinata, 1999: 19–21.
14. Govaars-Tjia, 1999: 69–71.
15. Govaars-Tjia, 1999: 72–73.
16. Govaars-Tjia, 1999: 64, 69–74.

17. Article 128 RR: The Governor-General shall establish schools for the benefit of the indigenous population.
18. Govaars-Tjia, 1999: 85.
19. Govaars-Tjia, 1999: 81.
20. Govaars-Tjia, 1999: 64, 82–85.
21. Govaars-Tjia, 1999: 92–94, 100.
22. Tjiook-Liem, 2009: 340.
23. Tjiook-Liem, 2009: 346–349.
24. Tjiook-Liem, 2009: 346–349.
25. Special courts for people who stand trial because of their official position or standing. They are tried by a judge other than the one who has jurisdiction under the ordinary rules.
26. Tjiook-Liem, 2009: 406–407.
27. Tjiook-Liem, 2009: 370.
28. Idenburg was Minister for the Colonies from 1902 to 1905, and again from 1908 to 1909. He then served as governor-general of the Dutch East Indies from 1909 to 1916.
29. Tjiook-Liem, 2009: 417–419.
30. The consular treaty between the Netherlands and China was made official on 8 May 1911. Prior to that, an agreement had to be reached that would stipulate that the Chinese were free to choose under which jurisdiction (Chinese or Dutch East Indies) they would fall when they were outside of Dutch territory.
31. Tjiook-Liem, 2015: 67; 2009: 376–378.
32. Tjiook-Liem, 2009: 300–374, 384–419; Tjiook-Liem, 2011: 117–138.
33. For authority to grant equation, see the last passage of Government Regulation Article 109 RR.
34. According to the 1930 census, there were 1,233,214 Chinese in the Dutch East Indies, of which 582,431 were in Java and Madura. In 1850, there were 123,934 Chinese in Java and Madura. Tjiook-Liem, 2009: 19.
35. Tjiook-Liem, 2009: 244–257.
36. The Chinese issue or Chinese problem here has to do with how to meet Chinese demands for legal equality.
37. For those obtaining equation, see: naturalizations.decalonne.com
38. Tjiook-Liem, 2009: 283–293.
39. Erkelens, 2013: 161–162.
40. Erkelens, 2013: 163–176, 237, 323, 416.
41. Govaars-Tjia, 1999: 27.
42. Termorshuizen, 2011: 85–86.
43. Tjiook-Liem, 2009: 520–521.
44. Suryadinata, 1999: 10–16.
45. Liem Hoo Soei in *Een Foto Vertelt* (A Photo Tells a Story), 2019: 38–43.
46. Suryadinata, 1999: 45–47.
47. See biographical sketches for Liem Hoen Hian and Ko Kwat Tiong.
48. Lecture Liem Koen Hian prior to the formation of the PTI in Surabaya in August 1932, in *Sin Tit Po*, 25–26 August 1932.

49. The Partai Komunis Indonesia PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) was founded in 1914 on the initiative of Henk Sneevliet under the name Indische Sociaal-Democratische Vereeniging ISDV (Indies Social Democratic Association). The party was banned from 1927 to 1945. Later, communism was one of the pillars of Sukarno's state ideology Nasakom, an acronym that stands for nationalism, religion(*agama*), and communism.
50. Suryadinata, 1971/11: 83–94.
51. The Visman Commission had seven members. Besides Dr F.H. Visman, a member of the Council of the Dutch East Indies, the committee consisted of two more Dutchmen: Mr K.L.J. Enthoven, director of the judiciary/Justice, and Prof. Dr. W.F. Wertheim, professor at the Batavia School of Law. Its three Indonesian members were Raden Adipati Ario Soejono, Visman's colleague at the Council of the Dutch East Indies, Raden Soepomo, lecturer at the Batavia Administrative Academy, and T.S.G. Moelia, member of the People's Council for the Christian Political Party (counterpart of the Dutch ARP). Finally, the Indo-Chinese group was represented by Ong Swan Yoe, who, as a delegate, was a member of East Java's provincial government. Ong had studied in Leiden and was a member of the CHH in 1933–1934. *Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog* (Kingdom of the Netherlands in World War II) volume 11a: 580; Van Galen, 1989: 245.
52. Tjiook-Liem, 2009: 613.

IV Educational Facilities (1900–1942)

1. Education for the indigenous population was split into first-class schools for the children of native leaders and dignitaries. Second-class schools were for the commoners. The first-class schools had a five-year curriculum, while it was three years for the second-class schools. This largely corresponded to the European schools. Govaars-Tjia, 1999: 50.
2. Govaars-Tjia, 1999: 101–105.
3. Govaars-Tjia, 1999: 109.
4. First-class schools only admitted paying students. Govaars-Tjia, 1999: 103.
5. Govaars-Tjia, 1999: 103–104.
6. Govaars-Tjia, 1999: 110, 115–120.
7. Govaars-Tjia, 1999: 99–103, 108.
8. Govaars-Tjia, 1999: 155.
9. Govaars-Tjia, 1999: 140–142.
10. The Chinese school in Malang had too few facilities.
11. First-class schools *hoofdenscholen* were for children of distinguished Indonesians. Second-class schools were modest and inexpensive schools. Govaars-Tjia, 1999: 160, 170.
12. Govaars-Tjia: 159–171, 180.
13. Govaars-Tjia, 1999: 173–188.
14. Tjiook-Liem, 2015: 58.

15. Suryadinata, 1972, 56–63; Amrith, 2011: 19, 38.
16. Suryadinata, 1978: 146.
17. Lyceum refers to a school with both gymnasium and HBS.
18. Schijf, 1988: 461.
19. Bertsch-Samuels Brusse, 1977: 28.
20. De Langen, 1988: 1582–1583; Schijf, 1988: 4xx; *Wikipedia*, June 2021.
21. One of the first Chinese students was Desiree Tan, who graduated in 1931 and then worked as a lawyer; Sioe Yao Kan, *Een Foto Vertelt* (A Photo Tells a Story), 2019: 52–55.
22. Groeneboer, 1993: 303, 344; Swanny Thee in *Een Foto Vertelt* (A Photo Tells a Story), 2019: 78–79.
23. Conversation between Tjiook-Liem and Go Kian Hiap, 2020.

V 'Asia for the Asians' (1942–1945)

1. In January 1942, the American–British–Dutch–Australian Command ABDACOM was formed to coordinate Allied forces in Southeast Asia. Later, China joined the Allies.
2. Japan had emerged victorious from the First Sino-Japanese War (25 July 1894–17 April 1895). With this, Japan, as an Asian power, had established itself among Western powers. From this point, Japan was taken into consideration in world politics. China realized that it was weak and lagging behind other powers. Chinese reform movements led to the revolution that would overthrow the Qing dynasty in 1912.
3. Kwartanada, 2002: 66–67, 268–269.
4. Go Tiong Han in *Een Foto Vertelt* (A Photo Tells a Story), 2019: 70–73.
5. Yo Ban Swie alias Erlangga Yogasoerja was employed as a spy by the Kenpeitai in Bandung; Sophiamuseum The Hague, 'Resistance', July 2019 exhibition; National Archives 2.10.62-3431.
6. Ken'ichi Goto, Encyclopaedia Pacific War: 37. Twang, 1998: 74–76.
7. Internment for many Chinese people started at the Bukit Duri prison in Batavia. They would then be transferred to Serang, and finally to the Cimahi internment camp where they stayed until the end of the occupation.
8. For the list of Chinese internees, see National Archives 2.20.17-192. Encyclopaedia P.W.: 37. Twang, 1998: 75–76.
9. See Biographical Sketches.
10. Setiono mentions Kwee Kek Beng (*Sin Po*) and Tan Ling Djie (*Sin Tit Po*) who fled to Bandung and Karawang, as well as Siauw Giok Tjhan, editorial board member of *Mata Hari* who lived in Surabaya.
11. NIOD 400-4661.
12. Immerzeel, 1993: 40–49; Setiono, 2003: 526–527.
13. Immerzeel, 1993: 54, 82, 187.
14. Immerzeel, 1993: 31–33, 42, 47–48.
15. Brugmans, 1960: 431, 448.

16. Pouw Kioe An, 1947.
17. Setiono, 2003: 527; *Indies Tijdschrift*, 2021: 16–17.
18. Ooi Keat Gin, 2011: 39.
19. Somers-Heidhues, 2003: 19–21, 201–210.
20. Hui Yew Foong, 2011: 41–57; Ooi Keat Gin, 2011: 102–117; Somers-Heidhues, 2003: 201–210.
21. Hui Yew Foong, 2011: 41, 51–62.
22. Brugmans, 1960: 200.
23. *Hong Po* was the pro-Japanese newspaper published in Batavia between 1939 and 1942. It was secretly funded by the Japanese to counterbalance the anti-Japanese propaganda of other Chinese newspapers, particularly *Sin Po*.
24. Ken'ichi Goto, Encyclopaedia P.W.: 35, 535; Brugmans, 1960: 199–200.
25. Keibotai, Encyclopaedia P.W.: 613, 401: The Overseas Chinese Special Vigilance Corps was a controversial unit of young Chinese men, established as a police support organization to supposedly provide peace, order, and security. At the same time, it was meant to counterbalance the Keibodan, which consisted of Indonesians. This Corps' establishment was viewed with distrust by Japanese officers as well as Indonesians and Chinese.
26. Kwartanada, 2002: 271.
27. Kwartanada, Encyclopaedia P.W.: 330. This policy was established on 12 January 1942, in the 'Fundamental Policy Concerning Education in the Southern Sphere'.
28. Kurasawa, 1988 II, 509.
29. Go Kian Hiap and Thio Sik Tjiang, CIHC Oral History Archives.
30. Twang, 1998: 76, note 42.
31. Kwartanada, Encyclopaedia P.W.*:* 327–334, 397–402.
32. The Pik Sin, Thio Sik Tjiang, Tan Swie Siang, Kwee Lie Siok, CIHC Oral History Archives.
33. Kwartanada, Encyclopaedia P.W.: 327–334.
34. Kurasawa II, 1988; 333–334. Before the Japanese occupation, mainly American films were shown (65 per cent), followed by Chinese ones (12 per cent), and movies from other countries. Films from 'enemy countries' were immediately banned; existing film companies were seized. During the Japanese occupation, mainly Japanese or Indonesian films were shown. Japanese films were intended to convey moral values and political indoctrination.
35. Kwartanada, Encyclopaedia P.W.*:* 397–402.
36. In Indonesia, the scorched earth tactic is known as *bumi hangus*. It is a military tactic used in war situations where everything of military or economic use in an area – bridges, rail and telegraph lines, industrial and agricultural zones – is destroyed or taken away before the area is given up to the enemy.
37. The Oei Tiong Ham group also includes the Kian Gwan Trading Company.
38. Go Kian Hiap (Boyolali) & Tan Hoo Lam (Lamongan) in CIHC Oral History Archives.
39. Twang, 1998: 73.
40. NIOD: 400–375. Notarial statement dated 10 November 1947, from two Chinese people about Japanese violence on 11 March 1942, against the Chinese fleeing to Tuban, in which more than one hundred Chinese were killed by the Japanese.

41. Twang, 1998: 70–74.
42. The initial instructions for the policy of 'enemy property control' came from the Army Headquarters in Tokyo (30 December 1941). These instructions involved taking control of strategic real estate and movable property, factories, railroads, ships, and communications facilities. More instructions followed in March 1942.
43. *Zaibatsu* were large (family) business conglomerates that dominated Japan's pre-war and wartime economy. They played a central and often dubious role in the economic exploitation of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. During the Japanese occupation, they were said to have cooperated with the Japanese military. They were assigned important industrial and development projects related to Japan's war industry. The four main *Zaibatsu* players were Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Yasuda. Encyclopaedia P.W.: 624.
44. Keppy in Encyclopaedia P.W.: 219–230.
45. Twang, 1998: 70–117.
46. Twang, 1998: 88–89.
47. Twang, 1998: 90–91.
48. Brugmans, 1960: 169–171.
49. Twang, 1998: 83.
50. Twang, 1998: 78–86; Brugmans, 1960: 493.
51. Twang, 1998: 100–104.
52. Go Kian Hiap in CIHC Oral History Archives.
53. 3A movement: a propaganda movement in Java founded immediately after the Dutch capitulation and disbanded at the end of 1942. The three As stood for Asia in 'Japan as the leader of Asia, Japan as the light of Asia, and Japan as the protector of Asia'.
54. Shigeru Sato, Encyclopaedia P.W.: 132–133. Pembela Tanah Air PETA (Defenders of the Fatherland) was an army composed of Indonesians established by the Japanese army. It had a political significance from the outset. After Japan's surrender, many PETA officers joined the Indonesian armed forces.
55. Heiho: local auxiliary soldiers recruited by the Japanese to increase their combat strength. 80 per cent were Indonesians. Some of the recruits were former soldiers from the KNIL and other combat groups.
56. For these figures, Twang relies on publications from Japanese news magazine *Kung Yung Pao*.
57. Brugmans, 1960: 24.
58. See S. de Graaf, 2009: 33.
59. Twang, 1998: 87.
60. Thio Sik Tjiang in CIHC Oral History Archives.
61. Twang, 1998: 76–78.
62. Keppy, Encyclopaedia P.W.: 279–281; Van Horn, Encyclopaedia P.W.: 220; Twang, 1998: 70–104.
63. Poeze-Schulte Nordholt, 2022: 68–70.
64. Between 1945 and 1949, Vietnam, the Philippines, India, Pakistan, Burma, and Sri Lanka became independent countries.
65. Ken'ichi Goto, Encyclopaedia P.W.: 44–46; Taufik Abdullah, Encyclopaedia P.W.: 121–126, 341; Encyclopaedia P.W.: 479–480.

VI Between Two Fires (1945–1949)

1. Queen Wilhelmina declared on Radio Oranje in December 1942 that it was her intention 'to create an opportunity after liberation for a joint consultation regarding an appropriate format of the kingdom and its parts based on changed circumstances'.
2. The British insisted on an agreement in some form before withdrawing all their forces from Java and Sumatra in December 1946. Ricklefs, 1993: 224.
3. Wikipedia, Ministry of Defence, 16 February 2022.
4. Ricklefs, 1993: 222–233.
5. Limpach, 2016: 161–162; Twang, 1998: 155.
6. At the Pangkalpinang Conference (October 1946), Dutch authorities including Lieutenant Governor-General Van Mook and former Prime Minister Schermerhorn spoke with delegates from Indonesian minority groups (Chinese, Arabs, and Indo-Europeans) about their social position in the context of Indonesian independence. The Chinese delegates included Loa Sek Hie from Java, Teng Tjin Leng from Makassar (NIOD 400: 2111–2112), and Kwa Tjoan Sioe.
7. During the Japanese occupation, the Chinese flag had provided some protection, but by 1946 this protection had disappeared, and the flag was often taken down.
8. Limpach, 2016: 223.
9. Limpach, 2016: 223.
10. Setiono, 2003: 577; Twang, 1998: 185–186.
11. Netherlands Indies Civil Administration.
12. Twang, 1998: 186, note 57.
13. Limpach, 2016: 215, 222.
14. Memorandum, 1947: 4.
15. Van de Veer, 2013: the PAT in Medan.
16. Setiono, 2003: 621–626; Limpach, 2016: 222.
17. Somers-Heidhues, 1988: 127.
18. See Biographical sketches.
19. Limpach, 2016: 162–163; Somers, 2003: 14.
20. See Biographical sketches.
21. The exact founding date of the CHTH is unclear. Twang mentioned January 1946 (Twang, 1998: 181), while, according to Somers, it was 15 October 1945 (Somers, 1988: 123).
22. The Chung Hua Tsung Hui in Tegal was founded on 8 January 1946, according to *Buku Peringatan Chung Hua Tsung Hui Tegal* 1946–1951 (Tegal Chung Hua Tsung Hui Commemoration Book 1946–1951). The Jakarta Chung Hua Tsing Nien Hui (Chinese Youth Association) was founded on 9 June 1946 (*Buku peringatan ulang taun ke lima*, Suryadinata, 1981).
23. Somers-Heidhues, 1988: 123; 2003: 10–11; 2012: 395–396.
24. R. Soedjono, regent of Pekalongan, 31 January 1951, Mayor Suputro of Tegal, 8 January 1951, in *Buku Peringatan Chung Hua Tsung Hui Tegal 1946–1951*: 5a.
25. Somers-Heidhues, 1988: 124–125.

26. Suryadinata, 1978: 19, 60–63; Somers, 1988: 128–129.
27. Jeroen van der Kris in *NRC*, 10 June 2022. On the term *Bersiap*: Esther Captain & Onno Sinke, The Sound of Violence.
28. Raben, 2008.
29. On 1 February 1946, General S.H. Spoor assumed command from Major General J.H. van Oyen. Van Oyen was appointed acting KNIL army commander in Australia on 28 August 1945. He arrived in Batavia on 1 October 1945. Bussemaker, 2005: 59, 69–70, 317.
30. The term *pemuda*s (young men) refers to revolutionary combat groups composed of young Indonesians.
31. Somers-Heidhues, 2012: 384–386; 2003: 8; Raben: 2008; Limpach, 2016: 143–148; Poeze-Schulte Nordholt, 2022: 116.
32. HBS Semarang Reunion Foundation, October 1995. Han Bing Siong, 2003: 159–2/3, 293.
33. Limpach, 2016: 157–158.
34. During the street battles in Surabaya in November 1945, the commander of the British troops, General Mallaby, was shot dead by Indonesian combatants.
35. Sie Gwan San, CIHC Oral History Archives; see also Bussemaker, 2005: 252.
36. Twang, 1998: 156–157.
37. National Archives 2.10.49-2408.
38. The violence allegedly took place on 17 March 1946.
39. Limpach, 2016: 147–148.
40. Limpach, 2016: 158, 163–164, 215–225; Somers-Heidhues, 2003: 7, 13; 2012: 394.
41. Limpach, 2016: 219–220, 163–164.
42. Twang, 1998: 160–161.
43. Poeze-Schulte Nordholt, 2022: 126.
44. Raben, 2006: 6–7; Somers-Heidhues, 2003: 381; 2012: 381, 387; 2017: 95; Setiono, 2003: 580–587; Memorandum, 1947: 5.
45. National Archives 2.10.49-2408.
46. Blatter, 2005.
47. Somers-Heidhues, 2012: 388.
48. Limpach, 2016: 159.
49. Memorandum, 1947: 11.
50. National Archives 2.10.49-2409.
51. Memorandum, 1947.
52. Limpach, 2016: 159–160.
53. Limpach, 2016: 159, Twang, 1998: 160.
54. Poeze-Schulte Nordholt, 2022: 231–232.
55. Twang, 1998: 153.
56. Limpach, 2017: 161; Siauw Giok Tjhan, 1981: 142–143.
57. Somers-Heidhues, 2012: 391–393; 2017: 97.
58. Van Doorn & Hendrix, 1970: 198.
59. Limpach, 2016: 179. Somers-Heidhues, 2012: 396 and Frederick et al. use the word 'genocide' for this structural violence.

60. Raben, 2011/7, Limpach, 2016: 161, 171; Twang, 1998: 153–160; Somers-Heidhues, 2012: 396.
61. Twang, 1998: 153–155.
62. Memorandum, 1947: 30–31; Twang, 1998: 153–156.
63. Twang, 1998: 183–184, note 22, 28.
64. This refers to the 'lordly' rights that were attached to private estates; see also Chapter I.
65. Twang, 1998: 142, 155.
66. Twang, 1998: 153, note 15.
67. Twang, 1998: 152.
68. Twang, 1998: 151.
69. The Chinese Red Cross was raising funds for the Republik Indonesia authorities in several places, see Twang, 1998: 151, note 5.
70. Twang, 1998: 151, note 2, 181–182, note 5.
71. Twang, 1998: 150–-155, CHTH, *Buku Peringatan Tegal*, 1951.
72. Twang, 1998: 150, 156–158.
73. Poeze-Schulte Nordholt, 2022: 214–215.
74. Twang, 1988: 150.
75. Twang, 1998: 178–180.
76. Japanese money remained in circulation even after Japan's capitulation. It would quickly lose value because of high inflation. N. van Horn, Encyclopaedia P.W.: 232.
77. In 1946, the so-called NICA money replaced the Japanese war money. NICA stands for Netherlands Indies Civil Administration. The issuance of the new currency was an important event and was received with great interest by the Indonesian population. It is currently not possible to make a value comparison between the different currencies during this period. We encounter Japanese Army Notes (JAN), *Oeang Republik Indonesia* (ORI), NICA guilders, and even pre-war Javasche Bank bills.
78. NICA money was already being printed in the USA during the Japanese occupation in the form of guilder and rupiah bills. It entered circulation as soon as Dutch authority was established in certain areas after the Japanese occupation; N. van Horn, Encyclopaedia P.W.: 231–232.
79. Verhoeven, 2020; Twang, 1998: 152, 160.
80. Twang, 1998: 221–222.
81. Poeze-Schulte Nordholt, 2022: 214–216; see also at Biographical Sketches.
82. Poeze-Schulte Nordholt, 2022: 351–354.
83. There were eight successive Indonesian cabinets during the revolutionary period.
84. See Biographical Sketches.
85. See Biographical Sketches.

VII Equal is Unequal (1949–1967)

1. A phrase often used in the construction world: connecting two equal parts together does not make the result look better. A visible difference in the linkage is better.
2. Ricklefs, 1993: 242, 248.

3. *Naasten*: 1) a country using its right to become the owner of assets of foreign corporations in exchange for some compensation; 2) to take unlawful possession, to appropriate (*Van Dale*).
4. Diplomatic relations were de facto severed immediately in the first week of December 1957; however, lines of contact remained open. Officially, Sukarno broke off diplomatic relations on 17 August 1960. The reason was the arrival of the aircraft carrier Hr.Ms. Karel Doorman in Indonesian waters. Hans Meijer, 1995: 583, 586, 607.
5. The terms 'nationality' and 'citizenship' are used interchangeably.
6. Official figures were not known. Processing and registering rejections of Indonesian citizenships through the courts went very slowly. On 1 January 1958, the justice minister decided to end the registration process. Willmott, 1961: 68–69.
7. '*Pribumi*' has the following meanings: indigenous, native population, national, see A. Teeuw, *Indonesian-Dutch* Dictionary, 1996.
8. Permesta: *Piagam Perjuangan Semesta Alam* (Universal Struggle Charter), solemn pledge for the Indonesian revolution, Ricklefs, 1993: 255.
9. In addition to February 1957, 14 March of that year has also been cited as the date martial law was declared.
10. Martial law: state of emergency declared by the government, in which the military is given more power, and governing rests with the military.
11. Ricklefs, 1993: 253–256; De Haas-Engel, 1991: 5–7; Coppel, 1983: 31.
12. Lindblad, 2002: 141–144.
13. Lindblad, 2008: 73.
14. Lindblad, 2008: 103–111, 113–115; 2002: 142.
15. Lindblad, 2008: 2–5.
16. Lindblad, 2008: 129–136.
17. Foreign exchange is money or foreign currency for international payments. It can be used to pay for imported goods.
18. The Big Five were the five largest trading houses: Borsumij; Internatio; Jacobson van den Berg; Lindeteves; and GeoWehry. Lindblad, 2008: 197.
19. The seeds of the Ali-Baba relationships – a collaboration between Indonesian officials and Chinese businessmen – were said to have been sown during the Japanese occupation. Twang, 1998: 85.
20. Willmott, 1961: 34–42; Coppel, 1983: 36.
21. Lindblad, 2008: 129–136.
22. Assaat, Datuk Mudo (Sumatra 18 September 1904–16 June 1976) was president of Indonesia between December 1949 and August 1950. He was vehemently opposed to the presence of the Chinese in Indonesia. Wikipedia, 18 December 2021.
23. Coppel, 1983: 37.
24. Lindblad, 2008: 143–145.
25. Coppel, 1983: 177–186; Lindblad, 2008: 242, 248.
26. Meijer, 1994: 49–50, 575–594, 602.
27. Coppel, 1983: 31–36.
28. Coppel, 1983: 33–34.
29. Translation of the word 'aliens'.

30. The softening possibly had to do with taking international reactions and pressures into account.
31. Lindsey-Pausacker, 2005: 49–52. Lindsey-Pausacker refers to article 14, paragraph 26, of the Nationality Law 1958 no. 2. The proof of citizenship was the *Surat Bukti Kewarganegaraan Republik Indonesia* SBKRI (Proof of Citizenship Letter of the Republic of Indonesia). Civil servants were aware that the SBKRI was important to Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent. This gave rise to corruption.
32. This number is an estimate. In general, it has been said that more than 100,000 people left Indonesia because of PP 10/1959.
33. Somers-Heidhues, 1964: 24–29; Mackie, 1976: 82–96.
34. Coppel, 1983: 31–34.
35. Willmott, 1961: 34–42; Coppel, 1983: 36; Suryadinata, 1978: 13–14.
36. Alexander Nadesan, in Asian Profile 8(1), 25–44. Speech Chou En-Lai of on 23 September 1954, before the National People's Congress.
37. The treaty was ratified by the People's Congress in China on 30 April 1957, and in Indonesia in April 1958.
38. For the use of the term 'exclusive' (in 'exclusive group, exclusive organization, exclusivity') see Coppel, 1983: 16–18.
39. Coppel, 1983: 35, 43–44.
40. Liem, M.H.T. and I.L. Taga-Tan, Wacana, 2017/I: 65; see also Biographical Sketches.
41. Coppel, 1983: 48.
42. Coppel, 1983: 36–37.
43. Coppel, 1983: 47; Lev, 2011.
44. Ricklefs, 1993: 268.
45. Coppel, 1983: 44.
46. Coppel, 1983: 82.
47. Coppel, 1983: 55. Among the ten signatories were prominent Catholic politicians, including the director of the *Keng Po* newspaper and the chief editor of *Star Weekly*. The latter had been a member of Baperki, but he had left the organization at an early stage.
48. Coppel, 1983: 45–46.
49. Coppel, 1983: 46, 43–51.
50. Coppel, 1983: 97–110.
51. See Biographical Sketches.
52. Coppel, 1983: 47–48.
53. Coppel, 1983: 56, 62, 75.
54. Sukarno only signed the document, on 11 March 1966, authorizing Lieutenant General Suharto to do whatever the latter deemed necessary in order to restore order in the country.
55. Coppel, 1983: 56–63.
56. Coppel, 1983: 69–72.
57. Keputusan Presiden Kabinet No. 127/Kep/12/1966.
58. Coppel, 1983: 97, 110.
59. Coppel, 1983: 99–106, 111–112, 119–123.
60. Coppel, 1983: 75–82, 143–144.

VIII Students in the Netherlands and Other Newcomers

1. Renamed Technical College since 1905.
2. Tjiook-Liem, 2017: 6–7; Van Galen, 1989: 39 note 82, refers to Poeze.
3. Van Galen, 1989: 39–40.
4. Lie Kong Ing, last CHH chairman, in *Een Foto Vertelt* (A Photo Tells a Story), 2019: 178–179.
5. Van Galen, 1989: 195; *Een Foto Vertelt* (A Photo Tells a Story), 2019: 102–103.
6. Van Galen, 1989: 40.
7. Tjiook-Liem, 2017: 6–7; Van Galen, 1989: 39, note 82.
8. After returning to Indonesia, Tan Ling Djie remained politically active. He later became a member of the Communist Party PKI.
9. Stutje, 2015: 524–534; Van Galen, 1989: 186–188.
10. Delpher, 9 July 1940.
11. Poeze, 1986: 297.
12. Van Galen, 1989: 191.
13. Poeze, 1986; Yap Kioe Bing, 2011.
14. Yap Kioe Bing, 2022.
15. Van Galen, 1989: 224–225.
16. The Indonesische Studeerenden Roekoen Peladjar Indonesia Roepi (Indonesian Students Association) was founded in Leiden in February 1936 as an apolitical and social organization, and in response to the one-sided course of the Perhimpunan Indonesia PI. In a short time, Roepi grew into a general Indonesian student association of which almost all Indonesian students in the Netherlands were members. Even many PI members became members of Roepi based on a united political stance. Although Roepi declared that it was not political, support for Indonesian nationalism was a given within the association. Van Galen, 1989: 140.
17. Van Galen, 1989: 68–71.
18. Van Galen, 1989: 88.
19. Van Galen, 1989: 38–40.
20. Van Galen, 1989: 39–70, 223–225.
21. Ong Eng Die, chairman of the CHH student organization, became Indonesia's finance minister between 1953 and 1955. Tan Ling Djie joined the Communist Party.
22. Meijer, 2006: 115–116.
23. Meijer, 2006: 112–113, 116–118, 131.
24. Names are known to the author. See also Blussé, 2000: *Retour Amoy*, interviews Rijkschroeff et al. 2010, *Een Foto Vertelt* (A Photo Tells a Story), 2019, CIHC Oral History Archives.
25. Swanny Thee in *Een Foto Vertelt* (A Photo Tells a Story), 2019: 78–79.

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

Chinese Indonesian Heritage Center

THE CHINESE FROM INDONESIA

The History of a Minority

The Chinese played a vital part in the Dutch colonial economy, and their economic role has remained important throughout the centuries. Starting in the early 1900s, China also influenced their socio-political life. After the Chinese in the Dutch East Indies managed to shed most discriminatory regulations in the first decades of the twentieth century, they again had to strive for their rights in the new Republic of Indonesia. This proved to be a difficult process filled with tension surrounding the issues of culture, ethnicity and nationality. In this book, Patricia Tjiook-Liem puts Chinese Indonesians at the centre of Dutch colonial and Indonesian history, and takes you through the most important periods in this often underexposed history.



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